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Preface 
 
“Take nothing but pictures, 
Leave nothing but footprints, 
Keep nothing but memories.” 
The quotation above is used by Philippine civil society groups as a slogan to combat “biopiracy”. The re-
search team of the German Development Institute (GDI), which carried out the present study, was confronted 
with quite a few conflicting views on questions related to the slogan: Who owns genetic resources? Who 
should benefit from their use? What conditions should users of genetic resources have to meet if they are to 
take such resources out of the country? What should the government do to protect the interests of local and 
indigenous communities? How might international agreements governing biodiversity best be formulated? 
Following seven months of intensive work, including a field study in the Philippines from mid-February to 
the end of April 2002, the research team came up with the present study. We have to admit that we took 
more than pictures: in 75 interviews, Philippine stakeholders shared their knowledge with us which we used 
to write the report. We do not know whether we left more than footprints: at least we tried to give our part-
ners in the Philippines a feedback when we presented and discussed the study’s results in Manila. And we 
are sure that we will keep a lot of memories of this research undertaking in a very hospitable country. 
We would like to thank all our interview partners in Germany and the Philippines for their willingness to 
contribute to the study. We are grateful to the GTZ – particularly to Andreas Drews – for supporting the 
project through a lot of advice. We learned from the start that in the Philippines nicknames are more impor-
tant than the original ideas of parents. Therefore, we thank Tina of the Palawan NGO Network Inc. (PNNI) 
as well as Paul, Rachel and Jojo of SEARICE/Bohol for organizing our studies “on the ground” in Palawan 
and Bohol. Josie and Teng from the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau (PAWB) supported us by provid-
ing unbureaucratic help with a variety of official documents. Special thanks go to our collaborator in the 
Philippines, the South East Asia Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment (SEARICE). We thank 
Angie, Julius, Agnes and – particularly – Lorie for their logistic and organizational support. Ping, Neth and 
Loret shared with us their profound knowledge of Philippine reality and the international regulation of ge-
netic resources. They forced us to take into account the viewpoints of the South, particularly of small farmers 
and local communities, and to forget our “obsession” with monetary benefits. Thanks to these fruitful discus-
sions, the present study is the result of an intense North-South collaboration. However, the authors alone are 
responsible for all the contents and shortcomings of the study. 
 
Bonn, August 2002 
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Executive Summary 
People have long relied on the diversity of bio-
logical resources. Animals and food crops like 
rice or corn serve as the nutritional basis for 
humankind; an estimated 75 % of the world’s 
population relies on traditional, largely plant-
based treatment for its primary health care. For 
the development of modern drugs, the pharmaceu-
tical industry extensively uses compounds derived 
from biological diversity. All these applications 
imply management of genetic resources. So why 
is there a renewed public interest in the discussion 
on governing biodiversity in developing coun-
tries? 
Technological developments and changed legal 
frameworks can go some way towards explaining 
this phenomenon. With the advent of modern 
biotechnology, the genetic diversity of plants and 
animals has become more valuable for commer-
cial purposes. Consequently, access to genes is of 
strategic importance. While genetic resources are 
mainly located in countries of the South, the 
financial, human and technological resources 
needed to convert them into products are pre-
dominantly based in the North. During the “Earth 
Summit” in 1992, more than 150 countries agreed 
on a new international legal framework to govern 
biodiversity: the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). The CBD departs from the 
former notion of biodiversity as a “common 
heritage of mankind” and assigns nation states 
sovereign rights over their genetic resources. 
Countries can now regulate access in bilateral 
treaties with interested users of genetic material. 
The hope is that the new concept will lead to an 
appreciation of biodiversity and facilitate a “grand 
bargain”, with genetic resources from the South 
being traded for money, technology and know-
ledge from the North. The bargain, it was hoped, 
would provide incentives to conserve biodiversity, 
to use it sustainably, and to ensure a fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits. 
Besides the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
another international convention is important for 
the global governance of biodiversity: the Inter-
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
(ITPGR). In November 2001, the member states 
of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) decided to vote for an alter-
native benefit-sharing arrangement for plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture. Due to 
the differences between these basically man-made 
resources and the “wild” resources covered by the 
CBD, and with a view to improving food security 
for humankind, the parties agreed on a system of 
multilateral benefit-sharing combined with free 
access for 35 of the world’s most important food 
crops. The International Treaty will establish a 
multilateral trust fund to share the benefits of 
modern plant breeding. 
Thus there are two alternative concepts for Access 
and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) currently envisaged 
by the global governance of genetic resources: 
bilateral ABS for biodiversity and multilateral 
ABS for agrobiodiversity. But how are these 
concepts being translated into the reality of devel-
oping countries? The present study explores both 
approaches, focusing on the case of the Philip-
pines. The results show that there is a large gap 
between high-sounding concepts at the global 
level and the reality of their national implementa-
tion. Conflicts between different political inter-
ests, bureaucratic deficiencies, and a lack of 
human and financial resources are responsible for 
this gap. Moreover, industrialized countries have 
been overly hesitant to force stakeholders in the 
North interested in gaining access to genetic 
resources (business and science) to play according 
to the global rules, thus leaving developing coun-
tries alone with the task of implementing and 
monitoring these rules. 
The Philippines is a good case to study the prob-
lems and achievements of implementing ABS. For 
bilateral ABS, the Philippines is the first country 
world-wide to convert the CBD into national law 
and action. However, as yet very few of these 
regulations have given rise to visible benefits. 
Most stakeholders in the country are disillusioned 
and are discussing reform options. Nevertheless, 
the study shows that at the same time implementa-
tion has entailed positive development-related 
effects that go beyond the simple concept of 
exchanging resources for money. For multilateral 
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ABS, the Philippines has played an active part in 
the international negotiations. However, know-
ledge about the treaty is very limited in the coun-
try, and stakeholders have only recently begun to 
consider possible consequences of the ITPGR and 
options to benefit from it. The main beneficiaries 
of the treaty should be farmers. Nevertheless, 
many stakeholders doubt that the International 
Treaty will have the power to actually influence 
policy in any meaningful way. The recent debate 
over the plant variety protection Act is taken as an 
example to show that the question of whether or 
not the pro-farmer provisions of the ITPGR are in 
fact implemented is indeed a question of political 
will.  
Ten years after the “Earth Summit” in Rio pro-
vided a big push for the global governance of 
natural resources, it is important to move from 
policy formulation to national implementation. 
Access and benefit-sharing have played an impor-
tant part in the international discussions, since this 
is a topical case for the combination of environ-
mental and development-related goals (“sustain-
able development”). The present study serves 
different ends: it presents a detailed picture of the 
experience the Philippines has made in imple-
menting ABS and highlights the bottlenecks that 
the country has encountered. Moreover, the study 
shows that, aside from the political will in the 
countries concerned, support of the international 
community is necessary to make global govern-
ance work. 
Global Governance of Genetic Resources 
The term biodiversity refers to the diversity of 
ecosystems, species, and genes. Access to and use 
of biodiversity is shaped by the current interna-
tional legal framework. The Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity and the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources share similar objectives 
but use different mechanisms to regulate access to 
genetic resources. Both aim at the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from its use. Moreover, both 
introduce access and benefit-sharing as a concept 
that frames the exchange of genetic resources 
between providers and users and regulates the 
sharing of benefits arising from their commercial 
use. But while the CBD opts for a bilateral sys-
tem, the ITPGR provides for a multilateral one. 
Under the bilateral approach, two parties ex-
change genetic resources for a share of the bene-
fits arising from their use and agree bilaterally on 
the terms of exchange. The CBD encompasses all 
genetic resources apart from the 35 food crops 
that now fall under the ITPGR. Its focus lies on 
“wild” resources which are not deliberately im-
proved by humans. The Convention gives member 
states the right to define the conditions for access 
to genetic resources, while at the same time gov-
ernments are required to facilitate access to these 
resources. The Convention encourages national 
governments to establish measures aimed at 
sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of 
research and development and the benefits arising 
from commercial and other utilizations of genetic 
resources.  
Negotiations on access and benefit-sharing have 
to be based on mutually agreed terms, resembling 
the idea of a bilateral treaty between equal part-
ners. In order to achieve this aim, the prior in-
formed consent (PIC) of the providing party is 
required before any deal may be concluded. The 
Convention explicitly acknowledges the contribu-
tions of local and indigenous communities in the 
conservation of biodiversity. Hence member states 
are encouraged to include such communities in 
benefit-sharing provisions as well as in the PIC 
negotiations themselves. 
Under the multilateral approach, access to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(PGRFA) is granted freely, without tracking the 
individual accession. The ITPGR thus exempts 
PGRFA, which are basically man-made, from the 
regulatory scope of the CBD. A separate system 
has been conceived on account of the different 
characteristics of PGRFA, which have been freely 
exchanged over the last centuries. Hence the 
Treaty places priority on open access to PGRFA 
to keep access costs low for all interested parties. 
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In this way, the ITPGR seeks to foster further 
breeding and to contribute to global food security. 
When benefits materialize from the commerciali-
zation of the resources, a predetermined share of 
the benefits is to be redistributed through a global 
trust fund. Commercial users of PGRFA who 
protect their product by means of intellectual 
property rights that restrict further research and 
breeding (e.g. a patent) have to pay a mandatory 
share into the trust fund. These financial means 
will then be allocated to conservation projects and 
programs. At the same time, the ITPGR streng-
thens the position of farmers vis-à-vis govern-
ments and breeders by codifying Farmers’ Rights 
for the first time in an international treaty. Farm-
ers’ Rights include (1) the right to exchange, re-
use and sell seeds, (2) the right to participate in 
policy issues surrounding PGRFA at the national 
level, (3) the protection of traditional knowledge, 
and (4) the right to share the benefits arising from 
PGRFA use. 
Bilateral ABS in the Philippines 
The Philippines is considered a pioneering coun-
try in the national regulation of biodiversity 
prospecting (shortly: bioprospecting). Philippine 
scientists had pushed forward the idea of bio-
prospecting legislation as a means of ending the 
alleged “exploitation” of the country’s genetic 
wealth by foreigners. In 1996, legislation was 
complete, and stakeholders started out implement-
ing it with great enthusiasm. At the same time, 
international bioprospectors sternly criticized the 
Philippine legislation as overambitious. The pre-
sent study shows that there is indeed room for 
facilitating access to genetic resources in the 
Philippines by improving implementation of the 
ABS legislation already in place. However, it is 
clear that one obstacle to realizing the “grand 
bargain” of the CBC is a lack of interest on the 
part of bioprospectors in fostering the Conven-
tion’s aims. The Philippines is therefore caught in 
a dilemma: if the country retains its comparatively 
strict bioprospecting legislation, users will go to 
other countries where no regulations are in place. 
If it lowers its standards, it will run the risk of 
foregoing its benefit options. 
Presidential Executive Order 247 (EO 247) of 
1995 and Department Administrative Order 
96-20 (DAO 96-20) of 1996 establish the legal 
framework for bioprospecting and regulate access 
to biological resources in the Philippines. Three 
basic elements of the regulations are important in 
the present context: a scheme of mandatory re-
search agreements, the establishment of an appli-
cation procedure including a multistakeholder 
body, and the requirement to seek prior informed 
consent from local communities. Mandatory 
research agreements are concluded between 
collectors and the government of the Philippines. 
The agreements set out detailed conditions for 
access and minimum terms on the provision of 
information, samples, technological cooperation 
and the benefits to be shared. There are two types 
of research agreement: academic research agree-
ments are entered into with academic institutions 
for the purpose of research only, while commer-
cial research agreements are concluded with 
private parties, corporations or foreign entities. 
As outlined in the regulations, the application 
procedure involves a number of different steps. 
First, the applicant has to submit a research pro-
posal to the newly created Inter-Agency Commit-
tee for Biological and Genetic Resources 
(IACBGR). This multistakeholder body has been 
set up to coordinate the processing of applications 
for bioprospection, to ensure transparency and to 
enable the participation of all stakeholders in 
reaching mutually agreed terms. After an initial 
screening, the applicant is required to submit a 
PIC certificate (see next paragraph). If the 
IACBGR recommends approval, the application is 
submitted finally to the responsible secretary for 
signing. 
Prior Informed Consent from Local and In-
digenous Communities plays a key role in the 
application process for ABS agreements in the 
Philippines. Before any kind of bioprospecting 
can begin, the applicant must obtain the consent 
by fully disclosing to the local community the 
intent and scope of the planned activities. The PIC 
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procedure includes two elements: the collector is 
required to notify and inform the public about his 
planned activities (public notification). A sector 
consultation is then held to discuss the activity at 
the community level. In the affirmative case, the 
applicant receives a PIC certificate from the local 
official authority after a period of 60 days has 
elapsed. 
As of April 2002, 15 commercial and 20 academic 
research agreements had been applied for. The 
IACBGR requested a research agreement for 19 
applications. Only six have been approved by the 
IACBGR. It has taken between one and a half and 
four years for the applications to successfully run 
through the overall process required by EO 247. 
Four applications have been withdrawn. It is un-
clear whether the remaining applications are still 
pending, since proponents have not responded to 
requests for further documents, in some cases for 
years. 
The small number of agreements and the lengthy 
access determination process are reasons for 
concern. The present study analyzes three points 
in more detail that could be instrumental in in-
creasing the number of research agreements and 
enlarging development-related impacts for the 
Philippines: streamlining the application proce-
dure, making prior informed consent of local and 
indigenous communities work, and ensuring a fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits. There are some 
points in which reforms could improve the present 
situation. The proposals aim at maintaining the 
spirit of the ABS legislation while making it 
easier for bioprospectors to follow the rules. 
Streamlining the Application Procedure 
The application procedure aims at ensuring a high 
level of transparency and participation. At the 
same time, though, it increases entry barriers for 
potential applicants. Our interviews revealed that 
on the one hand most stakeholders in the country 
still think that the regulations are good in princi-
ple. On the other hand, most of them agree that 
they are not working well, that the application 
process takes too much time and is too compli-
cated. 
A closer look at the reasons behind the problems 
in implementing EO 247 shows that there are 
bottlenecks at all stages of the application proce-
dure. It can hardly be claimed that the require-
ments as such are too onerous for international 
and national bioprospectors. Nevertheless, the 
Philippines should make it as easy as possible for 
applicants to comply with the regulations, without 
abandoning the objectives of EO 247. To achieve 
this, the following measures should be considered: 
first, it would be important to use innovative 
instruments to raise the level of information 
among possible applicants. Second, a focal point 
should be established to decrease transaction costs 
for applicants. Third, institutional reforms should 
be used to facilitate decision-making and speed up 
the application process. The best option would be 
to create an independent public agency with 
decision power that is advised by a multistake-
holder body. Fourth, the agencies involved must 
be furnished with the funds they need to effi-
ciently perform their tasks. 
Making Prior Informed Consent Work 
Involvement of local and/or indigenous communi-
ties in decision-making concerning access to 
genetic resources can be seen as supporting two 
major development objectives: participation and 
empowerment. The PIC process is regarded by 
some stakeholders, mainly NGOs, as the main 
instrument suited to reaching these goals, but the 
present study found few indications of any ade-
quate participation and empowerment of commu-
nity members. On the other hand, scientists in 
particular mention the transaction costs involved 
in obtaining PIC as an additional obstacle in the 
way of their research on genetic resources. In 
particular, bioprospectors from the North criticize 
the Philippine PIC provisions as being too com-
plicated to follow. Philippine legislation should 
therefore seek to strike a balance between facili-
tating PIC for researchers and fostering participa-
tion and empowerment of communities. 
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The following measures could be used to support 
both objectives simultaneously: First, awareness-
raising on bioprospection and legal advisory 
services could help enable local communities to 
exert their rights. Second, customary practices of 
how to conduct PIC in specific indigenous com-
munities should be documented with an eye to in-
creasing transparency for the applicant. Third, 
applicants should be supported by community 
workers, who could bridge the cultural gap be-
tween researchers and the local population. 
Fourth, appropriate monitoring of PIC consulta-
tions would ensure that all participants act in 
accordance with the rules. 
Ensuring a Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits 
Surprisingly, our interviews revealed that most 
stakeholders in the Philippines have no specific 
expectations on benefits from ABS agreements. 
Although interviewees frequently mentioned 
prevention of “exploitation of the country’s ge-
netic resources by foreigners” as an important 
reason for implementing EO 247, expectations on 
what constitutes fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits do not seem to be clear. 
The ideas that were mentioned cannot be catego-
rized as exaggerated expectations. No applications 
have been refused because of a lack of benefits for 
the government or the community. By experience, 
negotiations for prior informed consent and for 
benefit-sharing are largely kept separate by actors. 
Under the current approach, PIC is given without 
any clear-cut arrangements on the distribution of 
future benefits for the community. The govern-
ment should make sure that the local population’s 
preferences on expected benefits are determined. 
Most benefits realized thus far have accrued to 
Philippine scientists, even though few such bene-
fits result directly from the country’s bioprospect-
ing legislation. As far as future benefits are con-
cerned, the Philippine government has not yet 
elaborated a policy on the distribution of long-
term benefits (royalties), once these have 
materialized. It is still unclear what share is to go 
to local communities and who will decide on 
local communities and who will decide on distri-
bution. This opens the door for corruption and 
capture of benefits by influential groups in the 
capital region. Thus, as a matter of principle, 
benefits should be distributed on the basis of a 
standardized key. Only a small percentage should 
go directly to the community where collection has 
taken place. The majority of royalties should go 
into an independent trust fund for local and in-
digenous communities or for protected areas. A 
third share should be used to finance the institu-
tions responsible for bioprospecting. 
The Philippines could benefit more from the use 
of its biodiversity if it complemented a bio-
prospecting legislation by means of additional 
efforts aimed at transforming genetic resources 
into valuable products. A coherent strategy in-
volving focused and higher spending for research 
and development, targeted government programs, 
joint ventures, and innovative private initiatives 
will be necessary to pro-actively use the country’s 
genetic wealth and keep a larger share of value 
added in the country. 
Prospects for Multilateral ABS in the  
Philippines 
The International Treaty creates new options for 
member states to benefit from a multilateral 
system of access and benefit-sharing. Of course, 
the treaty is too recent to permit any analysis of 
experience, as in the case of bilateral ABS. In-
stead, the present study explores the prospects for 
the implementation of the ITPGR in the Philip-
pines as an example of multilateral benefit-sharing 
for genetic resources. 
Our interviews revealed that most potential stake-
holders are not aware of being stakeholders in the 
ITPGR. Nonetheless, some key stakeholders came 
up with elaborate assessments of how the Philip-
pines could benefit from the International Treaty. 
First, free access to PGRFA is highly valued by 
both the general public and private breeders. 
Second, non-monetary benefits are perceived by 
some stakeholders as an important part of the 
ITPGR, although no clear suggestions were ad-
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vanced on approaches to putting the weak provi-
sions of the Treaty into practice. Third, monetary 
benefits are welcomed, but only a limited number 
of stakeholders already regard themselves as 
potential recipients. Fourth, the promotion of 
Farmers’ Rights through international codification 
has not really been recognized by most stake-
holders. All in all, most stakeholders – in particu-
lar the more critical NGOs – doubt that the word-
ing of the ITPGR will be strong enough to alter 
the existing national constellation of power, which 
ultimately decides upon the implementation of 
laws. Moreover, NGOs expect tendencies in 
national intellectual property rights legislation to 
provide more and more protection of genetic 
resources as the most important restriction to 
access, and criticize the International Treaty for 
remaining silent on this trend. 
A good case for analysis of the extent to which 
provisions of the ITPGR have been placed under 
national jurisdiction is the controversial debate 
over the recently passed plant variety protection 
(PVP) Act. Legislators in the Philippines were 
under heavy pressure from the national and 
international breeding industry to introduce a PVP 
bill. At the same time, NGOs and small farmers’ 
organizations opposed the passage of the bill, 
citing its allegedly detrimental effects on agrobio-
diversity and small farmers. The final Act shows 
some signs of a political compromise between the 
different stakeholders but maintains its focus on 
plant variety protection rather than on an encom-
passing law for PVP, Farmers’ Rights and the 
conservation of agrobiodiversity. While some 
parts of the Act support elements of the ITPGR, 
others have not been implemented in the spirit of 
the ITPGR. 
Farmers’ Rights have been guaranteed to the 
extent that the Farmers’ Right to exchange, re-use 
and sell to small farmers is in accordance with the 
ITPGR. Moreover, a Community Gene Trust 
Fund has been established that aims at the protec-
tion of traditional knowledge as well as benefit-
sharing. However, it remains to be seen whether 
the newly created PVP board will actually imple-
ment these rights or in fact restrict them. As 
regards the ITPGR’s conservation objective, the 
net effect is not yet clear: on the one hand, PVP 
will increase the use of uniform commercial 
varieties, thus reducing agrobiodiversity. On the 
other hand, the Community Gene Trust Fund is to 
be used to support measures geared to conserving 
PGRFA. Finally, the Act requires the prior in-
formed consent of communities before any re-
sources may be accessed, a provision which is 
clearly in conflict with the ITPGR. PIC for access 
to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
hinders the “easy and expeditious access” called 
for in the ITPGR. 
Reflections and Recommendations 
The findings of the study presented in Chapters 
four and five focus on the reality of bilateral 
access and the potential for multilateral access and 
benefit-sharing in the Philippines, on obtained 
achievements, identified constraints, as well as on 
policy options suitable to overcoming them. The 
following synthesis derives from the findings: 
first, a confrontation of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of bilateral and multilateral ABS, 
second, lessons learned from the Philippine ex-
perience for the international debate on ABS, 
especially in the context of the CBD. 
It would be premature to compare the bilateral 
with the multilateral approach. While some 
experience has already been made with bilateral 
ABS, the multilateral approach is still in the 
conceptual stage. Moreover, the two approaches 
do not constitute alternative options for policy-
makers in developing countries. Biodiversity falls 
under bilateral ABS, whereas agrobiodiversity is 
to be accessed and shared under a multilateral 
system. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of 
view it makes sense to use the findings of the 
present study to analyze comparative strengths 
and weaknesses of both approaches and the condi-
tions needed for them to live up to expectations. 
The analysis reveals that the – by comparison – 
less regulatory nature of the multilateral approach 
leads to relatively lower costs for the implement-
ing country and lower transaction costs for users 
of genetic resources. While the bilateral approach 
creates restrictions before research starts, the 
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multilateral approach steps only in after successful 
research has been completed, when intellectual 
property rights are acquired for the results. The 
multilateral approach therefore places few re-
straints on research and innovation, while the 
bilateral approach entails adverse effects. Both 
approaches have the potential to contribute to 
local empowerment and development. Neverthe-
less, it is obvious that the intended positive out-
comes can only be reached if additional educa-
tional measures accompany activities related to 
ABS. 
Since the CBD was adopted, the international 
community has been seeking to refine the inter-
pretation of its provisions and the means for its 
implementation. One central document intended 
to help governments to implement the CBD in 
national ABS legislation is the Bonn Guidelines 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing, adopted in April 
2002 at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the 
CBD in The Hague. Lessons learned from the 
Philippine experience cast light on several points 
of the guidelines: a visible focal point and compe-
tent national authorities are imperative for any 
efficient ABS legislation. Stakeholder participa-
tion is important but requires a stringent institu-
tional setup, extra funding and capacity-building 
if it is to work smoothly. Clear-cut government 
policies governing PIC and the distribution of 
possible benefits are needed. 
Recommendations for International  
Cooperation 
The present study is about the attempt of a devel-
oping country to implement international conven-
tions with a view to benefiting from the use of its 
genetic resources. The international community 
has an interest in supporting developing countries 
in the implementation of global rules. Humankind 
as a whole will benefit if the exchange of the 
wealth of genetic resources leads to new medi-
cines or plant varieties. But industrialized coun-
tries cannot leave developing countries alone with 
the task of paying for the conservation of re-
sources that are valuable to the world as a whole. 
Biological diversity and agrobiodiversity are 
typical global public goods whose conservation 
and sustainable use require global governance. 
First of all, this means developing global policies, 
as has been done with the adoption of the CBD 
and the ITPGR. In a second step, it is necessary to 
move from policy definition to policy implemen-
tation. We have pointed out that the implementa-
tion of globally defined policies continues to be 
deficient and in need of reform. The international 
community can contribute on three different levels 
to the reforms needed to make global governance 
work. It would not cost much in terms of public-
sector spending to trigger potentially high future 
benefits. 
German bilateral development cooperation 
should contribute to the implementation of CBD 
and ITPGR by providing technical assistance for 
capacity-building as well as by facilitating public-
private partnership projects that serve as show-
cases demonstrating how bioprospectors can 
follow the rules, and seek, by fostering scientific 
cooperation, to induce transfers of know-how and 
technology. International Organizations can 
contribute to the implementation of the CBD and 
the ITPGR by facilitating communication among 
implementing countries through conferences and 
regional initiatives and by setting a deadline for 
the implementation of ABS regulations in accor-
dance with the Bonn Guidelines. Both bi- and 
multilateral initiatives should aim at fostering 
collective learning processes necessary to under-
stand the dynamics of global governance. 
User countries should undertake efforts to adapt 
procedures and regulations related to access and 
benefit-sharing in a way supportive to the imple-
mentation of the CBD. Patent law should establish 
a requirement for patent applicants to document 
source materials and prove compliance with 
source country laws, and especially with ABS 
legislation. Funding agencies should induce re-
searchers from developed countries to include 
ABS-related activities such as PIC in their re-
search applications and guarantee separate fund-
ing for these activities. Moreover, funding institu-
tions should foster technology transfer to develo-
ping-country institutions by requiring researchers 
from the North to provide as much capacity-
VIII Klaus Liebig et al. 
building and knowledge-sharing as possible. 
Environment ministries should promote aware-
ness-raising campaigns in developed countries 
among potential users of genetic material, both 
academic and private, concerning their roles and 
responsibilities when they access genetic material 
in foreign countries. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Objective and Background of the 
Study 
The issue of biological diversity and its “value” 
first came to the public attention a number of 
years ago. There are people who speculate about 
the billions of dollars that developing countries 
may earn by selling the great variety of genetic 
resources situated in their territories. Skeptics, on 
the other hand, argue that the options for turning 
genetic resources into financial flows are rather 
limited. These divergent positions underline the 
fact that biodiversity cannot and should not be 
assessed in solely economic terms but should 
instead be approached holistically. As opposed to 
attempts to assign a specific value to biodiversity, 
there is consensus on another point: that biologi-
cal diversity is of great use to humankind: 
“Biological diversity provides the goods 
and services that make life on earth pos-
sible and satisfy the needs of human so-
cieties. The variability it represents con-
stitutes a global life insurance policy.”1 
People have long relied on the diversity of bio-
logical resources. Animals and food crops like 
rice or corn serve as the nutritional basis for 
humankind; an estimated 75 % of the world’s 
population relies upon traditional, largely plant-
based treatment for its primary health care.2 The 
pharmaceutical industry extensively uses com-
pounds derived from biological diversity in the 
development of modern drugs. These applications 
all imply the management of genetic resources. So 
why is it that there is renewed public interest in 
the discussion on biodiversity in developing 
countries? 
Technological developments and changed legal 
frameworks can largely explain this phenomenon. 
With the advent of modern biotechnology, the 
genetic diversity of plants and animals can be 
                                                 
1 CBD (2001), p. 9. 
2 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 1. 
used more systematically as a storehouse for 
developing a wide range of products. Improved 
crops or new perfumes can nowadays be based on 
ever more sophisticated technologies and scien-
tific monitoring. Pharmaceuticals, botanical medi-
cines, food crops, horticulture, crop protection 
products and cosmetics are the most important 
industries that use genetic resources as an input in 
the development of their end products. Biotech-
nology is regarded as one of the core technologies 
of the 21st century, and, consequently, access to 
genes is of strategic importance. 
However, genetic material is only one input factor 
necessary to develop these products and create 
market value. It has to be combined with high-
skill human resources, modern technology and the 
financial resources needed for risky research and 
development (R&D) efforts. These inputs are 
distributed asymmetrically around the world. 
While genetic resources are mainly harbored in 
countries of the South, financial, human and 
technological resources are predominantly based 
in the North. At the same time, their development 
is proceeding in opposite directions. Biological 
diversity is being depleted at an ever faster pace, 
endangering species and microorganisms, while 
the stock of technological know-how is growing. 
Given this situation and trend, more than 150 
countries have agreed on a new international legal 
framework: the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD), which came into effect after the 
“Earth Summit” in 1992, gave nation states sover-
eign rights over their genetic resources. Nation 
states can now regulate access in bilateral treaties 
with interested users of genetic material. The 
agreement thus departed from the former notion 
of biodiversity as a “common heritage of man-
kind.” The hope is that the new concept will lead 
to an appreciation of biodiversity and facilitate a 
“grand bargain”, with genetic resources from the 
South being traded for money, technology and 
knowledge from the North. The bargain, it was 
hoped, would provide incentives to conserve 
biodiversity, to use it sustainably, and to ensure a 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits, thus creat-
ing a win-win-win situation. 
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A result of this kind is not easy to achieve, since it 
requires differing interests and positions to be 
reconciled. Companies in the North (the “users”) 
have to be willing to follow the new rules and to 
share benefits. This is, at first glance, at logger-
heads with their commercial interests. Moreover, 
if companies have to grant access to their technol-
ogy and know-how, this will frequently touch 
upon their intellectual property rights, a sensitive 
issue for knowledge-intensive branches like the 
biotechnology industry. Within developing coun-
tries (the “providers”), distributional conflicts may 
arise between stakeholders. Besides, stakeholders 
differ in the rights they hold to grant access to 
resources. While the nation state has the sovereign 
right to regulate access, private property concerns 
have to be dealt with separately. Local and in-
digenous communities, whose traditional rights 
are explicitly mentioned in the CBD, are to have a 
say in the process which leads to an access agree-
ment. In such situations, access and the resulting 
benefit-sharing are relatively complicated, and 
numerous problems have to be overcome to reach 
an agreement between all the parties involved. 
Ten years after the Rio Summit many expecta-
tions have been disappointed. The “grand bar-
gain” has not materialized. The literature provides 
ample explanations for this outcome. However, 
few in-depth empirical case studies focus on 
developing countries.3 We attempt to narrow this 
gap by analyzing the experiences of the Philip-
pines. The Philippines was the first country to 
implement the Convention into national law and 
still figures as one of the most prominent exam-
ples in the literature. At the same time, it is a 
typical case for the above-mentioned disappoint-
ment since few access contracts have been con-
cluded and hardly any benefits (in a narrow sense) 
have been generated. This study explores the 
reasons for this result and offers proposals to 
improve the present situation. 
                                                 
3 The third Conference of the Parties of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity invited stakeholders to submit case 
studies, which can be found under www.biodiv.org/ pro-
grammes/socio-eco/benefit/case-studies.asp. 
Beside the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
another international convention is important for 
the global governance of biodiversity: the Inter-
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
(ITPGR). In November 2001, the member states 
of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) decided in favor of an alter-
native benefit-sharing arrangement for plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture. Due to 
the different nature of these basically man-made 
resources as compared with the “wild” resources 
covered by the CBD, and in order to improve food 
security for humankind, a system of multilateral 
benefit-sharing, combined with free access for 35 
of the world’s most important food crops, was 
agreed upon. The International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources will establish a multilateral 
trust fund to share the benefits of modern plant 
breeding. Beneficiaries of this fund are to be 
mainly farmers who have conserved the great 
genetic variety of landraces that are an indispen-
sable (intellectual and tangible) input for modern 
plant varieties. The ITPGR recognizes these past 
(and ongoing) efforts and is for the first time 
codifying so-called Farmers’ Rights, which also 
have to be implemented in national law. Farmers’ 
Rights can be interpreted as a – weak – counter-
balance to the intellectual property rights con-
ferred on commercial plant breeders (plant variety 
protection or patents). 
The Philippines has participated actively in the 
international negotiations. The present study 
explores stakeholders’ opinions regarding the 
multilateral approach and discusses options avail-
able to implement the Treaty’s provisions. The 
debate over the Plant Variety Protection (PVP) 
Act highlights the links between national agricul-
tural policies and the international commitments 
stemming from the ITPGR. It is taken as an 
example of how different objectives might be 
harmonized. 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
The present study was prepared by a multidisci-
plinary team of the German Development Institute 
from November 2001 to May 2002. In a prepara-
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tory phase from November 2001 to February 
2002, the team reviewed literature on bilateral and 
multilateral access and benefit-sharing and formu-
lated research questions and hypotheses. Data was 
collected during field research in different places 
in the Philippines from February to April 2002; 
these efforts included interviews with various 
stakeholders, from indigenous and local com-
munities to government officials. In the final, 
analytical phase, from April to May 2002, the data 
collected was analyzed and the present report 
compiled. 
The preparatory phase in Germany drew on analy-
sis of the literature on bi- and multilateral access 
and benefit-sharing (ABS) to lay a theoretical 
foundation and clarify the international political 
and legal framework of the subject. Additionally, 
a small number of interviews were conducted with 
users of genetic resources and experts to gather 
background information. The visit of the Philip-
pine collaborator in January helped to identify 
issues relevant to the Philippines and, subse-
quently, to move on to the formulation of four 
research-guiding questions: 
1) What are the endogenous reasons for the 
relatively small number of bilateral ABS 
agreements signed thus far? 
2) How are the development-related aspects of 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing, stakeholder 
participation and empowerment achieved by 
the Philippines’ bilateral ABS legislation? 
3) What are the options for different stake-
holders in the Philippines to benefit from the 
ITPGR? 
4) How can a PVP Act promote the objectives of 
the ITPGR? 
The data collection phase in the Philippines com-
prised eight weeks, during which a total of around 
75 interviews were conducted (see Table 1). 
Initially, interviewees were identified with the 
support of the Philippine collaborator, whose 
good knowledge of the stakeholders provided a 
broad basis to start out from. During the inter-
views, additional interview partners were identi-
fied by snowball sampling. A questionnaire opera-
tionalizing the research questions was used as a 
guideline for semi-structured interviews with 
experts from government institutions, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and the scientific 
community. To avoid a metropolitan bias, three 
regions (Bohol, Palawan, Nueva Ecija) were 
visited to interview local government officials and 
non-governmental actors. In two of the regions, 
group interviews were conducted at the local level 
with farmers and members of an indigenous 
community. A workshop on the ITPGR, held in 
collaboration with the collaborator, turned out to 
be of great value in collecting new data on stake-
holder opinions and, at the same time, triangulat-
ing the existing data. 
The analytical phase began during the team’s stay 
in the Philippines, preparing a final presentation 
of the study’s results for an audience including 
many interview partners and other stakeholders in 
Manila. Data analysis at this point was geared to 
generating policy recommendations for the reform 
of bilateral ABS and optimizing the chances to 
benefit from the ITPGR at the national level. The 
presentation as such was embedded in an all-day 
workshop with two working groups on bilateral 
and on multilateral ABS; this presented a good 
Table 1: Interviews Conducted 
Type of Interview 
Partners 
on bilat-
eral ABS / 
biodiver-
sity 
on multi-
lateral 
ABS / 
agrobiodi-
versity 
National Government 5 5 
Local Government 6 2 
Parastatal Institutions 4 2 
Indigenous Communities 4 - 
Farmers - 5 
NGOs and POs 11 3 
Scientific Institutions 14 8 
Industry 5 1 
Total 49 26 
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framework for in-depth discussion and validation 
of the study’s findings. 
After returning to Germany, further analytical 
steps were undertaken to go beyond the Philippine 
context and to address three questions concerned 
with international policy: 
1) What are the comparative advantages of the 
bilateral and the multilateral approaches to ac-
cess and benefit-sharing? 
2) What are the lessons learned from the Philip-
pine experience for the international debate on 
access and benefit-sharing? 
3) How can the international community con-
tribute to the implementation of the CBD and 
the ITPGR in source countries of genetic re-
sources, in this way assisting in the realization 
of a successful global governance of biodiver-
sity? 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
The study breaks down into three parts. Part I 
surveys the international debate on the subject. In 
Chapter two, we briefly introduce the global 
governance of biodiversity. Chapter three focuses 
on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing. 
This chapter prepares for the analysis of the 
Philippine example by distinguishing between the 
bilateral and multilateral approaches as well as by 
analyzing the international policy discussion on 
the subject. 
Part II presents the case of the Philippines. Chap-
ter four looks into the Philippine experience with 
the bilateral ABS approach, while Chapter five 
inquires into the intentions to implement the 
provisions of the multilateral approach. 
Part III is directed primarily to the international 
reader and offers reflections on and lessons 
learned from the Philippine case. First, the bilat-
eral and the multilateral approaches are con-
fronted in order to draw some conclusions for a 
conceptual debate about relative merits and short-
comings. Second, the Philippine experience with a 
bilateral ABS approach is compared with recent 
discussions at the international level regarding 
best practices in ABS legislation. Third, proposals 
are offered on possible approaches to shaping 
German and international development policy. 
Ten years after the introduction of ABS at the 
“Earth Summit” in Rio is, we think, the right 
moment to assess what has been achieved and 
what challenges still lie ahead. 
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PART I:  
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE 
2 Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources: The Evolution of Rights 
and Responsibilities 
Biological diversity is vital for humanity in medi-
cine, agriculture and other fields, but it is in 
danger as more and more genetic resources con-
tinue to be depleted. Since a large part of these 
resources are situated in the southern hemisphere, 
but commercialized and used in the North, ques-
tions about ownership and access have arisen. 
Confronted with the ongoing degradation of 
biodiversity and unclear property issues, the 
international community adopted, in 1992, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and, nearly 
ten years later, the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The 
first section of this chapter provides background 
information on biodiversity; Section two discusses 
the governance of genetic resources from a theo-
retical perspective; while Section three presents 
the relevant international treaties. 
2.1 Biodiversity: Status and Commercial 
Use  
The definition of biodiversity, or biological diver-
sity (see Box 1), is political rather than purely 
biological in character. The term was coined in 
1986 by the biologist Edward O. Wilson to draw 
attention to the continuing loss of ecosystems, 
species, and genes. Earlier attempts to mobilize 
forces were geared to specific species or geo-
graphical regions. Only a coherent strategy, it is 
now thought, encompassing the broadest possible 
definition of biodiversity, has any chance to 
actually come to grips with the observed problem 
of degradation. 
It is difficult to measure biodiversity and, conse-
quently, the magnitude of its loss.4 Most efforts 
concentrate on species diversity, this factor being 
the easiest one to measure. In 1995, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) pub-
lished its “Global Biodiversity Assessment” 
report.5 According to its estimates, the total num-
                                                 
4 For a recent effort, see UNEP / CBD (2001). 
5 See UNEP (1995). 
Box 1:  Definition of Biodiversity 
Biodiversity refers to the totality of ecosystems, species, and genes in a specific area. Ecosystem diversity refers to 
the number and distribution of ecosystems in a given geographical area. The World Resources Institute (2001) 
defines ecosystems as “the organisms of a particular habitat, such as a pond or forest, together with the physical 
environment in which they live; a dynamic complex of plant, animal, fungal, and microorganism communities and 
their associated non-living environment interacting as an ecological unit”.a Ecosystems can have different levels of 
aggregation and are defined with respect to specific scientific or policy problems. Therefore, a coral reef, a part of a 
sea or the entire sea can all be examples of an ecosystem. Within a specific ecosystem, a number of speciesb coexist. 
Species diversity refers to the number of different species within a specific geographical region, commonly meas-
ured in terms of the number of species in this region. One example would be the number of plant, animal and micro-
bial species in the Black Forest. Genetic diversity is measured with respect to one or more populations.c It encom-
passes genetic variation within a single population as well as different populations of a species. The greater the 
genetic diversity within a species, the higher its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. The variation of genes 
within a particular tree species in the Black Forest is an example of genetic diversity. Ecosystem, species and genetic 
diversity can be seen as parts of a pyramid with ecosystem diversity at the top: an ecosystem contains several thou-
sands species, and each of these species contains several thousand genes. When an ecosystem collapses, several 
thousand of its species and millions of genes will therefore be destroyed in the process. However, some species have 
key roles for an ecosystem: if one of such species becomes extinct, the function of the entire ecosystem may seri-
ously impaired. 
 
a World Resources Institute (2001). 
b The term species refers to a group of organisms which can interbreed freely. 
c The term population refers to a group of individuals with common ancestry whose members are more likely to mate within the 
group than with members of other groups. 
6 Klaus Liebig et al. 
ber of species lies in the range of 13 to 14 million. 
However, a mere 1.75 million, or 13 percent, have 
been described scientifically to date. 
Even if the concrete magnitude remains unclear, it 
is generally agreed that species are becoming 
extinct at the fastest rate ever.6 For example, a 
number of flowering plants are disappearing at a 
rate of 50 to 100 times the natural rate of extinc-
tion. It is estimated that between 10 and 15 per-
cent of the known species of plants are threat-
ened.7 In both hemispheres ecosystems are erod-
ing.8 Ecosystem diversity is reduced as forests or  
coral reefs disappear, to mention only two exam-
ples. Annually, nearly 1 percent of tropical forests 
face extinction, while dry tropical forests are 
being depleted at an even higher rate.9 Of a total 
of 232,000 square miles of coral reefs, 60 percent 
are threatened and 10 percent are already extinct.10 
While there has always been a natural rate of 
extinction of species, industrialization has accel-
erated this rate to ever-higher levels. The needs 
for food, land, housing and industrial products for 
growing populations and the resulting intensifica-
tion of economic activity have been the main 
causes for the degradation of biological diversity. 
While the increase in production is primarily 
attributed to industrialized countries, developing 
countries contribute in other ways to the degrada-
tion process. One of them is the slash-and-burn 
system in agriculture. Moreover, forest fires, often 
triggered by negligence, extinguish vast areas. 
Additionally, economic activities like mining lead 
to further degradation. Chemical pollution is a 
problem in both developing and industrialized 
countries, while the latter group is responsible for 
the largest share thanks to their longer history of 
industrial production. 
                                                 
6 See World Resources Institute (2001). 
7 See Glowka (1998).  
8 See The Crucible Group II (2000), p. 8. 
9 See UNEP (1995). 
10 See World Resources Institute (2001). 
Biodiversity Distribution and the Use of 
Genetic Resources 
Species and genetic resources may be located 
either in situ (natural environment) or ex situ 
(man-made collections). With an estimated 83 
percent of all material, in situ material can be 
found predominantly in the South (see Figure 1). 
The South’s abundance of in situ material is not 
matched by an equally large share of ex situ 
genetic resources. The latter can be in the form of 
seed banks, zoos, botanical gardens, or microbe, 
bacteria, and fungi collections. Nowadays, indus-
trialized countries harbor roughly three-quarters 
of all ex situ genetic resources. However, it should 
be noted that the richness of ex situ collections in 
the North stems not from cataloguing its own 
resources but rather from past bioprospecting11 in 
the southern hemisphere.12  
In the last quarter of the 20th century, genetic 
resources have come to the center of attention as 
biotechnological innovations made it possible to 
create new products from these resources, espe-
cially in the biotechnological, pharmaceutical, and 
agricultural industries. A large industry survey 
estimates that the current global annual sales of 
                                                 
11 Bioprospecting refers to the search for genetic and 
biochemical resources with potential economic value. 
See Belgian Clearing House Mechanism (2002). 
12 See RAFI (1996). 
 Figure 1:  In Situ / Ex Situ Balance 
Ex Situ In Situ
Source: RAFI (1996) 
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products derived from genetic resources lies in the 
range of US $ 500 bn to US $ 800 bn (see Table 2). 
Some scientists consider 40 percent of global 
economic activity as based on genetic resources or 
processes. Although many products are based on 
or contain elements of genetic resources, other in-
put factors like technology or human capital play 
a more important role. Beside genetic material, 
these are necessary to create the final product. 
With ever more sophisticated technology, R&D 
costs for, say, an anti-cancer drug, account for a 
large part of total development costs. Further-
more, marketing costs have to be added if the drug 
is to be launched successfully in a highly competi-
tive market. Hence the share that genetic material 
contributes to the final product is only a fraction 
of the aforementioned sales figures. Conse-
quently, identifying the real value of the genetic 
material used remains a controversial issue. Nev-
ertheless, the above-mentioned figures at least 
give an impression of the varying significance of 
genetic resources for different industries. The 
most prominent sectors are agriculture and phar-
maceuticals, especially since innovations in bio-
technology have revolutionized the fields of 
applications for genetic resources. However, it 
should be noted that future growth rates may 
differ substantially from sector to sector. As an 
example, botanical medicine is expected to ex-
pand at a rate of 10 – 20 percent annually, while 
the pharmaceutical industry may grow at around 6 
percent per annum.13 In contrast to relatively 
steady industry growth rates, the interest in ge-
netic resources for new product development is of 
a more cyclical nature. 
Role of Intellectual Property Rights Con-
cerning Genetic Resources 
With R&D budgets experiencing constant in-
creases due to ever more expensive state-of-the-
art technologies, the need to protect new products 
from imitation has become an imperative for 
many knowledge-intensive industries. In addition, 
the low reproduction costs for some products, for 
example drugs and seeds, put further pressure on 
producers to seek protection. The industry claims 
that if products are copied, the costs incurred for 
R&D cannot be recouped and less research will be 
done in the future. The damage done will be borne 
by both producers and consumers. Producers will 
see markets and profits shrinking, while consum-
ers will have fewer new products available to 
them. For these reasons, multinational companies 
have vigorously called for effective legal protec-
tion of their intellectual property rights, a demand 
met by the World Trade Organization’ (WTO) 
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
                                                 
13 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 9. 
Table 2: Size of Markets for Products Based on Genetic Resources 
Industrial Sector 
 
Market size - low estimate 
(in bn US$) 
Market size - high estimate 
(in bn US$) 
Pharmaceuticals 75 150 
Botanical medicines 20 40 
Agricultural producea 300+ 450+ 
Horticultural products 16 19 
Crop protection products 0.6 3 
Biotechnologies other than healthcare 
and agriculture 
60 120 
Personal care and cosmetics 2.8 2.8 
Sum 500 800 
a The particularities of the supply chain for agricultural products make precise estimates impossible. While figures are available 
for seeds sold by seed companies to farmers, variables for the transformation of seeds into agricultural products at the farm 
level remain unclear. 
Source: Ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 2. 
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tual Property Rights. On the other hand, many 
developing countries are reluctant to accept intel-
lectual property protection on products containing 
genetic resources from their respective countries. 
They feel expropriated by Northern companies. 
Moreover, most non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are very critical towards intellectual 
property rights on biological resources. Among 
the reasons put forward are ethical concerns and 
the claim that big multinational companies are 
using intellectual property rights to shore up their 
monopolistic power. These opposing views make 
the issue of intellectual property rights one of the 
most controversial in the global governance of 
biodiversity. 
 
 
 
2.2 Economic Background: Valuing 
Genetic Resources and Assigning 
Property Rights 
As has become apparent, genetic resources are 
widely used and obviously have an economic and 
social value. The present section introduces a 
concept of economic valuation of genetic re-
sources and points out some of the difficulties 
involved in such an approach. The section goes on 
to argue that the assignment of property rights is 
important for a sustainable use of genetic re-
sources. However, economics cannot provide a 
clear-cut prescription on how to formulate an 
optimal system of property rights. 
Box 2:  Biological Resources, Genetic Resources and Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
Like the case of biodiversity, the terms biological and genetic resources have only recently become known to a wider 
public. Since resources are defined as any means that are used for the production of goods and services, talk of re-
sources usually indicates that one is looking at a material or a human capability from an economic perspective. Oil, 
coal, gas or certain human skills and knowledge are resources because they are valuable for use in economic activities. 
With the advent of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the economic prospects of the biotechnology industry, it 
has become common to regard species and genes as resources as well. Hence categories once considered as strictly 
biological are today also used as economic categories. In the present study, we use the terms biological resources and 
genetic resources in accordance with the definition found in the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Biological resources ”include genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic compo-
nent of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity” (CBD, Art. 2). This definition is obviously 
relatively broad. All plants, animals and micro-organisms that are used by humans for food production, medicine, 
construction and recreational, aesthetic or religious reasons – to name just the most important ones – are covered by 
this definition. 
Genetic resources ”means genetic material of actual or potential value” (CBD, Art. 2). Genetic resources are there-
fore a subcategory of biological resources. In the present study, the functional and informational values of genes – e.g. 
the value of a gene that holds the information for a certain substance of medical value - are of more interest than the 
sheer material value of organisms, such as cubic meters of wood or tons of grain. Thus we usually analyze processes 
related to genetic rather than to biological resources. Eventually, the manner in which it is used determines whether the 
substance or organism is a biological or a genetic resource: if for example a certain herb is used for making medicinal 
tea, it is clearly a biological resource. If, however, the genetic composition of the same herb is analyzed in modern 
biotechnology laboratories in order to find an interesting gene for medical applications, we speak of a genetic resource. 
In Chapter five, we zero in on a subcategory of genetic resources: Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(PGRFA) refers to any material of plant origin of actual or potential value (ITPGR, Art. 2). PGRFA therefore com-
prise the material growing in farmers’ fields and its wild and weed-like relatives (in situ) as well as material stored in 
genebanks (ex situ). These show certain peculiarities: PGRFA comprise varieties which were created through deliberate 
human breeding and selecting activities and are thus not pure natural resources. PGRFA have also been exchanged 
globally for centuries, and this makes it complicated to define their country of origin. PGRFA are the indispensable raw 
material for further crop improvement, which is needed to feed a growing world population.a  
a The treaty text of the CBD can be accessed online under www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asap. The text of the ITPGR can be 
accessed online under www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/news.htm 
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Why is it a useful exercise to use an economic 
approach to value genetic resources? The main 
reason lies in the fact that the conservation of 
biodiversity is costly. For this reason, humankind 
has to balance the costs and benefits of conserva-
tion efforts to come up with a rational decision. 
Various estimation techniques have been deve-
loped to measure the value of genetic resources. 
The one described below disaggregates overall 
value into different subvalues. The benefits of 
genetic resources can be estimated using the total 
economic value (see Figure 2), which is composed 
of use values and non-use values.14 The direct use 
                                                 
14 See Virchow (1999a), p. 65. 
value of genetic diversity is a static value. It 
consists of the consumptive value of genetic 
resources for the actual production of goods such 
as food and raw materials (for example wood) and 
the non-consumptive value of, say, recreational 
functions. For these types of values, economics 
offers manageable estimation techniques. Indirect 
use value and option value are also static values, 
yet they are far more complex to estimate, since 
the marginal benefit of a particular genetic re-
source to the overall functioning of the ecosystem 
is very difficult to estimate.  
 
Figure 2: Total Economic Value of Genetic Resources 
Total Economic Value 
of Genetic Resources 
Non-Use Value 
Existence 
Value 
Option 
Value 
Heritable
Value 
Indirect 
Use Value
Direct Use 
Value 
Use Value 
Consumptive & 
Productive 
Value: 
 
• Food 
• Raw Materials 
• Drugs 
Non-
Consumptive 
Value: 
 
• Recreation 
• Aesthetic 
Value 
Ecological 
Functions: 
 
• Prevention of 
Soil Erosion 
• Aesthetic 
Value 
• Regeneration 
of Air and 
WaterQuality 
Species 
diversity as an 
insurance 
against yield 
fluctuations 
and 
unforseable 
events. 
Ethical Value: 
 
• Ecosystems 
• Species Genes 
Genetic 
Information 
Decreasing Quantifiability and Valuability 
Adapted from von Braun / Virchow (1997) 
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Estimating the non-use value of genetic resources, 
which comprises their existence and heritable 
value, is even more complicated. Estimation in 
this case is a dynamic task which is hobbled by 
incomplete information about the future: the 
existence value is the intrinsic value of life and as 
such is subject to changing ethical assessments. 
The heritable value is the value of the known and 
unknown genetic information for future utiliza-
tion. In order to estimate the heritable value, 
assumptions have to be made on future technolo-
gies using presently known and unknown genetic 
information as well as on future environmental 
and market conditions in which genetic informa-
tion could be of value. This is highly speculative. 
Since the heritable value of genetic resources 
constitutes a large share of their total economic 
value, any attempt at an economic estimation of 
the latter is severely handicapped.  
The quantifiability of the value of genetic re-
sources decreases from left to right, as can be seen 
in Figure 2. Hence, the different values of genetic 
resources are known only roughly. Comparing 
these with costs will at least lead to the recom-
mendation that some conservation efforts are 
necessary in order to respect the ethical value and 
the insurance value of biodiversity – even if we 
cannot measure them. Beyond that, market-based 
techniques should be employed to tentatively 
capture the use values of biodiversity. 
For a market to function, benefits and costs should 
accrue to those people who are responsible for 
their creation, and property rights should be 
specified in an adequate way. Neither condition is 
met with regard to genetic resources. Many bene-
fits spill over to humankind as a whole or to 
people in the North who can afford the drugs 
made on the basis of genetic resources. At the 
same time, local and indigenous communities 
frequently bear the costs of conserving biodiver-
sity. To value the external benefits of biodiver-
sity, compensation schemes or other instruments 
are needed, some of which were introduced at the 
“Earth Summit” in Rio.15 
One option may be seen in an assignment of 
private property rights to induce a market-based 
solution. Before adoption of the CBD, biodiver-
sity was treated as a “common heritage of man-
kind”, but it now falls under national sovereignty 
(as will be explained in more detail in the next 
section). The previous situation was characterized 
as an example of the tragedy of the commons: 
everyone had the right to use these resources, 
while no one had an incentive to conserve them, 
because the benefits of conservation could not be 
appropriated individually. The marginal costs of 
conserving the resource therefore exceeded the 
marginal benefits of conservation for virtually all 
possible conservers. The new legal situation may 
be characterized as a step toward “privatizing” 
genetic resources. There are two different preva-
lent views on this strategy: a market-optimistic 
and a market-skeptical view.16 
The market-optimistic view holds that the new 
assignment of property rights and the creation of 
markets will automatically lead to an internaliza-
tion of formerly external conservation benefits. 
Consequently, it is assumed that providers will 
conserve genetic resources effectively and ensure 
an optimal long-term supply of them. Hence, this 
commodification of genetic resources is expected 
to reach two goals simultaneously: enhanced 
conservation and elevated incomes for the con-
servers. The rationale behind this view is the 
assumption that people who live in biodiversity-
rich areas will realize the value of this biodiversity 
and start to protect it as soon as they understand 
that they will receive adequate compensation for 
these efforts. In this view, the main task to be 
solved by policy-makers is the creation of func-
tioning markets. 
A more skeptical view holds that conservation of 
genetic resources is a task too complex and com-
                                                 
15 See Barbier (2000) for a comparative account of diffe-
rent internalization schemes. 
16 See Barrett / Lybbert (2000), p. 295. 
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prehensive to be achieved solely by the market 
mechanism. This view assumes that the deman-
ders’ willingness-to-pay for genetic resources is 
not large enough to have a significant impact on 
conservation activities. In the majority of cases 
the expected flow of benefits will, in this view, by 
no means change the land-use patterns of the 
people who live in areas threatened by biodiver-
sity loss. The skeptics further argue that any 
market for genetic resources will only be able to 
reap a fraction of their actual value because it can 
capture only their use values, but not their non-use 
values.17 
To conclude: in a situation where it is not possible 
to quantify the value of genetic resources, eco-
nomics is unable give a clear-cut recommendation 
on how best to assign property rights. A constella-
tion with unregulated access and without compen-
sation has led in the past to the tragedy of the 
commons. A new assignment of property rights 
has to be aware that complete privatization will 
not be able to induce a market solution that does 
justice to the total value of biodiversity. In addi-
tion, a political assignment of property rights runs 
the risk of seeking to satisfy as many interests as 
possible. This would lead to bundles of rights 
distributed among many stakeholders who can 
block each other from using the resource. A 
situation of this sort has been called the tragedy of 
the anticommons;18 it represents the mirror case of 
the tragedy of the commons. The following sec-
tion will show how political decision-makers have 
assigned rights and responsibilities in the global 
conventions governing genetic resources. 
2.3 International Conventions 
The access to and use of biodiversity is shaped by 
the current international legal framework. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
share similar objectives but pursue different 
                                                 
17 See von Braun / Virchow (1997), p. 10. 
18 See Heller (1998), p. 624. 
mechanisms to regulate access to genetic re-
sources. A third important international treaty, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, differs in terms of scope and 
objectives and influences the way genetic re-
sources are traded in market relationships rather 
indirectly. 
2.3.1 The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) 
The origins of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity can be traced back to the growing 
awareness of the deterioration of biological diver-
sity, as expressed by Western international ex-
perts. Under the lead of the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme, intergovernmental negotia-
tions for a convention on biodiversity protection 
were conducted between February 1991 and May 
1992. Due to their importance for industrialized 
countries, the latter were primarily concerned with 
the conservation of biodiversity. Originally, the 
North’s position was to stick to the notion of 
biodiversity as a common heritage of mankind; 
but this encountered opposition from the South. 
The North had to give in, and biodiversity was 
placed under national sovereignty. Access to it 
was no longer free but subject to national regula-
tion. Eventually, the CBD was signed by over 150 
states at the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development on 5 June 1992 in Rio 
de Janeiro. 
The CBD is a framework convention: it focuses 
on policies and objectives rather than on concrete 
action.19 It leaves national policy-makers space for 
a flexible implementation of the provisions.20 In 
this spirit, no specific targets have been set and 
provisions are to be freely chosen by national 
governments. Article 1 of the Convention states 
the overall objectives, which are conservation of 
biological diversity, sustainable use of its compo-
nents, and a fair and equitable sharing of benefits. 
                                                 
19 See ten Kate / Laird (2000b), p. 242. 
20 See Glowka (1994), p. 1. 
12 Klaus Liebig et al. 
It is noteworthy that the CBD is a landmark treaty 
in the environmental field, since it is the first 
agreement that applies an integrated, i.e. non-
sectoral, approach to biodiversity conservation. 
Moreover, it goes beyond conservation itself and 
addresses questions of access and use of genetic 
resources, benefit-sharing and technology transfer. 
The idea is simple: providers of valuable genetic 
material are encouraged to make agreements with 
users in which the latter are granted access to 
these resources in exchange for present or future 
benefits. In encouraging these agreements, the 
CBD aims to facilitate access to genetic resources 
while guaranteeing a fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the use of these resources. 
Contents 
The Convention marks a turning point in the 
notion of biodiversity passing from the status of a 
“common heritage of mankind” to that of a 
“common concern”. It is called a common con-
cern because the ongoing deterioration of biodi-
versity can only be stopped by a global effort and 
not by single nation states. For nation states, 
special rights and responsibilities for the resources 
on national territories are laid down. 
The Convention entails a number of responsibili-
ties for the purpose of biodiversity conservation. 
The formulation of national strategies and policies 
is encouraged in order to integrate conservation 
and sustainable use into existing sectoral pro-
grams (Art. 6). Special emphasis is put on in situ 
conservation (Art. 8), and to a lesser extent on ex 
situ conservation measures (Art. 9). Other meas-
ures include training and research (Art 12) and 
public education and awareness-raising (Art. 13). 
Article 14 addresses the use of techniques, for 
example impact assessment, to ensure that re-
sources are used sustainably .  
As far as rights are concerned, Articles 15, 16 and 
19 assign authority in regulating access to bio-
logical resources to nation states and contain 
provisions to guarantee a fair and equitable shar-
ing of the benefits.21 Article 8 (j) addresses the 
rights of indigenous and local communities. The 
article calls on signatories to respect and preserve 
their “knowledge, innovations, and practices […] 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity” and to promote their wider 
application if the knowledge holders agree. Bene-
fits arising out of the dissemination of this knowl-
edge are to be equitably shared. Article 8 (j) aims 
at the integration of local and indigenous commu-
nities in the Convention’s objectives. They are to 
participate as both providers of knowledge and as 
conservers of biodiversity. Importantly, their 
consent has to be sought before indigenous knowl-
edge can be disseminated and used. 
The scope of the Convention extends to all ge-
netic resources, with two exemptions. First, Arti-
cle 15.3 excludes genetic resources held in ex situ 
collections before 1993, the year in which the 
Convention came into effect. Second, plant ge-
netic resources for food and agriculture included 
in the ITPGR list fall outside the scope of the 
CBD. 
Impacts for Developing Countries 
The Convention allows owners of genetic re-
sources to sell them to interested users by means 
of access and benefit-sharing agreements. This 
could open up new sources of income for local 
communities or other entities in developing coun-
tries. With respect to the high potential value of 
genetic resources, a redistribution of wealth from 
North to South could take place. The South could 
expect different forms of benefits in the short, 
medium or long term. Next to the possibility of 
reaping benefits the Convention places providers 
under an obligation to protect biodiversity. 
                                                 
21 See Chapter three for details. 
Governing Biodiversity 13 
 
 
2.3.2 The International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources (ITPGR) 
Some time after the adoption of the CBD, the 
third Conference of the Parties22 recognized the 
competence of the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) for plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture (PGRFA) and called for 
harmonization of the CBD with the International 
Undertaking, a legally non-binding instrument 
adopted in 1983 and dealing with PGRFA (FAO 
Resolution 8/83). From 1994 to 2001 the Under-
taking was revised, leading to the adoption of the 
ITPGR on 3 November 2001 by 118 signatory 
countries at the FAO. It will enter into force when 
40 signatory countries have ratified it. 
The rationale behind a separate regulatory system 
for PGRFA lies in their distinct features and 
problems. These include the following: (1) 
PGRFA are essential for achieving and sustaining 
world food security, because they are the indis-
pensable raw material for crop improvement 
through traditional or modern breeding; (2) 
PGRFA are a common concern of all countries, 
because all countries depend in some measure on 
PGRFA that have originated elsewhere; (3) past, 
present and future PGRFA conservation by farm-
ers in all regions of the world is the justification 
for Farmers’ Rights (see Box 3); (4) all countries 
would benefit from a multilateral system of access 
to PGRFA, because every country uses more 
resources from the system than it contributes; (5) 
the innovation process for products based on 
PGRFA is quite different than that for products 
based on other genetic resources: Modern plant 
varieties are always the result of a long chain of 
incremental innovations, because they are based 
on varieties that have been developed by farmers 
and breeders throughout centuries. This raises 
different questions in relation to the ownership of 
PGRFA. While in the case of genetic resources a 
“wild” resource is transformed into a new product, 
in the case of PGRFA a resource which is partly 
                                                 
22 The Conference of the Parties is the governing body of 
the CBD. At its regularly meetings, decisions are taken 
with respect to the Convention’s implementation. 
natural, partly man-made is incrementally chang-
ed. 
The objectives of the ITPGR are the conservation 
and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from their use, in 
harmony with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food 
security (Art. 1.1). Unlike the CBD, the ITPGR 
envisages a multilateral system of access and 
benefit-sharing to achieve these goals. The Multi-
lateral System guarantees free access to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture covered 
by the system (Part IV of the agreement). It cur-
rently contains a list of 35 species of food crops 
and forages, covering the overall germplasm of 
these species in public ex situ collections as well 
as in situ in farmers’ fields and wilderness. In 
exchange for the free availability of this material, 
the system provides for payments by resource 
users into a trust fund which will be used to 
support the goals of the ITPGR, particularly the 
goal of conserving PGRFA in situ and ex situ 
(Art. 18).23 Article 9 of the Treaty addresses 
Farmers’ Rights (see Box 3) and puts them into 
responsibility of national governments. 
Impacts for Developing Countries 
Developing countries have, like all signatory 
states, access to the genetic material on the list. 
Unlike the CBD, here the cutting line passes 
between stakeholders for species on the list and 
those off the list, and not between providers and 
users. Species off the list remain under the scope 
of the CBD. For species on the list, the multilat-
eral system guarantees free access to all signatory 
states. This means that no additional costs and 
time-consuming negotiations are needed, as in the 
case of ABS agreements of the CBD. However, if 
a developing country has a particular diversity of 
a certain species on the list, guaranteeing free 
access to all can also mean income lost to this 
                                                 
23 For details, see Chapter three. 
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country, because it can no longer sell this diver-
sity via bilateral contracts. The future dynamics of 
the list – it is envisioned to gradually include 
more and more species in the multilateral system 
– will therefore be of special interest for develop-
ing countries. Countries of origin of a potentially 
valuable species may be tempted to prevent its 
inclusion in the list. Brazil, for example, has until 
today successfully lobbied to keep rubber and 
soybeans off the list, because it has a large diver-
sity in these two species and expects commercial 
gains from a bilateral marketing of this germ-
plasm. In contrast, non-origin countries will 
always attempt to add more species to the list, in 
order to ensure their free access to it. 
2.3.3 The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)24 
The TRIPS agreement was one of the main results 
of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
which ended in 1994 with the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). All WTO 
member countries are obliged to provide compre-
hensive protection of intellectual property rights. 
This extends to all products and processes from all 
fields of technology, including innovations based 
on biological resources. Since intellectual prop-
                                                 
24 The TRIPS agreement is available at www.wto.org/eng-
lish/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm.pdf. 
Box 3:  Farmers’ Rights 
For over twenty years, Farmers’ Rights have been intensively discussed at the international level as an instrument to 
provide developing-country farmers with compensation for their past, present and future efforts to conserve and develop 
plant genetic resources.a The discussion arose from a perceived inequality in the distribution of the benefits of PGRFA 
use: the seed companies of many industrialized countries were at liberty to freely use the traditional varieties of devel-
oping country farmers in the development of new varieties without having to pay for the right to use these traditional 
varieties as a fundamental input in the breeding process. In addition, seed companies were now able to protect their 
inventions by intellectual property rights, in this way restricting farmers’ free access to and exchange of seeds. Thus, 
Farmers’ Rights basically started out as a counter-concept to intellectual property rights. 
However, during the years of discussion, Farmers’ Rights have become an umbrella concept for all kinds of demands on 
behalf of developing-country farmers. Equity considerations and the call for compensation have always been the central 
element of Farmers’ Rights. Yet today compensation is not to flow in a general manner but is instead to be used in a 
functional way, namely to induce farmers to continue to practice their valuable conservation activities. Other elements 
discussed under Farmers’ Rights and seen as ways to advance them are the protection of traditional knowledge, the 
participation and the empowerment of farmers and the protection of farmers’ traditional practices of replanting, ex-
changing and selling seeds at the local level. Many new plant variety protection laws of developing countries pose a 
constraint to these traditional practices because they introduce intellectual property protection on commercial seeds. 
Since Farmers’ Rights cover matters of an extremely wide scope, critics have noted that the support for Farmers’ Rights 
has been 'a mile wide and an inch deep.' 
However, with the conclusion of the ITPGR, Farmers’ Rights are now for the first time included in a legally binding 
treaty under international law. Yet the definition of Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGR remains relatively vague. It is ac-
knowledged that traditional farmers, and especially those in developing countries, merit compensation for their century-
long contribution to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources. Responsibility for this compensation 
is, however, put in the hands of national governments. These are expected to “take measures to promote and protect 
Farmers’ Rights.” Three of these measures are prescribed in detail by the ITPGR: (1) “the protection of traditional 
knowledge relevant to PGRFA”; (2) “the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of 
PGRFA”; and (3) “the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of PGRFA.” Besides, reference is made to the legitimacy of traditional farmers’ practices of 
replanting, exchanging and selling seeds (ITPGR, Art. 9). 
It is apparent that Farmers’ Rights must be regarded less as legal rights in the strict sense than as a political concept. 
Thus they can rather be advanced and promoted than protected. Although the ITPGR could be a milestone in the 
promotion of Farmers’ Rights, many advocates are disappointed by the weak wording of the ITPGR text on Farmers’ 
Rights. According to Article 9, national governments have the duty to realize Farmers’ Rights “in accordance with 
their needs,..., as appropriate, and subject to its national legislation,…” which appears to make their implementation 
very much contingent upon the political will of the respective government. Nevertheless, recognition of Farmers’ 
Rights in an international treaty gives political advocates a new lever to press for their implementation. 
a For one of the few comprehensive discussions of the topic in the literature, see Correa (2000). 
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erty rights constitute an important part of agree-
ments on access to genetic resources and subse-
quent benefit-sharing, the provisions of the TRIPS 
agreement will be presented in outline. 
The overarching objectives of the TRIPS agree-
ment are laid down in Article 7 and can be sum-
marized as follows: promotion of technological 
innovation and dissemination of technology to the 
benefit of producers and users of technological 
knowledge.25 The line of argumentation is that the 
TRIPS agreement imposes minimum standards for 
intellectual property rights for all signatory states 
and that this protection should permit owners of 
intellectual property to prevent copying and thus 
to reap the full benefits of the sale of their com-
modities or services. As a consequence of this 
situation of legal security, trade in protected goods 
and services could increase. Also, investments in 
research for innovations should be more lucrative 
and therefore grow in volume. In this way, users 
as well as providers could become beneficiaries of 
the agreement. 
Contents 
The TRIPS agreement establishes minimum 
universal standards concerning patents, copy-
rights, industrial designs, geographical indica-
tions, integrated circuits and undisclosed informa-
tion. All WTO member countries are obliged to 
adjust their legislation to meet the TRIPS re-
quirements.26 Article 27 of TRIPS regulates the 
general patentability of products and processes. In 
principle, all products and processes from all 
fields of technology have to be patented if “they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capa-
ble of industrial application” (Art. 27.1). 
Article 27.3 (b) directly addresses the patentabil-
ity of biological resources and states that members 
may exclude “plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
                                                 
25 See Walker (2001), p. 9. 
26 For a comprehensive assessment of the TRIPS-agree-
ment, see for example Liebig (2001) or Maskus (2000). 
processes for the production of plants or animals 
other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes”. With respect to new plant varieties, 
however, all member states are required to sub-
scribe to a protection by patents, an effective sui 
generis system or a combination of both. The 
agreement contains no details on the design of an 
effective sui generis system and leaves leeway for 
individual member states to develop tailor-made 
systems. 
However, many industrialized countries favor a 
system which already exists for the protection of 
plant varieties: the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).27 
In 1961, UPOV was created by various European 
Governments on the initiative of modern plant 
breeders in order to establish common standards 
of plant variety protection laws. States can join 
UPOV if they enact a plant variety protection law 
in accordance with the requirements. A breeder 
can gain protection for a plant variety if the plant 
variety is distinct from existing varieties, uniform, 
stable, and new (the DUSN-criterion).28 The 
UPOV Conventions have been revised repeatedly 
and continually reinforced with stronger protec-
tion rights for plant breeders. Currently, 48 states 
are members of UPOV, 21 of which are develop-
ing countries. Plant breeders rights are similar to 
patents but less restrictive. Like patents, they 
grant the inventor exclusive rights to sell the 
product. However, plant breeders remain free to 
use a protected variety for research and develop-
ment purposes. 
Links between the TRIPS Agreement and 
the CBD/ITPGR 
Intellectual property rights have an impact on the 
implementation of the two international agree-
ments governing genetic resources. This is stated 
explicitly in Article 16.5 of the CBD: “Member 
states shall cooperate in this regard subject to 
                                                 
27 Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions 
Végétales. 
28 See Walker (2001), pp. 29-30. 
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national legislation and international law in order 
to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do 
not run counter to its objectives.” Following 
adoption of the two international treaties, a con-
troversial debate arose with regard to the relation 
between intellectual property rights and the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. In the ongoing 
debate, two opposite positions can be identified: 
those which favor patents as a means to protect 
biodiversity, and those which oppose that idea.29 
Those in favor of patents argue that companies 
that have the possibility to protect their innova-
tions based on genetic resources will be more 
willing to invest in research on natural products. 
Moreover, companies will be more inclined to 
engage in technology transfer within ABS agree-
ments if the shared technology is effectively 
protected from use by third parties. Therefore, 
patents are seen as promoting the sustainable use, 
conservation and equal sharing of benefits. Oppo-
nents of patents claim that intellectual property 
rights have perverse effects on biodiversity 
protection, since the monopolistic situation they 
create is intrinsically unfair. Moreover, such rights 
enable companies in the North to appropriate 
resources and knowledge from countries and 
communities in the South, thus circumventing 
benefit-sharing commitments. 
Although the two distinct views on patents are 
highly controversial, there is no direct legal con-
flict between the TRIPS agreement and the 
CBD/ITPGR. The relationship between TRIPS 
and the two other agreements can, instead, be 
described as different perspectives on one topic. 
CBD and ITPGR stress the access and benefit-
sharing aspects of genetic resources, while the 
relevant part of the TRIPS agreement puts special 
emphasis on protection of innovations based on 
genetic resources. This may, however, mean a 
conflictual relationship in practice whenever the 
                                                 
29 See Dutfield (2000), p. 41. 
interests of the different right-holders cannot be 
easily reconciled.30 
3 Access to Genetic Resources and 
Benefit-Sharing: Conceptual and 
Empirical Background 
Both CBD and ITPGR introduce access and 
benefit-sharing as a concept that frames the ex-
change of genetic resources between providers 
and users and regulates the sharing of benefits 
arising from their commercial use. To facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the issues discussed 
concerning access and benefit-sharing (ABS), the 
present chapter presents two concepts of ABS, 
identifies the main stakeholders and provides a 
typology of the benefits at stake. 
3.1 Concepts of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
There are two distinguishable approaches to 
access and benefit-sharing: bilateral and multilat-
eral ABS. Each approach is associated with one of 
the international regulatory frameworks discussed 
in the previous chapter. While the Convention on 
Biological Diversity represents a framework for 
bilateral ABS agreements, the International Treaty 
stands for a multilateral system of ABS in the area 
of agrobiodiversity. 
3.1.1 Conceptual Comparison of the 
Bilateral and Multilateral 
Approaches 
Under the bilateral approach (see Figure 3), two 
parties exchange genetic resources for a share of 
the benefits arising from their use. Bilateral ABS 
resembles private contracts insofar as it implies an 
agreement between the providing and the receiv-
                                                 
30 The relation between intellectual property rights and the 
CBD has been intensely discussed in different fora and 
in the literature. See Downes (1999) for a survey. 
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ing party (user) of genetic resources which sets 
out the terms of the exchange. The main advan-
tage of the bilateral approach is commonly seen in 
its flexibility for the participants. One disadvan-
tage lies in relatively high transaction costs for the 
user, since she or he has to negotiate ABS in 
every new case. 
 
In the multilateral approach (see Figure 4), pro-
viders (P) of genetic resources exchange genetic 
resources (GR) among each other within the 
system. All participating parties both provide 
resources to and receive resources from the multi-
lateral system in which all resources are pooled. 
The participants agree on a common set of rules 
which also regulates the transfer of resources to a 
user (U) outside the multilateral system. When 
benefits arise from the use or commercialization  
 
 
of the resources transferred to a user, a predeter-
mined share of the benefits is redistributed to the 
providers through a trust fund. The trust fund 
collects the benefits and is open to providers’ 
applications to finance a defined range of projects. 
One distributive consequence is that all partici-
pants of the multilateral system have equal access 
to generated benefits, independent of individual 
contributions. The multilateral approach therefore 
comes into conflict with economic considerations 
when one provider possesses a large share of the 
total diversity of one species. Such providers 
could consider optimizing benefits by excluding 
that resource from the multilateral system, seeking 
bilateral agreements with users instead. In general, 
the prominent advantage of the multilateral ap-
proach is seen in the relatively low transaction 
costs it involves for each participant. For all 
transactions, the terms of exchange are commonly 
agreed upon and thus do not require any negotia-
tions. Disadvantages can be seen in a lack of 
flexibility concerning the terms of exchange and 
in a certain propensity of the system to develop 
bureaucratic characteristics, which would again 
increase transaction costs. 
3.1.2 The Bilateral Approach: 
Biodiversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity lays 
down a range of provisions for national legislation 
to regulate access to biological resources and to 
ensure a fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
resulting from their commercial use. The issue of 
ABS can be found in Article 15 of the Conven-
tion. Beside addressing general means of access 
legislation, Article 15 requires ABS agreements to 
be negotiated under mutually agreed terms and to 
follow the principle of prior informed consent. 
The aim of fair and equitable sharing is also 
included in Article 15. 
As regards the general means of access legisla-
tion, “the authority to determine access to genetic 
resources rests with the national governments and 
is subject to national legislation” (Article 15.1). 
On the other hand, all member states “shall en-
deavour to create conditions to facilitate access to 
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genetic resources...” (Article 15.2). The signatory 
states’ right to develop legislation determining 
access to genetic resources is thus combined with 
the duty to facilitate users’ access to them. In 
more concrete terms, this means that access 
should be generally possible, clearly administered 
and non-restrictive, as well as free of excessive 
costs.31 The CBD does not cover access to bio-
logical resources collected before the Convention 
came into force (Article 15.3). Owners of ex situ 
collections of genetic resources, for example 
botanical gardens or pharmaceutical companies, 
may therefore continue to use their collections 
without being subject to the CBD.32 
Article 15.4 sets out a requirement to negotiate 
access to genetic resources on mutually agreed 
terms. Typical terms include legal acquisition, 
permitted use of genetic resources, restrictions on 
supply and benefit-sharing.33 Legal acquisition 
emphasizes that the resources have to be of legal 
origin and be transferred in accordance with the 
relevant access legislation of the country of origin. 
Permitted use of genetic resources means that the 
intended use of the resources in question is de-
fined in the ABS agreement. Restrictions on 
supply apply to the recipient’s right to supply the 
resources to third parties. All of the terms of an 
ABS agreement affect the recipient’s options to 
pass resources or their derivatives on to third 
parties. Thus it is important for intermediary 
institutions such as genebanks, universities or 
companies to ensure that terms agreed upon in the 
original acquisition of genetic resources are taken 
into account when these resources are supplied to 
other parties. A precondition for the negotiation of 
mutually agreed terms is the existence of an 
institution in the provider country which is both 
competent and legally authorized to negotiate (so-
called focal points or competent national authori-
ties). The CBD contains no provisions on the 
composition of the parties to such negotiations.34 
                                                 
31 See Brand / Görg (2001), p. 25. 
32 See Glowka (1998), p. 3. 
33 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 22. 
34 See Seiler / Dutfield (2001), p. 12. 
Consequently, it is  an open question whether 
governments are legitimized to negotiate without 
consulting or involving local groups and commu-
nities.35 
Prior informed consent (PIC) is established as a 
principle in Article 15.5 of the CBD; this means 
that the receiving party to an ABS agreement must 
inform the providing party beforehand about the 
intended use of the resources in question. Provid-
ers then approve or reject access, based on the 
information given, which must be truthful and 
adequate to understand all implications.36 Al-
though this is not explicitly set out in the Conven-
tion, it is commonly understood that PIC is to be 
regulated by the government of the providing 
country. Many countries, though, have not yet 
taken steps to define administrative responsibili-
ties for genetic resources. As a consequence, 
scattered competences among government organs  
obstruct compliance with the PIC provisions and 
make it difficult for interested institutions or 
companies to identify the agent whose consent is 
needed. When national access legislation has been 
adopted pursuant to the CBD, for example in the 
Philippines, but also in the member states of the 
Andean Pact Common Regime, consent may have 
to be sought from additional stakeholders such as 
local and indigenous communities. While such 
access laws effectively grant rights governing the 
control of access of genetic resources to local 
individuals, organizations and communities, some 
problems have been reported in operationalizing 
PIC. Collectors, who are often unacquainted with 
local languages and customs, are required to 
identify whose consent is needed at the local level 
and who is to negotiate on their behalf, a poten-
tially difficult and costly undertaking. Finally, 
there is potential for tension between the PIC 
requirement to provide information on the in-
tended uses of extracted resources and the corpo-
                                                 
35 See Brand / Görg (2001), p. 26. 
36 While PIC is not defined in the Convention, several 
commentators have identified its contents as presented 
here. See ten Kate / Laird (2000a) pp. 27-29, Glowka 
(1994) and Posey / Dutfield (1996). 
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rate interest in keeping commercialization plans a 
trade secret.37 
The CBD’s focus on benefit-sharing, laid down 
as one of its three objectives in Article 1, attempts 
to address two main issues. First, it aims to ensure 
that benefits derived from biological resource 
exploitation translate into sustainable use and 
conservation of genetic resources, and not to their 
destruction. Second, it aims to enable local users 
and legal owners of genetic resources to gain a 
share of the benefits resulting from their commer-
cialization.38 The obligation to share benefits 
arises in three contexts. First, when access to 
genetic resources is sought, the CBD requires 
contracting parties to define the modes and extent 
of benefit-sharing as part of the mutually agreed 
terms described above. Article 15.7 states in this 
regard that national governments shall establish 
measures “with the aim of sharing in a fair and 
                                                 
37 See Brand / Görg (2001), p. 26. 
38 See Columbia University (1999), p. 74. 
equitable way the results of research and devel-
opment and the benefits arising from the commer-
cial and other utilization of genetic resources...” It 
is noteworthy that the word “aim” is used instead 
of the stronger “requirement”, leaving abundant 
space for interpretation concerning the extent to 
which CBD provisions have to be realized in 
national legislation. Second, when access to 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indige-
nous and local communities is sought, Article 8(j) 
calls on contracting parties to “encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and 
practices.” Here again, the term “encourage” 
allows room for interpretation.39 Third, Articles 
16 and 19 encourage countries of the North to 
share technology and in particular the results and 
benefits of biotechnologies based on resources 
provided by developing countries. 
Article 15 of the Convention has probably been 
the most controversially discussed element in the 
                                                 
39 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 15, Glowka (1994). 
Box 4:  The Appearance of a New Variety of Pirates: the “Biopirates” 
Researchers and entrepreneurs in the North have been collecting biological materials in tropical countries since 
colonial times. But only recently have non-governmental organizations reacted to the increasing scope of intellectual 
property protection for genetic resources, coining the term “biopiracy”. Since then biopiracy has figured as one of 
the most controversial issues on the agenda of ABS discussions. There are at least three different views as to what is 
meant by biopiracy.a First, from a legal perspective, it is said to be the appropriation of biological resources without 
the prior informed consent of the local people and/or of the competent authority of a specific region for access and 
benefit-sharing, under mutually agreed terms. Second, a critical view conceives biopiracy primarily as a moral 
question. According to this view, every plant breeder or biotech engineer implicitly relies on the accumulated suc-
cess of generations of farmers and indigenous communities. Claiming exclusive monopoly rights to modified plants 
is therefore regarded as immoral. This argument mainly relates to agricultural – or improved – biodiversity. Third, 
industry denies that there is a problem which might be termed biopiracy. According to this view, knowledge and 
material in the public domain may be used freely, while intellectual property protection should only be possible for 
real and actual inventions. In this view, if the term biopiracy were to be used at all, then it should refer to the unau-
thorized copying of plants or biotechnological innovations protected by intellectual property rights. 
Industry usually disagrees with NGOs when it is charged with biopiracy. On the one hand, this has to do with the 
opposing views described above. On the other hand, even if one takes the legalistic viewpoint, it is difficult to assess 
whether a specific case should be called biopiracy or not. The basmati rice patent of the US company RiceTec, 
issued in 1997, is a well-known example of such a dispute.b RiceTec claims that it has invented a new variety of 
basmati rice using germplasm that was freely available for breeding. NGOs and numerous farmers’ organizations 
from the developing world were outraged because they saw RiceTec as having appropriated the knowledge of South 
Asian farmers and the famous basmati name. By now, the Indian government has challenged the patent claims and 
has already succeeded in having most of the claims revoked. There are many other examples of alleged biopiracy. 
The heated discussion surrounding the subject has lead to high public awareness in developed and developing 
countries alike and has served as catalyst in making the general public aware of the issue of ABS and intellectual 
property rights. 
a See Crucible Group II (2000), p. 111. 
b See Crucible Group II (2000), p. 112. 
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field of bilateral ABS, both during the negotiation 
of the CBD and since its adoption. With its impli-
cations for national law-making, economic devel-
opment, the rights of local and indigenous com-
munities and companies’ transaction costs, it has 
triggered hopes for rapid monetary returns (the 
“grand bargain”) as well as fears concerning 
obstacles to access. 
In view of the fact that implementation of the 
provisions of Article 15 has been slow, member 
states of the CBD have responded by adopting the 
Bonn Guidelines for access and benefit-sharing.40 
The guidelines are of a voluntary nature and are 
meant to assist countries in developing their 
national access legislation and procedures for 
benefit-sharing.41 Among other issues, the guide-
lines deal with PIC, mutually agreed terms and 
guidelines for the roles, responsibilities and par-
ticipation of stakeholders. The guidelines recog-
                                                 
40 The guidelines were formulated by an Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Working Group on ABS of the CBD and adopted 
at the Sixth Conference of the Parties in April 2002. The 
Decision VI/24 is available at www.biodiv.org/ deci-
sions. 
41 See IISD (2001). 
nize that all relevant stakeholders should be 
involved in access determination, but add that the 
question of which stakeholders need to be in-
volved can only be answered on a case-by-case 
basis. Local and indigenous communities are 
explicitly noted as stakeholders who need to be 
involved in consultations as well as in PIC proce-
dures that are in accordance with traditional 
practices. While most participants were quoted as 
supporting the contents of the guidelines, criticism 
was voiced on the voluntary status of the guide-
lines and their lack of elaboration compared with 
laws already adopted in some countries.42 
3.1.3 The Multilateral Approach: 
Agrobiodiversity 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture is devoted to the 
objectives of “conservation and sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
                                                 
42 See Shon (2001). 
Box 5:  Implementation of the CBD on a National Scale 
Since the CBD entered into force, there have been a large number of planning and legislative activities at the regional, 
national and subnational level dealing with access to genetic resources. In the meantime, authorities have implemented 
laws and other policy measures in ways of their own. According to Glowka, existing and draft access legislation can be 
broken down into five groups.a 
1) Environmental framework laws; such laws are of an enabling nature. National authorities are obliged to develop 
measures designed to regulate the export of germplasm, benefit-sharing, and access fees. 
2) Framework sustainable development, nature conservation or biodiversity laws; such laws tend to be more 
detailed and show a specific intent to comprehensively implement the CBD. 
3)  Dedicated or stand-alone national laws or decrees on access to genetic resources; constitute the most compre-
hensive pieces of access legislation. 
4)  Modification of existing laws to better reflect access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing issues 
5) Regional law creating a common regime of access to genetic resources; a minimum set of rules to be imple-
mented by each member state to strengthen the bargaining position of the members. 
It is estimated that today some 50 countries are drafting and implementing laws and policies aimed at fair business 
partnerships.b However, there are only a few comprehensive national ABS regulations in existence. The three best 
known examples are: (1) Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law 7788 (1998) envisages a framework law approach. (2) In the 
Philippines, Executive Order 247 (1995) and Administrative Order 96-20 (1996) represent the only finalized example 
of a stand-alone law. (3) Thus far, Decision 391 of the Andean Pact (1996) is the only regional approach; it includes 
five member states of the Andean Commission (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). 
a See Glowka (1998), p. 23. 
b See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 4. 
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and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of their use [...] for sustainable agri-
culture and food security” (Article 1). While the 
CBD encourages market mechanisms via bilateral 
ABS agreements aimed at conserving biological 
diversity, the multilateral approach represented by 
the ITPGR pursues a very different path. 
Rather than relying on a bilateral “grand bargain”, 
the ITPGR subscribes to the belief that no func-
tioning markets can be created for the most impor-
tant PGRFA. Such markets would either be mo-
nopolized or distorted by players who possess 
larger shares of PGRFA, and this would conse-
quently mean high transaction costs for users. The 
International Treaty hence puts priority on open 
access to PGRFA as a means of keeping access 
costs low for all interested parties. In this way, the 
ITPGR seeks to foster further breeding and re-
search and to contribute to global food security. 
The ITPGR requires the multilateral sharing of 
benefits through four mechanisms (ITPGR Article 
13.2): (1) exchange of information, (2) access to 
and transfer of technology, (3) capacity-building, 
and (4) sharing of monetary and other benefits of 
commercialization. The central instrument of the 
ITPGR is the establishment of a global multilat-
eral system of access, exchange and benefit-
sharing for PGRFA. This means that PGRFA are 
effectively exempt from the regulations estab-
lished under the CBD. Most importantly, PGRFA 
will not be exchanged through bilateral contracts 
but are to be accessed “expeditiously, without the 
need to track individual accessions and free of 
charge” (ITPGR Article 12.3(b)) by any member 
country of the ITPGR. 
The rationale of the multilateral system is that – 
due to the high global interdependency of PGRFA 
– every member country will gain access to more 
resources than it contributes itself, making each 
country a net beneficiary. However, the ITPGR 
goes beyond the pure exchange of PGRFA. The 
ITPGR also aims at the global conservation of 
biodiversity by supporting the implementation of 
the Leipzig Global Plan of Action.43 To this end, a 
global trust fund for in situ and ex situ conserva-
tion is to be established and governed by the FAO 
(Article 18). The fund’s financial means are to be 
allocated to conservation projects and programs in 
line with the Global Plan of Action. Contributions 
to the fund are envisioned to come from two 
sources: 
• Developed countries are expected to provide 
a core contribution (ITPGR Article 18.4). 
• Recipients who commercialize a product on 
the basis of PGRFA from the multilateral sys-
tem must pay into the fund an equitable share 
of the benefits arising from that product if the 
product is protected by intellectual property 
rights in a form that restricts its availability 
for further research and breeding (e.g. patent). 
The level, form and manner of this mandatory 
payment is to be determined at the first meet-
ing of the ITPGR Governing Body yet to be 
created. 
Recipients who commercialize a product on the 
basis of PGRFA from the multilateral system but 
keep the product available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding are ex-
empt from the benefit-sharing requirement, 
though they are nevertheless encouraged to make 
such payments (ITPGR Article 13.2 (d) (ii)). This 
would be the case when a breeding company 
chooses to protect a new variety not by patent but 
by means of a Plant Breeders’ Right. Usually, the 
reason why a new plant variety can be protected 
only by such rights is that the conventional breed-
ing process is not considered as involving an 
inventive step, one essential criterion for a patent 
application. But new genetically engineered plants 
generally involve an inventive step and therefore 
qualify for patent protection. Financial flows to 
                                                 
43 The FAO Global Plan of Action was adopted in 1996 in 
Leipzig by representatives of 150 nations in order to de-
vise and coordinate a global in situ and ex situ conserva-
tion strategy for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture. The strategy is aimed at coordinating global 
and national conservation efforts. Its implementation is 
regarded as a major contribution to the realization of the 
CBD in the field of food and agriculture. 
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the fund from private sources will therefore only 
materialize if companies are granted patents on 
their products. 
3.2 Stakeholders Involved in Access and 
Benefit-Sharing 
Stakeholders can be subdivided into direct and 
indirect stakeholders.44 Direct stakeholders will 
either benefit from or be harmed by the terms and 
conditions of a specific case of biological resource 
exploitation. The providers and users of genetic 
resources are most likely to be direct stakeholders, 
and they will in general be parties to formal ABS 
agreements. Indirect stakeholders include those 
who have a general interest in the outcome of 
access agreements but are not immediately af-
fected by the negotiation or implementation of a 
specific agreement. On the largest scale, all of 
humanity may have a stake in the preservation of 
biodiversity in general, even though it would be 
affected only negligibly by the extraction of a 
particular sample.45 NGOs represent the interests 
of various groups of indirect or, in case of self-
help organizations, direct stakeholders. In what 
follows, the focus is on direct stakeholders. 
Authors writing on the subject have stressed the 
necessity to identify and involve all direct stake-
holders in a specific case of biological resource 
exploitation to ensure the process proceeds effec-
tively. Otherwise, stakeholders who feel neglected 
in access negotiations may prevent access to 
resources under their control if their rights and 
interests have not been respected. This appears 
especially, but not exclusively, relevant for local 
and indigenous communities. 
                                                 
44 See Columbia University (1999), p. 68. 
45 As far as the pharmaceutical industry is concerned, all 
persons suffering from a specific disease may be consi-
dered indirect stakeholders; in the case of agricultural 
plant varieties, those who suffer from hunger may be de-
fined as indirect stakeholders. In both cases, the details 
of particular ABS-agreements would be beyond the 
broad interest of the indirect stakeholders. 
Stakeholders in bilateral as well as multilateral 
access and benefit-sharing can be divided into 
seven groups: (1) national governments, (2) local 
government units, (3) indigenous communities, 
(4) farmers, (5) NGOs and peoples’ organizations 
(POs), (6) scientists and scientific institutions, and 
(7) industry.46 Each category may include indi-
viduals, community groups, organizations, or 
institutions from developing and developed coun-
tries who will be directly affected by an instance 
of access to genetic resources and the benefits 
arising from their subsequent commercialization. 
1) Nation states are accorded sovereignty over 
biological resources on their territories by the 
CBD. They are defined as stakeholders to bi-
lateral ABS because of their responsibility to 
create and enforce national ABS legislation 
under the CBD. In national ABS legislation, 
competences must be specified for govern-
ment bodies in dealing with access applica-
tions, negotiation of mutually agreed terms, 
and PIC. In some cases of bilateral ABS, spe-
cific provisions are made for government bod-
ies to receive monetary benefits arising from 
the commercialization of accessed genetic re-
sources. As contracting parties to the ITPGR, 
governments are required to implement the 
multilateral system and to pursue steps to 
make the Treaty fully operational. However, 
in contrast to the CBD, governments do not 
have to enact separate legislation to comply 
with the ITPGR. Under both CBD and 
ITPGR, governments are assumed to be be-
nevolently interested in maximizing the flow 
of benefits to their countries. 
2) Local government units are involved by 
some national access legislation to give PIC 
under the CBD. Local mayors and city coun-
cils represent communities, including farmers, 
from whose lands genetic resources are ex-
tracted. Representative local government units 
are assumed to be interested in reaping a 
maximum of benefits for their communities. 
Furthermore, regional and local level line 
                                                 
46 See Columbia University (1999), p. 69. 
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agencies of national government institutions in 
fields such as environment or agriculture may 
be assigned responsibilities under national 
ABS legislation or in in situ conservation 
strategies. Their assumed interest is to avoid 
additional responsibilities without being given 
additional funding and to maximize the bene-
fits for their region. 
3) Indigenous communities are usually repre-
sented by a council or organization that nego-
tiates on their behalf when access to tradi-
tional knowledge or resources on indigenous 
land is sought. Although the CBD prescribes 
to seek PIC only from the government of the 
country of origin, involvement of indigenous 
communities is required by some national ac-
cess laws. Indigenous communities are as-
sumed to have an interest in reaping both 
monetary and non-monetary benefits. Besides, 
indigenous communities are assumed to attach 
more holistic values to genetic resources and 
to be interested in gaining respect and legal 
security for their traditional lifestyles, land 
and knowledge. 
4) Traditional farmers are stakeholders of the 
ITPGR in the sense that they provide in situ 
conservation of agrobiodiversity. We can as-
sume that most traditional farmers are not 
aware of the role the ITPGR assigns to them. 
However, farmers in developing countries are 
the principal recipients of the benefits of the 
trust fund, which are meant to be used for in 
situ conservation measures. 
5) NGOs and POs, as representatives of citi-
zens’ interests, figure as stakeholders either in 
the role of third parties to bilateral ABS 
agreements or as parties external to such 
agreements, seeking to influence their out-
come. As farmers’ organizations, NGOs rep-
resent stakeholders’ interests in the multilat-
eral system; as scientist-farmer networks, 
NGOs conduct in situ conservation projects. 
Interests of NGOs and POs have to be seen 
not only in terms of the content of their work, 
for example maximizing community participa-
tion, but also in terms of their organizational 
interests as moral entrepreneurs who seek to 
preserve legitimacy. 
6) Scientists and scientific institutions of 
developing and of developed countries are 
stakeholders in both bilateral and multilateral 
ABS. Under the CBD, national scientific insti-
tutions in the providing country are regularly 
involved in the collection or processing of ge-
netic resources. In many cases, they are a di-
rect party to a bilateral agreement and collect 
for a contracting scientific institution or com-
pany from a developed country. As members 
of the multilateral system, public agricultural 
research institutions such as members of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricul-
tural Research facilitate access to their ex situ 
collections and fix material transfer agree-
ments with commercial users of supplied 
PGRFA. Scientific institutions in general are 
assumed to have a strong interest in preserving 
free access to genetic resources for research 
(especially in developed countries) as well as 
in receiving technologies, either through bilat-
eral ABS agreements or from the multilateral 
system (especially in developing countries). 
7) Industry is the main commercial user of 
genetic resources. Research and development 
units of private companies are also subsumed 
under this group. While most companies em-
phasize the importance of screening technolo-
gies to find lead substances and acquire sam-
ples, a few companies have applied an ethno-
pharmacological approach, drawing explicitly 
on indigenous knowledge. Studies conducted 
thus far on industries’ opinions on the CBD 
note that companies are concerned about a 
lack of clarity concerning access rules as well 
as about high transaction costs. On the other 
hand, companies see access legislation as a 
potentially reliable legal environment for their 
operations47. The industry perspective will be 
presented in more detail in Section 3.4. 
                                                 
47 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), pp. 296-297. 
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3.3 Typology of Possible Benefits 
A broad range of benefits may arise from the 
commercialization of genetic resources, and a 
large number of different approaches to benefit-
sharing have emerged in practice. As a conse-
quence, the benefits accruing under benefit-
sharing agreements are equally diverse. What 
follows focuses on benefits for the source country. 
Benefits for commercial users of genetic resources 
arising from the marketing of products accessed 
through bilateral ABS agreements will therefore 
not be outlined here. Also, the majority of benefits 
presented are discussed in the context of bilateral 
ABS. Since the ITPGR is still very recent, little 
has been written about expected benefits. 
When using the term benefits, we are referring to 
those transfers that can be agreed upon in ABS 
agreements. It has to be considered, though, that 
the process of implementing the CBD in national 
access legislation as well as subsequent negotia-
tions of ABS agreements, may give rise to benefi-
cial effects which were not explicitly intended by 
the Convention. We will discuss these beneficial 
side-effects at the end of this section and concen-
trate for now on benefits in a narrow sense. 
Most frequently, benefits are categorized accord-
ing to whether they take on monetary or non-
monetary forms.48 Monetary benefits are cash 
payments, while non-monetary benefits may be 
regarded as payments in kind. Most non-monetary 
benefits have a monetary value that can be quanti-
fied, such as training costs, costs for laboratory 
equipment or profits forgone, for example when 
local populations are granted free access to devel-
oped medicines. It has to be recognized, though, 
that the monetary value of some non-monetary 
benefits is more difficult to assess, for example 
when local contributors are acknowledged in 
publications. 
                                                 
48 See Columbia University (1999), p. 74. 
Box 6:  The Costa Rican National Biodiversity Institute (INBio): The First Example of Institutionalized 
Benefit-Sharing 
Strengthening and reviving the value of biological diversity was the motto when, in 1989, INBio was established by 
the Costa Rican Ministry of Environment and Energy. INBio aims at conserving biodiversity within the country, 
developing inventories of the country’s biodiversity and using biological resources in a sustainable manner. To date, 
the institution comprises 28 research stations and offices in major conservation areas of Costa Rica and employs over 
165 people.a 
INBio attained fame in 1991 when it entered into the first benefit-sharing agreement between a drug company 
(Merck) and a biodiversity-rich country, and has since then figured in the literature as a template for ABS agree-
ments. In the meantime, the initial contract has been renewed and agreements with other companies have been 
signed.b 
Different types of benefits have already been realized. INBio emphasizes scientific and institutional capacity-
building as part of a long-term strategy. The institute obtained an upfront-payment of US$ 1m from Merck to estab-
lish a laboratory of its own. Merck delivered laboratory equipment and Diversa contributed another US$ 30,000 for 
the laboratory. Aside from that, INBio profits from training, joint research and technology transfer.c All partners pay 
sample fees, thus contributing to the operating costs. However, no royalties have been paid thus far because bio-
prospecting has not yet led to the successful development of a drug. 
Should other countries imitate INBio’s example? It would be premature to assess the results of the case, since it 
builds on long-term expectations regarding the value of genetic resources. If resources turn out to have a large com-
mercial value, this will mean royalties, and INBio will be in a good position to actively use and market the resources. 
If, on the other hand, commercial success fails to materialize, INBio will not be able to operate in a financially 
sustainable manner and would need large government subsidies to fund its work.d 
a See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 253. 
b INBio signed agreements with Bristol-Myers Squibb (1993), the Swiss-US-Company Givaudane Roure (1994), Diversa 
Corporation (1995) and the Italian INDENA on the development of new phytochemicals and phytomedicine (1996). See ten 
Kate / Laird (2000a), pp. 253-254. 
c See Columbia University (1999), pp.21-23 and ten Kate / Laird (2000a), pp. 256-257. 
d Barbier (2000), pp. 89-91 shares this pessimistic outlook and argues that social costs of biodiversity conservation are much 
higher than private revenues arising from bioprospecting contracts. Note, however, that this is not an argument against the ac-
tivities of INBio in general, which may be worthwhile from a social point of view. 
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However, with regard to relevance for stakeholders 
in providing countries, a temporal distinction 
between short-, medium- and long-term benefits 
seems most appropriate. Short-term benefits com-
prise those payments and in-kind transfers which 
immediately accompany access to genetic re-
sources. The medium term comprises the phase 
between the extraction of resources and the final 
commercialization that creates actual profits for the 
user. The long term refers to the point in time when 
successful product development has been achieved 
and profits arise from commercialization. Table 3 
presents an overview of types of benefits in order 
of time and notes whether benefits are predomi-
nantly monetary or non-monetary. 
Given the time lag between the collection of 
genetic resources and the commercialization of a 
Table 3:  Short-, Medium- and Long-Term Benefits for Developing Countries and their Monetary and Non-
Monetary Nature 
 benefit type monetary non-monetary
access to ex situ facilities and databases  X 
advance payments X  
bioprospecting fees (“up front fees”) X  
payments per sample (“sample fees”) X  
share in research budget and/or equipment for laboratories X  
fees to trust funds for conservation & sustainable use of biodiversity X  
Short term 
 
mutual agreement on salaries and preferential terms X  
acknowledgement in publications  X 
technology transfer under most preferential terms  X 
research collaboration (if possible in provider country)  X 
scientific capacity-building  X 
administrative capacity-building  X 
return of modified material  X 
maintenance of and contribution to ex situ collections  X 
participation in product development  X 
contributions to local economy  X 
research directed at local priority needs  X 
protection of local applications of IPR  X 
joint ventures X  
research funding X  
Medium term 
payments accompanying valorization (“milestone fees”) X  
free access of population to developed products  X 
access to research results and exchange of experience  X 
joint ownership of patents & other IPR  X 
participation in value added X  
Long term 
share in royalties X  
Source: Adapted from the Bonn Guidelines and Columbia University (1999), p. 75  
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subsequently developed product – normally 5 to 
20 years for pharmaceutical products – most types 
of benefit-sharing take the form of advance con-
tributions. Types of benefits that can be realized 
in the short term mainly take the form of small-
scale monetary transfers. Hence the expectations 
in some provider countries of rapid and large 
monetary returns for their biodiversity are not 
likely to be met. In the medium term, though, 
providing countries stand to gain from non-
monetary benefits such as the transfer of know-
how and technology. Only in the long run, as 
benefits eventually arise from the commercializa-
tion of genetic resources, are stakeholders in the 
providing countries apt to receive monetary re-
turns such as a share in royalties. 
The majority of benefits realized so far through 
bilateral ABS agreements are reported to be non-
monetary.49 Where benefit-sharing focuses on 
non-monetary issues such as capacity-building 
and the provision of equipment for legal and 
scientific institutions in the providing countries, 
the result is enhanced options for further bio-
prospection and consequently for additional 
potential commercialization. Types of benefit-
sharing which aim at enhancing local infrastruc-
ture are an investment in the countries’ ability to 
provide genetic resources in a form that meets 
users’ demands. On the other hand, reservations 
have been expressed concerning the sustainability 
of infrastructure enhancement based on benefit-
sharing. According to this view, scientific infra-
structure is build up to match the needs of the 
receiving party. An eventual withdrawal of the 
receiving party may signal to other potentially 
interested parties that results of bioprospection are 
no longer expected to yield options for commer-
cialization. Provider countries could then be left 
with an oversized infrastructure, but no demand 
for genetic resources. 
Another important issue in benefit-sharing is who 
in the providing country is actually to receive 
benefits. Table 4 presents the same typology for 
benefits as Table 3, but notes recipient stake-
                                                 
49 See Brand / Görg (2001), p. 28. 
holders for each type of benefit. The overview 
shows scientists and scientific institutions in 
providing countries to be recipients of the broad-
est range of types of benefits. This can be inter-
preted in relation to the investment character of 
monetary or non-monetary transfers to this group 
of stakeholders, as noted above. Apparently, user 
interest in enhancing collecting and processing 
capacities in providing countries has led to a 
larger number of benefit types geared to local 
scientists. 
In discussing the development-related conse-
quences of benefit-sharing, it should not be 
forgotten that the implementation process of the 
CBD as such entails a potential for beneficial 
impacts on development. Access to resources as 
emphasized in the Bonn Guidelines requires a 
consultation process involving different stake-
holders: local and indigenous communities, scien-
tists, governments, and industry. This is intended 
to place marginalized groups such as local and 
indigenous communities in a position in which 
they are respected as negotiation partners and find 
a chance to be heard, provided their government 
does not take impeding measures. Moreover, 
governments are encouraged in the course of the 
implementation of the CBD to introduce laws 
clarifying property rights for local and indigenous 
communities. Hence implementation of the CBD 
may have two accompanying effects: it makes of 
otherwise marginalized stakeholders partners that 
are heard in consultations, and it encourages the 
introduction of land rights. The ability to negotiate 
on one’s own behalf and the possession of rights 
are preconditions not only for sustainable devel-
opment but also for multi-stakeholder approaches. 
The implementation process thus may bring about 
unintended but beneficial side-effects by function-
ing as a vehicle for empowerment and may in this 
way contribute to sustainable development. 
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Table 4:  Types of Benefits and their Recipients in Developing Countries 
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access to ex situ facilities and databases     X 
advance payments X X    
bioprospecting fees (“up-front fees”) X X    
payments per sample (“sample fees”) X X    
share in research budget and/or equipment for laboratories     X 
fees to trust funds for conservation & sustainable use of biodiversity    X X 
mutual agreement on salaries and preferential terms  X    
acknowledgement in publications     X 
technology transfer under most preferential terms     X 
research collaboration (if possible in provider country)   X  X 
scientific capacity-building     X 
administrative capacity-building X     
return of modified material     X 
maintenance of and contribution to ex situ collections     X 
participation in product development  X X  X 
contributions to local economy  X    
research directed at local priority needs  X   X 
protection of local applications of IPR  X    
joint ventures  X X  X 
research funding     X 
payments accompanying valorization (“milestone fees”) X X   X 
free access of population in case of product development (e.g. medicines)  X    
access to research results and exchange of experiences   X  X 
joint ownership of patents & other IPR  X X  X 
participation in value adding  X X   
share in royalties X X    
Source: Adapted from the Bonn Guidelines and Columbia University (1999), p. 75  
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3.4 Reasons for the Limited Success of 
Bilateral ABS Agreements: The In-
dustry Perspective 
It is difficult to assess whether the new interna-
tional regulations on access and benefit-sharing 
under the CBD have changed the amount of 
benefits flowing to developing countries. Even 
before the Convention, benefit-sharing was an 
accepted part of academic or commercial practice. 
However, the CBD and – in the future – the 
ITPGR are set to institutionalize these voluntary 
types of cooperation. But thus far few successful 
bilateral ABS agreements have been concluded. 
This section, based on the literature and our own 
interviews, takes a look at the obstacles seen by 
industry and the latter’s strategies for dealing with 
them. The main points brought forward by indus-
try are: a lack of clarity and legal security, exces-
sive bureaucracy involving high transaction costs, 
and unrealistic expectations on benefit-sharing by 
governments and provider institutions. Given this 
critical perception, industry is responding by 
developing substitution strategies: avoiding coun-
tries with ABS legislation in place, decreasing in 
situ collection activities, and employing interme-
diary institutions from developing countries.50 
Industry’s most common concern is a perceived 
lack of clarity in many countries. Companies 
hold the CBD responsible for obligations that 
most developing countries are not able to ade-
quately fulfill. They find it hard to identify the 
relevant and competent access authority and the 
necessary requirements. In this way countries 
make it difficult even for well-intentioned compa-
nies to follow their policies. This concern is 
critical in that most companies – theoretically – 
regard the legal security the CBD could bring as 
one of its major advantages. Large companies in 
particular would prefer to follow clear-cut rules in 
order to avoid any accusations of biopiracy. 
In countries that have implemented national ABS 
legislation, business complains that excessive 
bureaucracy causes considerable transaction 
                                                 
50 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), pp. 297-303. 
costs. The existing procedures are seen as too 
complicated, too lengthy and non-transparent. 
Tedious negotiations with government agencies, 
travel and communication expenses, staff time 
and long delays until applications are completed 
tend to make bioprospecting uncompetitive in 
these countries, from the viewpoint of the users 
(see Box 7 for industry perceptions of the Philip-
pine ABS regulation). 
Commercial users accuse governments and pro-
vider institutions of expecting the value of ge-
netic resources to be unrealistically high. 
Economists are debating the possible development 
of research on genetic resources, and many argue 
that the potential to obtain monetary benefits from 
them is rather limited.51 As a representative from 
Bayer mentioned, research on natural substances 
is today only a marginal part of their medical 
research portfolio. Nowadays, fewer natural 
substances are needed than before, and new tech-
nologies even make it possible to successfully 
reanalyze existing company collections. This does 
not mean that natural genetic resources are not 
relevant, but their share in the value of a newly 
developed pharmaceutical product may not be in 
line with provider estimates. If this argument 
holds, developing countries will have to down-
grade their expectations on benefits, and their 
prospects to enter into profitable ABS agreements 
will be limited, even in the long run.52 
The present legal and policy climate could result 
in decreased demand for in situ genetic resources 
and less benefit-sharing than has been expected by 
policy-makers. Companies adapt their strategies 
to the new situation mainly in three ways. The 
major substitution strategy is to simply circum-
vent countries with stringent access regimes.53 
This is easy to do, since most countries of the 
                                                 
51 See for example Barbier (2000), pp. 89-91, and Colum-
bia University (1999), p. 87. 
52 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 297 and ten Kate / Laird 
(2000b), p. 251. 
53 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 301. 
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world have not implemented any regulation yet.54 
In any case, it is virtually impossible for most 
developing countries to effectively control the 
(illegal) export of genetic resources, since surveil-
lance costs would be prohibitively high. Second, 
business is consolidating its activities in natural 
products research. Collecting programs are being 
downscaled and concentrated on fewer countries, 
companies rely increasingly on ex situ collections 
that do not fall under the provisions of the CBD, 
or they refine their technologies with an eye to 
getting along without in situ collections. “Compa-
nies and research groups are turning to other 
methods such as combinatorial chemis-
try/biochemistry and the extraction of microbial 
DNA from environmental samples (e.g. soil sam-
ples which can be collected without going to 
exotic foreign countries)”, as Gordon Cragg of the 
                                                 
54 Moreover, many European countries still have some 
simple options for bioprospecting in the tropics because 
of the French and British overseas territories that fall un-
der the jurisdiction of the European Union. 
National Cancer Institute noted as one alternative. 
Third, it has become more common to engage 
intermediaries as brokers to either evade legisla-
tion or to comply with regulations with the sup-
port of a local collaborator. This strategy could, as 
a side-effect, lead to capacity-building in develop-
ing countries. 
In conclusion, the economic value of genetic 
resources depends not only on science and tech-
nology but also on law and policy. Companies 
basically have four options to deal with ABS 
regulations: ignore them, work around them, work 
with them, or seek to shape their further develop-
ment and implementation. The two last options 
seem to be the most recommendable from the 
point of view of all stakeholders, but thus far they 
have been the ones used least.55 
                                                 
55 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 300. 
Box 7:  Bioprospectors’ Perspectives on the Philippine Access Legislation 
Excerpt from a letter by Manheim, Fox, Bennet and Turner on behalf of Bristol-Myers Squibb, to the Hon. Timothy 
Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Department of State, USA, 3 November 1995:a 
“A recent Executive Order from the Philippines implementing these provisions of the Convention creates a severe 
impediment to any natural products research by Bristol-Myers Squibb and its collaborators in that country... Indeed it 
must be emphasized to the Convention parties that Bristol-Myers Squibb will not pursue natural products research in 
those countries that impose requirements similar to those contained in the Philippine Executive Order... 
[G]overnment initiatives that place onerous restrictions on those seeking access to genetic resources or do not afford 
appropriate protection to intellectual property rights will result in fewer efforts to survey natural sources for pharma-
ceuticals and that will ultimately work to the detriment of environmental protection... Among other things, one 
requirement of such an agreement is that, for endemic species, ‘the technology must be made available to a desig-
nated Philippine institution and can be used commercially and locally without paying a royalty to a Collector or 
Principal...’ Although the Philippine EO goes on to provide that other arrangements may be negotiated ‘where 
appropriate and applicable’, this requirement amounts to nothing more than a compulsory licensing scheme. More-
over, while somewhat ambiguous, the provision would appear to allow the designated Philippine Institution to use 
the technology commercially both within and outside of the country. This scheme is flatly inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IPR (TRIPS) negotiated in the Uruguay Round of the GATT ... [Consulta-
tions] to the best of our knowledge, ... did not include pharmaceutical firms such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, whose 
natural products research efforts will be seriously undermined by the Philippines EO and other similar initiatives.” 
Gordon Cragg, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) in the USA:b 
“My reading of the situation is that the requirements (no matter how well intentioned) are so onerous (PIC from local 
municipalities, town meetings, advertising intentions in local media, etc.) that it is almost impossible for a foreign 
organization to initiate/perform collaborative research. ... Another problem is that there does not seem to be a single 
government agency to deal with, which makes trying to get permits/agreements a very complex, if not impossible, 
process. 
a ten Kate/Laird (2000a), p. 301. 
b Personal communication, 5 April 2002. 
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PART II: 
THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
4 The Practice of Bilateral Access and 
Benefit-Sharing in the Philippines 
The Philippines was the first country worldwide 
to issue a comprehensive set of regulations on 
biodiversity prospecting. It therefore provides a 
pioneering example of how to translate the CBD 
principles on access and benefit-sharing into 
national law and action. Philippine scientists had 
pushed for the idea of bioprospecting legislation 
and were supported by some politicians and 
NGOs. In 1996, legislation was complete and 
stakeholders started out implementing it with 
great enthusiasm. Nevertheless, visible results of 
the regulations are still rare. Some problems 
arose, criticism was raised from different stake-
holders’ points of view, and options for reform are 
being discussed. This chapter provides back-
ground information about the Philippine ABS 
legislation, analyzes the reasons for the limited 
number of ABS agreements, assesses the devel-
opment-related impacts of the past agreements 
and presents some policy options to improve the 
present situation. 
4.1 Background Information 
This section provides some introductory informa-
tion about the state of biodiversity as well as the 
legal setting and stakeholders of ABS in the 
Philippines. Finally, it presents a short overview 
of pending and concluded ABS agreements. 
4.1.1 The State of Biodiversity: Rich, but 
in Danger 
The Philippines holds a very high rate of biodiver-
sity, though the latter is experiencing an alarming 
rate of decline. Over 40,000 wildlife species are 
found here in a great number of different ecosys-
tems such as forests, coral reefs and mangroves.56 
The country’s forests are among the world’s most 
diverse. Recently, the World Rainforest Move-
ment reported about 14,500 plant species in the 
country, of which 8,000 species are flowering and 
roughly 6,500 species are non-flowering plants.57 
This means that the Philippines harbors around 
5 % of the world’s known flora. It is assumed that 
192 species of wildlife are endangered on the 
archipelago.58 
Moreover, it is the great number of endemic59 
species that makes the country’s biodiversity so 
valuable to humankind and users of biological 
resources. There are approximately 3,500 endemic 
species of flowering plants, about 111 endemic 
species have been found among lower plant 
forms.60 All together, an estimated 30 – 40 % of 
Philippine flora is endemic.61 For the future, it can 
be expected that the – still largely undiscovered – 
Philippine marine resources will provide a great 
reservoir for scientific and commercial applica-
tions. 
The disappearance of ecosystems in the Philip-
pines is a major cause for the biological meltdown 
during the past decades, which is unparalleled in 
Southeast Asia and perhaps in the world.62 Lim-
ited political efforts in environmental protection, 
an economic system that fails to place value on 
the environment, lack of knowledge and a fast-
growing population have accelerated forest degra-
dation, which poses a grave threat to this global 
natural heritage.63For this reason, Conservation 
International, an NGO, has declared the Philip-
pines the most urgent biodiversity conservation 
                                                 
56 See Wood (no year), p. 2. 
57  See World Rainforest Movement (2001). 
58  See Wood (no year), p. 2. 
59 Endemic means that these species exist only in one 
region worldwide, in this case exclusivly in the Philippi-
nes. 
60 See La Viña / Caleda /  Baylon (1997), p. V. 
61 See World Rainforest Movement (2001). 
62 See La Viña / Caleda / Baylon (1997), p. V. 
63 See Barber / La Viña (1997), pp. 118-119. 
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priority on the planet.64 At present, only 18 % of 
the original forest cover is left and 180,000 ha of 
forest are destroyed every year. Moreover, only 
27 % of the original mangrove forests remain. The 
main direct causes of forest loss in the Philippines 
are over-logging, migration, and conversion of 
forest lands to agricultural lands. In the mangrove 
ecosystems extraction of fuel and construction 
materials and development of fish ponds have led 
to environmental degradation and thus biodiver-
sity loss.65 Even though lack of data on species 
and scientific uncertainty about extinction rates 
makes it difficult to prove exactly how many 
species are already lost or threatened by extinc-
tion, the magnitude of the problem in the Philip-
pines cannot be ignored. 
4.1.2 Institutional and Legal Setting 
The Philippine legislation on bioprospection is 
one of the first of its kind worldwide. It is there-
fore pathbreaking as an example of how to trans-
late the ABS provisions of the Convention on 
Biodiversity into national law. This section briefly 
introduces the Philippine legal setting on bio-
prospection and other laws influencing this set-
ting, before later sections concentrate on experi-
ences with its implementation. 
Presidential Executive Order 247 on Bio-
prospection and Rules of Implementation  
Presidential Executive Order 247 (EO 247) of 
1995 and Department Administrative Order 96-20 
(DAO 96-20) in 1996 established the legal frame-
work for bioprospecting and regulation of access 
to biological resources in the Philippines. EO 
24766 was enacted in May 1995. It “... covers 
                                                 
64 See Chanco (1998), p. 1. 
65 See Wood (no year), p. 1. 
66 The explicit designation of the Order is“Prescribing 
Guidelines and Establishing a Regulatory Framework for 
the Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources, 
Their By-Products and Derivatives, for Scientific and 
prospecting of all biological and genetic re-
sources in the public domain, including natural 
growths on private lands, which foreign and local 
individuals, entities, organizations whether gov-
ernment or private – intend to utilize.”67 In its 
first section, EO 247 recognizes the clear frame-
work for property rights to biological resources 
put forward in the Philippine constitution: the 
Philippine State owns all forests, wildlife, flora 
and fauna, and other natural resources (Section 2, 
Article XII). While EO 247 sets the legal frame-
work, in June 1996 it was complemented by the 
DAO 96-20, which lays down the administrative 
rules on implementing EO 247.68 
The regulations include four basic elements: setup 
of an Inter-Agency Committee for Biological and 
Genetic Resources, a scheme of mandatory re-
search agreements, a regulation on achieving prior 
informed consent from local communities, and 
requirements on conforming with environmental 
protection.69  
An Inter-Agency Committee for Biological and 
Genetic Resources (IACBGR), located within 
the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources and supported by its Technical Secre-
tariat, was set up to coordinate the processing of 
applications for bioprospection and discuss im-
provements to the existing rules on bioprospec-
tion. A multi-stakeholder approach was chosen to 
do justice to all stakeholders and their differing 
interests and to ensure participation of all partners 
by reaching mutually agreed terms. 
Mandatory research agreements are concluded 
between collectors and the government of the 
Philippines, while the IACBGR acts as the author-
ity responsible for the negotiation process. The 
agreements contain minimum terms on the provi-
sion of information and samples, technological 
                                                                            
Commercial Purposes and For Other Purposes.” The full 
text of EO 247 is available at www.psdn.org/chmbio. 
67 La Viña / Caleda / Baylon (1997), p. iii. 
68 The full text of DAO 96-20 is available at www.psdn. 
org/chmbio. 
69 See La Viña / Caleda / Baylon (1997), p. vii. 
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cooperation and benefit-sharing. There are two 
types of research agreements: academic research 
agreements (ARA) are concluded with universi-
ties, academic institutions, government agencies 
for the purpose of research only, while commer-
cial research agreements (CRA) are concluded 
with private parties, corporations or foreign enti-
ties. Requirements for CRA are slightly more 
stringent and contain more benefit-sharing provi-
sions, since commercialization of research results 
is seen as their intent. 
Prior Informed Consent from local and indige-
nous communities plays a key role in the applica-
tion process for ABS agreements in the Philip-
pines. Before any kind of prospecting begins, the 
applicant must obtain the consent by fully disclos-
ing to the local community the intent and scope of 
planned activities. It depends on the location and 
legal status of the area, whose PIC must be 
sought. Usually, the local signatory is the head of 
the Local Government Unit responsible for collec-
tions on communal land, the Council of Elders or 
a recognized head of an indigenous community 
responsible for ancestral domains, the Protected 
Area Management Board for protected areas, or a 
private land owner. 
Requirements to conform with environmental 
protection are formulated by the IACBGR and 
must be met by the applicant. EO 247 stipulates 
that all prospecting activities and their results 
must not directly or indirectly harm biodiversity, 
ecological balances or the inhabitants of the area 
where collection takes place. Whether or not these 
requirements are met is examined by environ-
mental impact assessment, which is mandatory for 
both types of research agreements. In practice, the 
Technical Secretariat determines if the assessment 
actually needs to be conducted. Especially in 
ARAs, it is frequently not demanded.  
Philippine Laws Affecting the Regulations 
on Bioprospection 
The use of biological resources is also affected by 
a number of other laws, in particular the Indige-
nous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), the National 
Integrated Protected Area System Act, the Tradi-
tional and Alternative Healthcare Act, the Na-
tional Museum Act and the Wildlife Act 
(RA 9147). The regulations are usually corre-
sponding, but in a few cases other laws can 
change the legal force or interpretation of EO 247. 
This especially holds true for the Wildlife Act, 
which will lead to a significant reform of Philip-
pine bioprospecting legislation. In the context of 
the present study, only IPRA and the Wildlife Act 
have a major impact on Philippine bioprospecting 
legislation and will be presented briefly. 
The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act was enacted 
in 1997 to recognize, protect and promote the 
rights of indigenous cultural communities and 
indigenous peoples. It is regarded as one of the 
strongest national laws to protect indigenous 
rights.70 It creates a National Commission on 
Indigenous Peoples and emphasizes indigenous 
land rights. The definition of the term ancestral 
domain includes property rights on lands, inland 
waters, coastal areas, and also includes the natural 
resources therein in the land rights of indigenous 
peoples. Free and prior informed consent, i.e. the 
consensus of all members of the Indigenous 
Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples 
(ICCs/IPs), is the precondition of all outsider 
activities in an ancestral domain. According to 
Section 34 of the law, “ICCs/IPs are entitled to 
the recognition of the full ownership and control 
and protection of their cultural and intellectual 
rights.”71 And: “Access to biological and genetic 
resources and to indigenous knowledge related to 
the conservation, utilization and enhancement of 
these resources, shall be allowed within ancestral 
domains of the ICCs/IPs only with a free and 
prior informed consent of such communities, 
obtained in accordance with customary laws of 
the concerned community” (Section 35).72  
EO 247 and IPRA both allow access to biological 
and genetic resources within ancestral domains in 
                                                 
70 See Barber / Glowka / La Viña (2002), p. 384. 
71 See Congress of the Philippines (1997), p. 13. 
72  See Congress of the Philippines (1997), p. 13. 
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accordance with the customary law of an indige-
nous community. But the procedure of achieving 
PIC as set out in EO 247 is not the same as the 
procedure for reaching free and prior informed 
consent (FPIC) under IPRA (see Box 13). Since 
IPRA supercedes EO 247, FPIC should be the 
modus operandi followed in ancestral domains.73 
There have been some attempts to conduct FPIC 
for bioprospecting activities, but thus far no 
experience has been made with FPIC for applica-
tions that fall under the scope of EO 247.74 
The Wildlife Act75 was signed into law in 2001. 
Its main objective is the protection of the envi-
ronment and biological and genetic resources in 
the Philippines. One of the important improve-
ments emphasized is the renewal of policies 
regarding sanctions for violations against wildlife, 
which had not been amended since the 1940s. The 
Wildlife Act defines bioprospection as the collec-
tion of material for commercial use only. For 
academic research, a free-of-charge permit is 
provided for by Section 15 to allow access to 
biological and genetic resources. Section 4 states 
that the DENR and DA will share all responsibili-
ties for the Philippine flora and fauna, leaving 
terrestrial wildlife with the DENR and assigning 
aquatic wildlife to the DA. Only one exception is 
defined in this section, placing the Palawan envi-
ronment fully in the hands of the Palawan Council 
for Sustainable Development. Moreover, monitor-
ing of activities involving the use of natural 
resources is an aspect expressly emphasized by 
the Act. 
Speculation about the influence of the Wildlife 
Act on the regulation of bioprospection is mani-
                                                 
73 See Chapter I, Sec. 4 and Chapter III, Sec. 14, 15 in 
Congress of the Philippines (2001). 
74 For example, the Apu Agbibilin Community Inc. in 
Bukidnon, Mindanao has developed its own local prior 
informed consent procedure, taking IPRA as the legal 
basis for exertion of rights to resources. The local PIC 
process is continuosly implemented for ongoing bi-
oprospecting activities. For more information, see 
SEARICE (2001c). 
75 Congress of the Philippines (2001). 
fold. This will only end after the Implementing 
Rules and Regulations of the Wildlife Act clarify 
the precise consequences. The new Act is seen by 
the DENR as a chance to improve the regulation 
of ABS for biological and genetic resources by 
including the experiences made with the EO 247 
in the new guidelines. The DENR proposes regu-
lating commercial research under the Wildlife 
Act, while academic research on genetic re-
sources, no longer defined as bioprospection, will 
still fall under EO 247. SEARICE, while not 
wholly opposed to reforms of the present regula-
tion, insists on maintaining the basic ideas of 
EO 247 in the Wildlife Act. It is not clear yet what 
role will be given to the IACBGR, since it is not 
mentioned in the new law and exclusive authority 
is assigned to DENR and DA. Under the Wildlife 
Act, bioprospection in the province of Palawan 
will probably be regulated at a decentralized level 
and no longer fall under national law. The Wild-
life Act will provide sanctions for violations of the 
regulations on bioprospection. 
4.1.3 Philippine Stakeholders in Bilateral 
ABS 
Stakeholders to bilateral ABS agreements in the 
Philippines are the state, represented by its com-
petent agencies, local and indigenous communi-
ties, scientific institutions, non-governmental 
organizations of different political alignments, and 
companies. Foreign enterprises and scientific 
institutions are classified as another group with 
common features. One key finding of the study on 
stakeholders’ characteristics is that that opinions 
on the ABS legislation appeared to be very het-
erogeneous within stakeholder groups. This 
section introduces the different groups of stake-
holders, relating the international findings pre-
sented in Chapter three to the Philippine case. 
Under the CBD, the nation state is assigned with 
the responsibility of regulating access to biologi-
cal resources on its territory. In the Philippines, 
regulation is acted on mainly by two ministries: 
first, the Department of Environmental and Natu-
ral Resources, including the Protected Areas and 
Wildlife Bureau (PAWB), responsible for terres-
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trial resources, which acts as a focal point for the 
administration of bioprospecting activities. 
PAWB hosts the Inter-Agency Committee on 
Biological and Genetic Resources (IACBGR), the 
regulatory body most central for bioprospection 
under EO 247. Second, the Department of Agri-
culture, whose the Bureau for Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is responsible for 
marine bioprospection. 
The concept of inter-agency committees like the 
IACBGR, whose idea is to bring concerned agen-
cies and stakeholders from different parts of 
society together, has frequently been described as 
a legacy of post-Marcos times. After years of 
autocracy, the governments following Marcos felt 
that more participation of society was called for 
and that problems could best be tackled by having 
different agencies work jointly on them. For 
environmental politics, the Philippine Council for 
Sustainable Development, set up in the wake of 
the Rio-Summit, has acted as an important stake-
holder in fostering the inter-agency approach to 
regulating bioprospection. Since then, overlapping 
spheres of responsibility and divergent agency 
approaches have led to a certain degree of skepti-
cism among stakeholders, who question the use-
fulness of Inter-Agency Committees in general 
and of IACBGR in particular. 
Local communities, given a mandate to decide 
over their local resources, come into the picture 
when bioprospection takes place on communal 
lands, which is always the case if the site of 
collection is not privately owned land, part of an 
environmentally protected area or an indigenous 
ancestral domain. The CBD calls for prior in-
formed consent from source communities, which 
is seen as a key condition in the Philippines and 
has been implemented under EO 247 as part of the 
access determination procedure. The political 
organization of the Philippines on the local level 
includes barangays (of approximately 500 house-
holds), represented by a barangay captain, and 
municipalities, comprising several barangays and 
represented by a mayor. One of these community 
representatives is defined on a case-by-case basis 
to sign PIC certificates. The active involvement of 
the local community in the PIC negotiations thus 
depends largely on the commitment of local 
political elites and awareness-raising by NGOs. 
The Philippines is home to about 4.5m indigenous 
Filipinos, belonging to more than 70 ethno-
linguistic groups.76 The most frequently quoted 
characteristic of indigenous peoples’ communi-
ties is their diversity in terms of cultural lifestyles, 
customary laws and living conditions, but also in 
terms of their attitudes towards the utility of the 
natural resources on their lands. Some communi-
ties have developed management plans compati-
ble with economic uses. Others have preferred a 
more holistic approach, assigning cosmological 
relevance to their natural environment and there-
fore rejecting most interventions on it. What many 
indigenous communities have in common is a 
historically grown, skeptical attitude towards the 
potential good that commercial ventures in their 
territories can do for them. Bioprospection is put 
into a context of activities such as logging, mining 
and dam-building which in the past have curtailed 
indigenous rights and led to the exploitation of 
indigenous communities. Another aspect contrib-
uting to a negative outlook, at least for the more 
radical of the indigenous communities and their 
organizations, is that the laws seen as relevant by 
them for bioprospection in ancestral domains are 
rejected as a whole.77 While activities such as 
mining or logging have to be seen as having a 
much more significant impact on the life of in-
digenous communities,78 bioprospection encoun-
ters, for the reasons mentioned, many reservations 
and is treated as another external intervention. 
                                                 
76 See Singh (1996), p. 231; additional information at 
www.nnca.gov.ph. 
77 Namely, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) and, 
arguing that ancestral lands have been declared protected 
areas, the National Integrated Protected Areas System 
Act (NIPAS) are seen as such laws. The EO 247 is hard-
ly recognized among these indigenous groups. See Cor-
dillera Peoples Alliance / DINTEG (1998). 
78 Typically, among the applications for permitting activi-
ties in ancestral domains piling up at the NCIP during 
the time of a moratorim 2001/2002, not a single one was 
concerned with bioprospecting. 
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Internationally renowned for its strong and vigor-
ous civil society, the Philippines has a large 
number of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), some of which have played an important 
role in the implementation of ABS regulations. In 
some cases NGOs are appointed by the govern-
ment to advocate national interests in the country 
or even in international debates. Attitudes towards 
bioprospection range from comprehensive rejec-
tion of it as biopiracy and/or capitalist exploitation 
to qualified approval as long as the rules are 
adhered to. The NGOs that generally disapprove 
of bioprospection mostly take a “no patents on 
life!” position which consequently leads them to 
regard ABS agreements as a “pact with the devil” 
on account of their inherent tolerance towards 
exclusive intellectual property rights. NGOs 
participating actively in the implementation 
process and in the IACBGR have taken a more 
differentiated stance, encouraging bioprospection 
that follows the rules laid down in EO 247 and 
that is respectful to communities’ rights. Those 
NGOs have gained a position of power and a 
reputation as “centers of competence” which 
make them important actors in the enforcement of 
ABS legislation. 
Members of the Philippine scientific community 
once set the consultations on EO 247 going and 
have promoted the involvement of other stake-
holder groups in the negotiation process.79 A 
group of natural chemistrists announced its will to 
end the “exploitation” of the country’s natural 
resources by foreigners and aimed at fostering 
technology transfer to the Philippines. Scientists 
from universities or public research institutions 
are central actors in the country’s research and 
development activities. From the very beginning, 
however, opinions among the scientific commu-
nity were split over bioprospecting legislation. 
While some actively applied for academic and 
commercial research agreements, others remained 
skeptical or even hostile. Both the only two CRAs 
and the only ARA that have been signed so far 
involve the University of the Philippines in Dili-
man, Quezon City, which has also been a driving 
                                                 
79 See Swiderska / Daño / Dubois (2001), pp. 10, 17. 
force in the implementation of EO 247. Other 
scientific institutions have thus far avoided sign-
ing ARAs for bioprospection by using alternative 
sources to substitute for genetic materials from the 
wilderness.80 Still others state that they are 
refraining from all activities that would require 
new materials to be collected, the aim being to 
avoid accusations of biopiracy.81 The Philippine 
National Museum, a publicly funded institute with 
the job to do taxonomy, has taken yet another 
approach, altogether disputing that its academic 
operations fall under EO 247. In short, scientific 
institutions have reacted to the new ABS legisla-
tion with variations of affirmation, exit and voice.  
The industrial sector in the Philippines, one 
potential commercial user of genetic resources, 
has not shown any major interest in ABS legisla-
tion so far. Only one CRA has been applied for by 
a Philippine company, which was approved by the 
IACBGR in 2002 (see 4.1.4). Reasons for the 
relatively small-scale response can be seen in the 
low level of relevance that research and develop-
ment has for national companies. An exception, 
the Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Association 
of the Philippines, bringing together about 80 
multinational and national companies, has partici-
pated, as a representative of industry, in the con-
sultations on EO 247. The association echoes to a 
large extent the concerns of multinational compa-
nies. 
Foreign scientific institutions and companies 
are accorded equal treatment under current ABS 
legislation. All research agreements which involve 
non-Philippine parties are generally classified as 
commercial, and this obliges them to follow 
stricter rules. This makes it more difficult to 
undertake scientific research in the Philippines for 
purely academic reasons. Since the perceptions of 
                                                 
80 A scholar of Ateneo University told us that his institute 
has been acquiring materials from the university‘s back-
yard and from properties of student parents in the pro-
vinces. 
81 Among those are Siliman University and IRRI (which is 
not a Philippine institution but falls under EO 247 for 
their collections in the Philippines). 
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international stakeholders are important for the 
results of the Philippine ABS legislation, they 
have already been described in more detail in 
Section 3.4. 
4.1.4 Record of Past Research 
Applications 
The number of research agreements concluded is 
smaller than had been expected by the initiators of 
EO 247. As of April 2002, 15 CRAs and 20 ARAs 
had been applied for to the IACBGR’s Technical 
Secretariat. Of these, for 19 applications the 
IACBGR demanded research agreements, one was 
passed on to the Palawan Council for Sustainable 
Development, while the others were referred to 
the PAWB for issuance of a free permit.82 
A closer look at the applications83 that fall under 
the scope of EO 247 shows that only six have 
been approved by the IACBGR. Five have been 
explicitly withdrawn by the applicants, with the 
applicants complaining about the regulations. 
Most prominently, two collaborations with the US 
                                                 
82 See PAWB (2001) and PAWB (1996-2002). 
83 Table A-I in the Annex provides detailed information 
about the applications. 
National Cancer Institute have ended, and the 
researchers have chosen to collect specimens in 
another Asian country, avoiding Philippine bio-
prospecting legislation. For a large number of 
applications, however, it is not clear if they are 
still pending or have been withdrawn, since appli-
cants have – for years – not responded to the 
PAWB’s requests for further documents. 
The length of the application process for those 
agreements that have been approved can be seen 
in Figure 5. The light part of the bar shows the 
time from application to approval by the IACBGR 
and the dark part shows the time taken by the 
responsible departments to finally sign the agree-
ments. It is obvious that the application procedure 
takes a long time, in some cases more than three 
years. Two of these agreements, the commercial 
research agreements of the University of the 
Philippines’ Marine Science Institute (“UP-MSI 
Concepción” and “UP-MSI Cruz”), can be re-
garded as model agreements and will be presented 
as a case study in more detail in boxes in the 
following sections. 
Figure 5:  Length of Application Process 
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4.2 Reasons for the Small Number of 
ABS Agreements Concluded 
The present section will ask three questions in 
order to find possible reasons for the low number 
of research agreements concluded in the Philip-
pines. First, is the application procedure too 
complicated and too lengthy? Second, is the 
process of prior informed consent (PIC) too costly 
and too time-consuming? And, third, are benefit 
claims exaggerated? The two latter points, the PIC 
process and benefit expectations, were not found 
to be responsible for the relatively low number of 
agreements, while the practice of the application 
procedure involves various bottlenecks that make 
the legal access procedure complicated and 
lengthy. All in all, however, the small number of 
ABS agreements cannot be explained by problems 
of implementation in the Philippines alone. Obvi-
ously, users are not too inclined to follow the 
comparatively strict rules in the Philippines as 
long as they have alternatives. 
4.2.1 Complicated Access Procedure? 
Initially, Philippine access legislation was praised 
internationally for its efforts to implement the 
Convention’s objectives on access and benefit-
sharing. There has always been, of course, criti-
cism from industry, which frequently complains 
about source countries’ access regulations. Typi-
cal concerns are the lack of clarity concerning 
access rules and the transaction costs involved.84 
The main finding of the following section is that 
the access procedure established by EO 247 can 
be regarded as a good approach in theory, though 
it nevertheless has some bottlenecks that might 
explain the low number of RAs. The main prob-
lems identified are the low information level of 
applicants, the long processing time of the agen-
cies involved, deficiencies in the work of the 
multistakeholder bodies, and the time it takes for 
Secretaries to sign. 
The Application Procedure in Theory 
The application procedure has been designed to 
ensure transparency, participation of relevant 
stakeholders and an equitable sharing of benefits, 
thus mirroring the ideas behind the CBD. In order 
to apply for a research agreement under EO 247, it 
is necessary to go through a number of different 
steps (see Figure 6). First, the applicant has to 
submit the application form and three copies of 
the research proposal to the IACBGR, the central 
body under ABS legislation. Second, the Techni-
cal Secretariat of the IACBGR performs an initial 
screening. At this stage, the Secretariat decides 
whether or not an application falls under the scope 
                                                 
84 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), p. 297 and Section 3.4. 
Box 8:  IACBGR and Technical Secretariat 
Under the law, the IACBGR is composed of one representative from each of the following institutions: the Depart-
ment of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Health, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Philippine National Museum, non-
governmental organizations, and Peoples’ Organizations. Two representatives belong to the Philippine scientific 
community. 
Its most important tasks encompass the processing of applications for academic as well as commercial research 
agreements, assessment and possible recommendation of approval to the government agency concerned. Further-
more, it is expected to ensure that the conditions of the research agreements are observed by the competent bodies. 
Funding for the IACBGR is to come from contributions of the appropriate and concerned government departments. 
Annexed to the IACBGR, EO 247 provides for a Technical Secretariat. It is  composed of staff from the Protected 
Areas and Wildlife Bureau (PAWB) and designated personnel from other IACBGR-member institutions. The chair is 
held by the director of PAWB. Its main tasks include information and preparation of IACBGR meetings as well as 
the preparation of minutes of the meetings, initial screening of proposals, initial review and evaluation of applica-
tions, dissemination of information to applicants and the leadership of the Inter-Agency Commission's Monitoring 
Team. 
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of EO 247. In the latter case, the application is 
handed over to the competent government agency. 
In the affirmative case, the applicant has to submit 
further documents, including a PIC certificate, to 
the IACBGR.85 These documents are then passed 
on to the Technical Secretariat, which conducts an 
initial review of the complete application and 
submits its evaluation to the IACBGR. The 
IACBGR discusses the application and concludes 
with a final recommendation of approval or rejec-
tion, which is handed on to the Secretary con-
cerned. It is the Secretary who has to approve and 
sign the research agreement. Finally, the Techni-
cal Secretariat provides copies of the signed 
agreement to the relevant parties and is supposed 
to maintain the files on the research agreement. 
                                                 
85 As for its special importance among the access provi-
sions, the PIC procedure will be dealt with separately in 
Section 4.2.2. 
The Continuum of the Application Proce-
dure in Practice 
A statement made by a great number of stake-
holders boils down to the following point: “In the 
Philippines, we are great in making sound laws – 
but the implementation lags behind.” Most of the 
stakeholders interviewed agreed that the regula-
tion is not working well, that the application 
process takes too much time and is too compli-
cated. However, these opinions have not always 
been evidenced by factual information. This leads 
to a situation where many stakeholders tend to 
blame others for the deficiencies in the procedure. 
For analytical reasons, the following section 
separates the different stages and players in the 
entire application process. It goes on to critically 
analyze the roles of the applicant, the agencies 
concerned, the IACBGR and its Technical Secre-
tariat, and the signing Secretary. All stages bear a 
share of the responsibility for the observed defi-
cits in the application procedure. 
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Figure 6:    Steps in Access Determination in the Philippines
Source: Drews / Gettkant (2000), p.70.   
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a) The Applicant 
In the ideal case, the applicant would be a) fully 
aware of the requirements he / she has to meet, b) 
able to meet these requirements right at the begin-
ning of the application procedure, and c) willing 
to follow the procedure. In practice, however, 
missing information, inadequate institutional 
capabilities and a lack of will on the part of the 
applicants appear to prevent more applicants from 
going through with the EO 247 procedure, thus 
reducing the possible number of research agree-
ments. It is safe to assume that some institutions 
are not adequately equipped to shoulder the addi-
tional burdens imposed by EO 247. On the other 
hand, for many possible applicants the lacking 
will to follow the procedure appears to be more 
important. 
Government agencies noted that many applica-
tions are incomplete, with either documents 
missing (e.g. code of conduct for ARAs) or their 
content not satisfactory. Even in cases of appli-
cants who are supposed to be well informed and 
well staffed (like the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) or the University of the Philip-
pines), documents were missing or arrived late, as 
a PAWB representative told. Thus, the documents 
required were, it seems, a problem for many 
applicants. The spectrum of opinions from scien-
tists was diverse, with some considering the 
requirements acceptable, noting that scientists are 
used to write research proposals anyway, while 
others see the provisions as an additional burden. 
Especially for foreign institutions, the require-
ments may been seen as manageable. 
Frequently, applicants shun the effort needed and 
drop their applications, as Neth Daño from 
SEARICE noted. The large number of applica-
tions that are considered as “pending” seems to 
validate this proposition. Aside from this, there 
may also be cases where researchers consider the 
application procedure too complicated and refrain 
from going through with it in the first place. One 
can argue that applicants may not be fully aware 
of EO 247 and its implications. However, the 
PAWB did launch a variety of information cam-
paigns two years after the regulation was adopted. 
Apart from workshops that were held in a number 
of provinces, PAWB also sent letters to 123 
academic institutions, explaining the regulation 
and its provisions concerning the application 
procedure.86 Moreover, different types of informa-
tion material are available at the PAWB. It there-
fore appears that Philippine scientists were actu-
ally informed about the regulation, though they 
may not have assigned much importance to it. 
b) The Work and Role of the Agencies 
Concerned 
The application procedure established through 
EO 247 delegates applications to the competent 
agencies87 in order to have them reviewed and 
evaluated by specialized staff. This decentralized 
process assigns these agencies more responsibil-
ity, but allows to have handled every application 
by specialists on the field. However, a number of 
persons interviewed remarked that some agencies 
were relatively slow in processing applications. 
The main reasons mentioned in the interviews 
were: no additional financial or personnel re-
sources for the agencies concerned, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, and lack of political commitment. 
For example, a representative from the Philippine 
National Museum complained about an applica-
tion that the Museum made in cooperation with 
the Coral Reef Research Foundation and the 
National Cancer Institute (USA). According to the 
representative, the application was “stuck” in the 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
(BFAR) for more than a year – an accusation that 
has been disputed by BFAR. A similar conflict 
arose with regard to a CRA application of Siliman 
University in cooperation with the University of 
California San Diego.88 Others charge PAWB of 
being too slow in responding to applicants. 
                                                 
86 See PAWB (1996-2002), January 26th 1998. 
87 One or several of the following Departments: Environ-
ment and Natural Resources through PAWB, Agriculture 
through BFAR, Science and Technology through 
PCARRD, Health through PITAHC. 
88 See PAWB (1996-2002), June 9th, 1998. 
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These complaints have to be seen in the light of 
the fact that the agencies are not provided suffi-
cient funding for their additional tasks. Obviously, 
the heads of the agencies concerned do not attach 
enough political importance to the implementation 
of EO 247. Taken together, this leads to a situa-
tion where the agencies do not perform well as 
facilitators of research agreements. 
c)  The Work and Role of the IACBGR 
and its Technical Secretariat 
Most persons interviewed agree that the multista-
keholder approach pursued by the Inter-Agency 
Committee on Biological and Genetic Resources 
is a very positive part of EO 247. It is intended to 
ensure participatory and transparent decision-
making on ABS agreements. Nevertheless, the 
body and its Technical Secretariat have been 
criticized by many stakeholders. The most 
common criticisms are irregular meetings, low 
attendance rates, lack of commitment by IACBGR 
members, the composition of the body, and slow 
decision-making procedures. 
Figure 7 shows the IACBGR meetings since 1996 
and the number of participants attending them.89 It 
can easily be observed that during the first two 
years of its existence the IACBGR met quite 
regularly, although a quorum was not always 
achieved.90 After August 1998, the “two lost 
years” of the IACBGR began, as some interview-
ees termed the period. Work resumed in 2001, but 
it has become even more difficult to achieve a 
quorum. A similar picture evolves for the fre-
quency of meetings of the Technical Secretariat. 
                                                 
89 The data has been kindly provided by PAWB. The 
authors’ examination of the minutes of the IACBGR 
meetings, however, reveals lower attendance rates, on 
average one participant less. It is not easy to distinguish 
between participants with voting power and guests. Thus 
the figures should be treated as maximum numbers. 
90 In theory, six attendants are needed to achieve a quorum. 
However, some meetings took place even without a quo-
rum, and decisions were later referred to absent members 
via mail to give them the opportunity to object within a 
certain period of time. 
Here, the required quorum has only been reached 
once since 2000. The schedule of both bodies can 
be traced back to the presidential elections and the 
changes among higher-level government employ-
ees. These have a substantial impact on the fre-
quency of meetings and therefore also on the 
speed at which applications are processed. 
According to the research conducted by the au-
thors, attendance was high among the representa-
tives from the DENR (PAWB)91, NGO 
(SEARICE), Science (UP Diliman, A. Guevarra), 
and DOH (PITAHC). Representatives missing a 
considerable number of meetings include those of 
the PNM, DA (BFAR), DOST, DFA and the 
second science representative. The representative 
of the Peoples’ Organization was virtually never 
present. 
Regularly participating stakeholders voiced some 
frustration about the work of the IACBGR. They 
attend the meetings because they feel a strong 
commitment, which may be due to the fact that 
most of them belonged to the group of scientists 
and NGOs who initiated EO 247 in 1995. When 
asked for the reasons for the absenteeism of many 
members, most mentioned the lack of will, ex-
plaining that all members have regular jobs and 
the IACBGR comes “on top” of that. Next to the 
time constraint, a lot depends on the chairman, 
who is expected to motivate the members. While 
this was the case for the first two years, since 
1998 the chairmen have usually attached less 
importance to the IACBGR. There have been 
cases where the chairman called a meeting, but 
failed attend himself, or called it off too late. 
Another issue brought up by many interview 
partners: the body lacks funds. Although EO 247 
calls for financial contributions from all agencies 
involved, in practice PAWB is the only one that 
adheres to this provision.92 For this reason, the 
IACBGR lacks institutional capacity and is unable 
                                                 
91 As a rule, the Undersecretary of DENR holds the chair 
of the Body. He was, however, frequently represented by 
the Director of the PAWB. 
92 See PAWB (2001). 
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to provide compensation for travel expenses or 
attendance allowances for its members. 
As to the composition of the IACBGR, a certain 
level of disagreement can be observed. Some 
voices, among them PAWB and science, have 
suggested including fewer politicians and more 
people from the “action level”. While, it is noted, 
the chairman needs to belong to a higher political 
level to have the necessary authority, members 
should be technical people. However, other inter-
view partners expressed doubts as to whether 
current members are technical enough. Indeed, 
commitment seems to be more important than the 
actual position held by a member. Representatives 
from science outside the capital region called for 
the inclusion of more scientists, because scientists 
could be expected to be more objective in their 
decision-making. However, the two IACBGR 
members from science, both from the capital 
region, have seldom taken their seats at the meet-
ings. Moreover, different stakeholders noted that 
the IACBGR has sometimes been a forum for 
rivalries among the participating agencies. 
While most interview partners agree that the 
IACBGR has not lived up to expectations, it is 
more difficult to assess whether it has actually 
slowed down the process. Many interview part-
ners who do not belong to the IACBGR and 
observe the whole procedure from outside seem to 
blame the IACBGR for the long application 
procedure. However, the minutes of IACBGR 
meetings do not prove that applications have been 
slowed by additional burdens put forward by 
IACBGR members. Indeed, successful applica-
tions were for the most part delayed in the proc-
essing agencies or – after IACBGR approval – 
with the signing Secretary. Those that were not 
successful in most cases did not even reach the 
IACBGR. However, what seems to be clear is that 
the “two lost years” slowed down the process of 
then pending applications. Moreover, applicants 
mentioned the quorum problem in decisive meet-
ings for their applications, a factor which leaves 
them unsure about the progress of their applica-
tions.93 
d) The Role of the Signing Secretary 
The signing of approved research proposals by 
one or more Secretaries takes substantial time. 
When the IACBGR finally approves an applica-
                                                 
93 This happened, for example, during the meeting of the 
IACBGR in March 2002, when the renewal of the UP-
MSI CRA was to have been finally approved by the 
IACBGR. 
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tion, it would be everything but normal to allow 
the applicant to start out soon with bioprospecting 
activities. However, the duration between ap-
proval of a research agreement and its final sign-
ing is substantial and can amount to more than a 
year, especially when more than one Secretary has 
to sign, as two examples of academic research 
agreements show: the agreement of the University 
of the Philippines, which was approved by the 
IACBGR in 1999, and took more than two years 
to be signed by the respective agencies; the Inter-
national Rice Research Institute (IRRI) applied in 
1998 and saw the agreement approved by the 
IACBGR in 2001. However, this involved signa-
tures by four different Secretaries, and the proce-
dures had not been completed by April of 2002. 
Dr. Padolina from IRRI, a former DOST Secre-
tary, claimed that bureaucratic practice and atti-
tudes in the Philippines were responsible for 
delays. Often, the Secretary concerned has addi-
tional questions on a research agreement which 
has already been approved and signed by other 
Secretaries, and thus refers it to his/her legal 
office for further study. 
4.2.2 Difficult Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure? 
For the initiators of the Philippine bioprospecting 
legislation, involving the community in the proce-
dure to grant access to genetic resources figured 
high on the agenda. Toni La Viña, former Under-
secretary of the DENR, called PIC “the heart and 
soul” of ABS legislation, a position still held by 
most Philippine NGOs.94 On the other hand, PIC 
                                                 
94 See SEARICE (2001a). 
Box 9:  Case Study (I): The Application Procedure 
There are two commercial research agreements (CRAs) that can be regarded as model ABS agreements. Both CRAs 
have been concluded between the University of the Philippines’ Marine Science Institute (UP-MSI), the Department of 
Agriculture and the University of Utah. The first agreement (“CRA 1998”) was signed in 1998 and regulates the collec-
tion of marine sponges and ascidians for research on anti-cancer medication. The second agreement (“CRA 2002”) was 
signed in 2002 and allows the collection and/or purchase of marine conus (cone snails) for research on compounds that 
affect nerve and muscle tissue, including potential pain relievers. Table A-II in the Annex presents basic information 
about both agreements. These CRAs will be used as case studies to illustrate the general analysis. The application 
procedure, the prior informed consent process, the benefit-sharing provisions, and unintended side-effects will be 
presented below in four boxes. 
CRA 1998 was applied for in January 1998, approved relatively quickly and finally signed by all secretaries in June 
1998. Mrs. Gisela Concepción of UP-MSI noted that both the motivation of the Department of Agriculture to get a first 
research agreement signed and the support provided by Toni la Viñaa helped UP-MSI to get through the application 
process at a relatively speedy pace. Since the agreement ended in 2001, the research group applied for a renewal of the 
CRA in February 2001. It was approved by the IACBGR in March 2002 and is expected to be signed soon. 
The application for CRA 2002, on the other hand, took almost four years before is was finally signed in 2002. It was 
submitted to the IACBGR in September 1998, which coincides with the “two lost years” of EO 247. An interim permit 
allowed UP-MSI to continue its research and cooperation with the University of Utah while waiting for the signing of 
the agreement. Rules had to be followed, and especially PIC had to be conducted for collection and purchases under the 
interim permit, as demanded in the agreement itself. UP-MSI sees the main reasons for the application taking so long in 
ongoing political changes and bureaucracy, caused by changing personnel in government agencies and irregular 
IACBGR meetings. The procedure itself is not seen as the major problem, but the slowness within the IACBGR and 
government agencies in making decisions and signing papers. The Philippine agencies took two years to come up with 
a draft CRA which was approved by the IACBGR and BFAR. On the other hand, sending papers back and forth be-
tween Utah and UP-MSI was also seen as a burden. It took one and a half years for the University of Utah to sign the 
draft CRA which it received from BFAR in July 2000, since administrative changes in Utah had made a reexamination 
of the CRA necessary. 
The distribution of tasks between the principal collector (University of Utah) and the co-collector (UP-MSI) means that 
the responsibility for dealing with Philippine government agencies and handling applications is mainly left to the 
Philippine co-collector. This is a great relief for the foreign partner, which should not be underestimated in its signifi-
cance because it takes a lot of the co-collector’s time and effort to follow these administrative rules. The long delays in 
the application process, as in the case of CRA 2002, are regarded as a great inconvenience by the research institutions 
and as a burden on the relationship between the cooperating partners. 
a Toni la Viña is one of the initiators of EO 247 and served as DENR undersecretary from 1996-1998. 
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is often regarded by applicants as making access 
more difficult. Scientists in particular mention the 
transaction costs involved in achieving PIC as an 
additional burden for their research. Nevertheless, 
none of our interviewees explicitly mentioned the 
PIC provision as the reason for not applying for a 
research agreement. 
Internationally, business and science appear to be 
especially uncomfortable with the idea of obtain-
ing PIC for every collection activity. The main 
reasons why bioprospecting activities are thought 
to be virtually impossible in the Philippines, 
concern PIC.95 Indeed, Philippine legislation goes 
further in terms of community involvement in the 
access procedure than in most other countries. Is 
this provision in fact an obstacle to ABS agree-
ments in the Philippines? Our interviews rather 
revealed that most users would be able to follow 
the PIC provisions if they were really willing to 
do so. 
PIC Provisions in EO 247 
The CBD stipulates that bioprospectors have to 
obtain PIC of the source country unless otherwise 
specified by the contracting parties. The Philip-
pines implemented the provision in such a way as 
to require Prior Informed Consent by the local 
communities before the national level can approve 
an ABS agreement. Especially NGOs and Peo-
ples’ Organizations place great emphasis on 
ensuring participation of the local stakeholders. 
Before bioprospecting can begin, the applicant 
must obtain consent by fully disclosing the intent 
and scope of planned activities. The language and 
the process of PIC needs to be understandable to 
the local community. 
The PIC procedure includes two elements: public 
notification and sector consultation. For public 
notification, various media such as newspapers, 
radio or television are used to inform the public. 
Sector consultation means a public hearing at 
                                                 
95 See Box 7 for the viewpoint of the National Cancer 
Institute. 
community level. The meeting must be announced 
at least one week in advance. It has to be adapted 
to local customary laws and traditional practices. 
If the community accepts the bioprospecting 
activity, the applicant can obtain the Prior In-
formed Consent Certificate from the local official 
authority, after a period of 60 days has elapsed. 
Later, the applicant is required to submit to the 
IACBGR the PIC Certificate and proof that the 
procedures for obtaining PIC have been complied 
with. 
Assessment of the Practice 
In general, scientists have not found it particularly 
difficult to obtain the consent of the community 
involved. Thus far only one PIC application has 
been rejected in the Philippines. Mr. Noel Saguil, 
a UP-MSI researcher, states that according to his 
experience approval or disapproval depends to a 
large extent on the ability to build a trust-based 
relationship with the community in question. 
However, many scientists perceive PIC as a duty 
with transaction costs for time and money. More-
over, business has expressed concerns regarding 
their trade secrets.  
Scientists have to allocate more time for consulta-
tions with communities than they would in a 
situation where they only needed to apply for a 
permit at the national level. Three main points 
were mentioned in our interviews: first, collectors 
have to prepare information material that is suit-
able and understandable for communities. Second, 
it takes time to organize and hold the sector con-
sultation in the community. Third, the process 
between the consultation and the issuance of the 
PIC certificate can take some time: from the 
mandatory 60 days (which is already considered 
to be too long by many scientists) to several 
months if administrative changes at the local level 
lead to unexpected delays (see Box 10). On the 
other hand, most scientists noted that even in the 
past it was common to consult the communities 
involved. It is therefore difficult to measure how 
much additional time a mandatory PIC procedure 
means for to the applicant. 
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Scientists argue that PIC is costly. Collectors have 
to refund all costs for organizing the sector con-
sultation, including catering costs, translators for 
local dialects, and copying costs for documents. 
Moreover, collectors addressing their interest to 
an indigenous peoples` community have to com-
ply with customary traditions such as inviting the 
community to a generous meal. All these factors 
enlarge the budget needed to conduct PIC prop-
erly. However, Aliño, one of the few researchers 
with PIC experience, cites expenditures, for eight 
PIC procedures, of approximately PhP 50,00096 
(approx. US$ 1,000) of a budget of PhP 8 million 
for the overall research project.97 Hence, in this 
case, PIC accounted for only 0.625% of the over-
all research budget, which may be regarded as 
negligible. 
                                                 
96 Figure includes working hours. 
Apparently, the stakeholders who have already 
conducted PIC, perceive it as less burdensome 
than stakeholders who have yet to go through the 
procedure. There appears to be a certain miscon-
ception among some stakeholders about the real 
burdens involved in PIC. This misconception may 
pose a real disincentive to apply for a research 
agreement, in particular for foreign applicants. In 
reality, however, consultations are (and have been 
in the past) tasked to the local collaborator in the 
Philippines, who has a comparative advantage in 
conducting PIC. Seen this way, the international 
applicant would simply have to pay the (modest) 
costs of the PIC undertaken by a Philippine col-
laborator. 
A different argument is put forward by the Phar-
                                                                            
97 See Searice (2001a). 
Box 10:  Case Study (II): The Handling of Prior Informed Consent  
In the case of CRA 1998, researchers needed the prior informed consent of different communities in several regions. 
The most recent PIC was conducted in October 2000 in Coron. There, a hearing had to be held with the Palawan 
Council for Sustainable Development (PalCSD) first, because of a specific Palawan law which gives the Council the 
full responsibility for all environmental activities in the region. Only after their permission had been given did the 
actual PIC meeting with the town council of Coron take place. The town consultation was attended by members of the 
Coron town council, a PalCSD representative, the local DENR officer, the barangay captains of the three communities 
closest to collection sites and an indigenous peoples' organization. The UP-MSI project, procedures and purpose of the 
research were explained in detail and discussed with the local representatives. The value of the research to humankind 
was explained in order to underline the usefulness of the project, but no long-term benefits were discussed. At the end 
of their stay in Coron, UP-MSI invited all participants of the meetings to their boat to allow them a closer look at the 
research. The PIC certificate was signed after the 60 day period required by EO 247. 
For two reasons, the research group of UP-MSI found it somewhat difficult to conduct PIC in Coron: first, the mem-
bers of PalCSD and the indigenous community of the Tagbanua are very restrictive on any projects that want to make 
use of their natural resources. But once the research’s value to mankind and to environmental conservation had been 
explained, resistance to the proposal was able to be overcome. Second, UP-MSI encountered difficulties in defining 
the communities involved, since these are located at a distance of 15 km and more from the collection site. This is a 
common problem with most marine bioprospecting activities. 
For CRA 2002 and the interim permit preceding it, public consultations were conducted in four different localities. 
The PIC procedure as set out in the implementation guidelines of EO 247 was strictly followed by the UP-MSI staff. 
In Mabini, Bantangas, the mayor received the notification letter, including the research proposal, information flyers, 
and public notification on October 2, 1998. The barangay captains, representatives of the town mayor, government 
officials and SEARICE attended the public consultation held on October 28, 1998. About half of the 20 participants 
were fishermen. However, a new mayor took office on January 1, 1999, and the PIC certificate was signed in March 
1999, far beyond the 60-day period. In Punta Engano/Cebu, preliminary talks started in June 2001, followed by a 
public hearing, but again a new mayor took office and as of April 2002 he has not yet signed the PIC. 
Obtaining consent of the community to purchase cone shells during public consultations was not a problem for UP-
MSI, but having the PIC signed by the mayor caused delays due to changes of political leadership. PIC certificates for 
CRA 2002 were quickly obtained thanks to a long partnership between UP-MSI and the communities, which began 
even before the implementation of EO 247. Moreover, sales of the conus to UP-MSI yielded an immediate benefit 
through income generation to the local community and facilitated an agreement. At the same time, community in-
volvement reduced collection costs for UP-MSI, since it was easier to purchase conus from fishermen than to collect 
the conus itself. 
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maceutical and Healthcare Association of the 
Philippines. In their opinion, PIC could represent 
a danger to their business interests. Actually, 
EO 24798 requires full disclosure of research goals 
at the local community level. In a statement on the 
matter, the association explains that “confidential-
ity will be seriously impaired if the princi-
pal/collector is required to submit a research 
proposal to the local community and discuss 
proposed activities in a public hearing.”99 At the 
same time, they assure that they would agree to 
the PIC provisions if confidentiality were pro-
tected. SEARICE, PAWB and other stakeholders 
claim that neither EO 247 nor the implementing 
rules require applicants to reveal trade secrets. It 
remains open whether the pharmaceutical industry 
really fears being forced to reveal trade secrets or 
whether there are tactical reasons for its rejection 
of PIC. 
4.2.3 Exaggerated Expectations on 
Benefit-Sharing? 
The business side states that unrealistically high 
expectations of anticipated monetary and non-
monetary benefits on the part of source countries 
sometimes make it difficult to arrive at ABS 
agreements. Our interviews have shown, however, 
that stakeholders neither at the national nor at the 
community level have specific expectations 
concerning benefits which might prove to be a 
burden for any research agreement. 
National Level 
Surprisingly, our interviews revealed that most 
stakeholders in the Philippines do not have spe-
cific expectations on benefits from ABS agree-
ments. Although one reason frequently mentioned 
as important for implementing EO 247 is to 
prevent “exploiting of the country’s genetic re-
                                                 
98 See 7.1.1 / 7.2.1.b, Annex B, Department Administrative 
Order No. 96-20. 
99 See PHAP (no year), p. 1. 
sources by foreigners”, expectations about a fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits do not seem to 
be clear. At the same time, the expectations that 
were mentioned cannot be considered exagger-
ated. 
Past experience supports this finding. In the two 
commercial research agreements concluded by 
UP-MSI (see Box 11), no large benefits are 
agreed upon on the Philippine side. There are 
hardly any short-term benefits envisaged that 
could be a burden for an applicant. Interestingly, 
in one IACBGR meeting two NGO representa-
tives called for inclusion of short-term monetary 
benefits in the 1998 CRA.100 However, after the 
applicant (UP-MSI) explained that it would take 
much longer than three years until there might be 
a chance for the research to generate monetary 
benefits, the proposal was dropped and the CRA 
approved without any additional benefit-sharing 
provisions. 
As far as long-term monetary benefits are con-
cerned, it is interesting to note that the only share 
of royalties that is fixed is that one which will go 
to the government (5% of net revenue). It was left 
open to negotiation, however, what percentage the 
company would have to pay to the collectors in 
case of successful commercialization. This provi-
sion leaves space for the negotiators and can be 
interpreted as a flexible approach by Philippine 
authorities. 
Community Level 
At the community level, no applications have 
been refused due to low benefits offered to the 
community. Experience shows that local commu-
nities have only moderate expectations as regards 
benefits. 
NGOs consider non-monetary benefits more 
appropriate and valuable to communities than 
monetary benefits; whereas local communities 
expressed their desire for compensation in the 
                                                 
100 See PAWB (1996-2002), June 9th, 1998. 
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form of both monetary and non-monetary bene-
fits. Non-monetary benefits may comprise recog-
nition and acknowledgement of the source of 
specimen, assistance in the conduct of resource 
assessment, equipment and training, among oth-
ers.101 In terms of monetary benefits, short-term 
payments such as fees for a local guide and en-
trance fees or fees-per-sample are favored. Apart 
from an expected share of royalties, no further 
long-term benefits have been considered so far. 
By experience, negotiations on prior informed 
consent and benefit-sharing are largely kept 
separate by actors. In the current approach, PIC is 
granted without any clear-cut arrangements on the 
distribution of future benefits for the community. 
In particular, scientific collectors tend to separate 
negotiations concerning access and benefit-
sharing. Since scientists have no clear prospects of 
revenues, they are reluctant to create expectations. 
But even if expectations about benefits are modest 
at the moment and do not constitute a burden on 
ABS agreements, this need not remain the case in 
the future. Some NGOs and local communities 
noted that it is important to see positive examples 
of benefit-sharing in the near future to sustain a 
positive attitude on the part of local and indige-
nous communities. They reason that locals may in 
the longer run develop an attitude of protection-
ism towards their biological resources, since they 
are not convinced that there will be any fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing. This attitude may be 
fostered by “biopiracy“. Fair and equitable bene-
fit-sharing with local communities may in this 
sense be in the self-interest of applicants, i.e. to 
secure future possibilities of bioprospecting 
activities based on the good will of local commu-
nities. 
4.3 Developmental Aspects of the ABS-
Agreements 
This section aims to evaluate the ABS agreements 
concluded thus far with regard to the attainment of 
                                                 
101 See PNNI (2001), p.16 and authors’ data. 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing as defined in the 
CBD and the attainment of community involve-
ment in decisions affecting the use of their re-
sources. 
4.3.1 Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing 
– Sharing Hopes for Things to 
Come 
The present study asks how countries may create 
benefits using their genetic resources by regulat-
ing access to their resources. As has been shown, 
few access agreements have been concluded since 
EO 247 came into effect. The analysis in the 
present section includes three steps: first, the 
section describes the benefits realized so far and 
shows that they mostly accrue to Philippine scien-
tists.102 Second, it explores the mechanisms for a 
future fair and equitable sharing of benefits, 
noting that the foundations have been properly 
laid, although there is still no policy on benefit-
sharing with communities. Third, it is argued that 
few additional benefits have been generated thus 
far, compared with a situation without access 
legislation. This may change, however, in the 
future if long-term benefits materialize. The 
analysis in this section is based primarily on the 
three commercial research agreements concluded 
so far. 
Benefit-sharing is defined in DAO 96-20, section 
2 e) as “the sharing of bioprospecting activity and 
benefits arising from the utilization or commer-
cialization of the biological or genetic resources 
fairly and equitably with the indigenous cultural 
community, local community [...] and the national 
government by the Principal/Collector.”103 As 
spelled out in section 2 n), equitable sharing refers 
                                                 
102 The term “benefits“ in this section is limited to monetary 
or in-kind benefits. In a broader sense, benefits can inc-
lude issues like participation or community empower-
ment. These issues are dealt with in the following secti-
on (4.4.2). 
103 La Viña / Caleda / Baylon (1997), Annex B, Definition 
of Terms, p.32. 
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to “the benefit-sharing mutually agreed upon by 
the parties to the Research Agreement.”104 
Realized Benefit-Sharing 
The sharing of benefits needs to be looked at on 
two levels: the international level between the 
Philippines and users from industrialized coun-
tries and the national level between involved 
stakeholders in the Philippines. Concerning the 
international level, the cooperation that accounts 
for the largest share of benefits transferred so far 
is the UP-MSI – University of Utah ABS agree-
ments, as shown in Box 11. 
                                                 
104 La Viña / Caleda / Baylon (1997), Annex B, Definition 
of Terms, p.33. 
Another case is the cooperation between Pascual 
Lab. and a British pharmaceutical company. 
Unlike the CRAs of UP-MSI, this agreement 
covers a business partnership of a joint-venture 
type. Pascual produces a herbal extract and mar-
kets it as a cough medicine in the Philippines; it is 
won from plant material grown by contract farm-
ers (“Lagundi”). The medicinal properties of 
Lagundi are based on traditional knowledge of 
Philippine healers discovered more than 20 years 
ago. Since then, the development of an extracting 
technology was funded and later patented by 
Philippine state agencies (PCHRD and 
NIRPROMP), which issued a non-exclusive 
license to Pascual to commercialize Lagundi. In 
this way, Pascual makes use of biological re-
sources and traditional knowledge from the Phil-
ippines and generates new value. Apart from the 
company itself, contract farmers who grow La-
Box 11:  Case Study (III): The Handling of  Benefit-Sharing  
The equitable sharing of benefits between principal collector, co-collector, the Philippine government and local 
communities is very similarly defined in both CRAs. It includes provisions on direct assistance, technology transfer, 
co-ownership of intellectual property, community education and profit-sharing. Until now, only UP-MSI has received 
any substantial benefits. Long term benefits have not yet materialized. 
Benefits for UP-MSI arise in the short term through direct assistance for equipment, scholarships and salaries. In CRA 
2002, this support is set at US $ 73,000 for the period of the agreement. However, it is stressed by the interviewees 
from UP-MSI that funding for their projects is not a result of the research agreements under EO 247 but has been 
provided continually since the beginning of the research cooperation with Utah in the 1970s. In the long term, all 
licensing fees, milestone payments and royalties will be shared equally between principal collector and co-collector. If 
a third party obtains intellectual property rights, commercializes a discovery or technology derived from the material, 
an extra agreement between principal collector/co-collector and the third party has to define the concrete sharing of 
royalties and other monetary benefits or technology. 
The Philippine government receives only negligible benefits in the short term. A yearly bioprospection fee of PhP 
10,000 (US$ 200) has to be paid to the IACBGR. Also, the co-collector has to provide the IACBGR technical exper-
tise to develop a monitoring scheme for marine bioprospection. In the medium term, benefits will focus on capacity-
building. An education module on resource conservation and environmental protection geared to communities will be 
developed by the co-collector. At least one government representative will be trained in taxonomy of marine resources 
through a short-term internship or observation program. In the long run, technology transfer and profit-sharing come 
into the picture. The government will have access to all product discoveries deriving from the Philippine materials. 
For endemic species, the technologies used to make the discoveries have to be made freely available to the Philippine 
government. In case of a successful commercialization deriving from the collected materials, the Department of 
Agriculture will get a 5 % share of the net revenue. The Philippines have to be recognized as the country of origin in 
all documents and publications referring to the materials and improvements on them. 
Benefits for local communities focus on education and training in the short term and material benefits in the long term. 
The co-collector has to conduct an information campaign on conservation, protection and the value of coastal re-
sources for the community after collecting in its area. In the long term, benefits for local communities are to be fi-
nanced from the 5 % of royalties given to the Philippine government. The exact share and use of these benefits remain 
to be defined. All research results have to be made available and explained to the community. Also, the local commu-
nity at which the material was extracted from has to be acknowledged in any document or publication. Besides, in 
case of commercialization training in natural products chemistry or some other field of scholarship has to be provided 
by the co-collector to at least one person from the local community. 
Sources: University of Utah / UP MSI / DA (1998, 2002) and authors’ interviews. 
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gundi benefit from this arrangement. In the future, 
Pascual will deliver Lagundi under the CRA to the 
British company that is currently developing a 
standardized herbal medicine from it for interna-
tional commercialization. Nearly all benefits that 
are intended to be transferred under this CRA 
depend on the successful development of a prod-
uct by the British side. 
As regards distribution at the national level, Table 
5 shows that most benefits realized go to scientific 
institutions, which ensues from the prominence of 
UP-MSI in ABS-agreements so far. For source 
communities, immediate material benefits have 
accrued in the form of wages for services (guid-
ing, translating, assisting in collection, farming 
Lagundi and collecting conus). Modest benefits 
have accrued in a non-monetary form in the case 
of UP-MSI, where environmental knowledge 
about a site was created as a by-product of the 
collection and later shared with local communi-
ties. Environmental training of local communities 
as agreed upon in the relevant ABS agreements 
has not been conducted yet. The government has 
been the recipient of additional benefits in terms 
of having staff members participate in collection 
activities as interns. The country as a whole may 
benefit from an expansion of the ex-situ database 
of the Philippine National Museum, which re-
ceives a copy of the samples collected by UP-
MSI. 
Mechanisms for Benefit-Sharing in the 
Future 
All four approved commercial ABS agreements 
contain provisions that lay down rules for the 
sharing of benefits in the event of a commerciali-
zation of developments stemming from Philippine 
materials. Although the agreements provide a 
satisfactory degree of clarity on how benefits are 
to be shared between the foreign entity, the co-
collector and the Philippine government, there is 
no policy on the distribution of possible benefits 
to source communities. The following paragraphs 
shed some light on the potential monetary and 
non-monetary benefits. 
Monetary Benefits: The UP-MSI commercial 
research agreements of 1998 and 2002 as well as 
the renewal of the 1998 agreement define the MSI 
and the University of Utah as the main partners in 
benefit-sharing. Between them, the net revenue is 
evenly divided, after a share of 5 % has been 
deducted for the Department of Agriculture (DA, 
see Box 11). The most important question yet to 
be solved concerns the use of the 5 % share due to 
the DA. Stakeholders who have provided materi-
als (source communities, indigenous peoples, 
Integrated Protected Areas or private persons) 
may receive a share of benefits “as declared by 
the DA”.105 It was a common understanding 
among the interview partners that the DA has 
assumed the responsibility to ensure a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing involving compensation 
for source communities. At present, though, DA 
lacks any comprehensive policy for an adequate 
benefit-sharing mechanism for this 5%. Draft 
Implementing Rules and Regulations prepared by 
a group of consultants, including among other 
things points of departures for such a benefit-
sharing mechanism, were discussed in the 
IACBGR during several meetings in 2001, but 
have been put on hold. In the present situation, 
arising benefits would be likely to flow into the 
DA budget without contributing specifically to the 
advancement of source communities or environ-
mental goals. The providers of the genetic mate-
rial are hardly able to take an informed decision 
about granting access and will not adapt their 
behavior regarding the environment.  
In the ABS agreement between Pascual Laborato-
ries and the British pharmaceutical company, 
monetary benefit-sharing is envisaged on two 
levels. First, as exporter of herbal extracts Pascual 
will receive a regular price for the goods deliv-
ered. Second, in case a product is successfully 
developed and patented, Pascual will receive a 
                                                 
105 Section 4.3 of Attachment “3” of both UP-MSI CRAs. 
This is consistent with Section 5 (e) of EO 247 („Mini-
num Terms of the Commercial Research Agreement and 
Academic Research Agreement“). 
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3.5 % share of royalties and a free license to 
produce and sell the product in the Philippines.106 
                                                 
106 This is consistent with Section 5 (l) of EO 247, („Min-
inum Terms of the Commercial Research Agreement and 
Academic Research Agreement“). Also, the Philippine 
government will be co-owner of any patent on standard-
ized Lagundi, having done initial basic research on the 
plant. 
10 % of Pascual’s share will go to two Philippine 
government institutions, NIRPROMP and 
PCHRD, which had initially contributed to the 
development of the original herbal medicine. 
Non-monetary benefits: training and technology 
transfer are the two most important non-monetary 
benefits that may materialize in the future. 
EO 247 aims, in Section 1, at the “development of 
Table 5:  Realized and Future Benefits and Recipients in the Philippines 
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access to ex situ facilities and databases    X 
share in research budget and/or equipment for laboratories    X 
salaries for guides and collection helpers  X   
payments per sample (“sample fees” e.g. for conus)  X   
environmental information about local area  X   
bioprospecting fees (“up-front fees”) X    
research collaboration    X 
scientific capacity-building    X 
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contribution to ex-situ collections X   X 
maintenance of and contribution to ex situ collections    X 
technology transfer under most preferential terms    X 
scientific capacity-building    X 
access to research results and exchange of experience    X 
participation in product development   X X 
research collaboration (if possible in provider country)   X X 
acknowledgement in publications  X  X 
research funding    X 
contributions to local economy  X   
administrative capacity-building X    
participation in value added  X X  
share in royalties X X  X 
fu
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re
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free access of source country in case of product development  X    
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local capability in science and technology to 
achieve technological self-reliance in selected 
areas”. The agreements concluded so far include 
technology transfer elements, but they are unlike-
ly to achieve this goal. 
Technology and skills are transfered to UP-MSI 
through various channels that form part of the 
academic cooperation. Pascual and government 
staff will be trained at the British company in the 
production of the standardized herbal medicine. 
This provision aims at technology transfer and 
shows one major limitation to it at the same time. 
While the Philippine side may acquire knowledge 
about the production process in this way, the 
application of this knowledge depends on the 
availability of advanced technology.  
Are Additional Benefits Generated? 
In the cases at hand, all relevant benefits realized 
so far would have accrued without any specific 
ABS legislation in place. Additional benefits are 
expected in the future, when developments de-
rived under ABS agreements reach the commer-
cialization stage. Apart from that, there are even 
some cases where cooperation ventures have 
ended up leading to fewer benefits than before. 
Bioprospectors unwilling to share benefits under 
an institutionalized scheme have not adhered to 
the EO 247 process. 
The benefits realized thus far go primarily to UP-
MSI in the form of training and technology trans-
fer as well as to local communities in the form of 
salaries or sample payments. Academic coopera-
tion has been in place in a similar form for 30 
years now. Salaries would have to be paid by any 
bioprospector regardless of ABS legislation. At 
the same time, the ABS legislation has led some 
interested bioprospectors to end their activities. 
For example, this affected Siliman University and 
the Philippine National Museum that had been 
cooperating with US universities under grants of 
the National Cancer Institute. Both Philippine 
institutions complain that they receive fewer 
benefits today than before EO 247 because the US 
side opted to divert their activities to other coun-
tries. 
It is debatable whether the Philippine ABS 
legislation should be blamed for this outcome. As 
long as international bioprospectors are able to 
find easy alternatives, they can circumvent ABS-
provisions. The country in question would need 
advantages like endemic resources, an efficient 
administration or highly skilled cooperation 
partners to effectively counter the internationally 
perceived “disadvantage” of having ABS legisla-
tion in place.  
For future benefits, it can be argued that the ABS 
legislation has been a suitable framework to en-
sure that the Philippine state receives a certain 
percentage of possible commercialization gains. 
This provision is clearly additional compared to 
the situation before. 
Box 12:  Case Study (IV): An Unexpected but Beneficial Side-Effect 
While researching possible benefits, interviews with researchers of UP-MSI revealed unexpected side-effects of the 
newly established communication between scientists and locals. The PIC meetings “slowly opened our eyes and 
exposed us to poor rural communities. We never met the locals in Manila. PIC brought us closer and we saw how 
depressed they are” (Mrs. Lourdes Cruz). From these experiences arose the idea to develop a model for a technology-
based “rural livelihood incubator” now being tried with an indigenous tribe called the Aetas, in Bataan. Volunteers 
from UP-MSI have carried out different projects: a small library is being set up, a dormitory for high school students is 
being repaired, scholarships for distance education are being solicited. “We believe the educational component is 
extremely necessary to develop the people’s capacity to understand issues and to maximize their ability to take advan-
tage of possible benefits from scientific and technological progress” (Lourdes Cruz). The “livelihood incubator” is 
regarded by UP-MSI as a possible vehicle for providing benefits to local communities which might later be replicated 
in other regions. It is hoped that these partnerships will be able to build trust between scientists and local communities 
for future bioprospecting activities. 
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4.3.2 Community Involvement: Steps 
towards Participation and 
Empowerment 
While fair and equitable benefit-sharing shows 
potential to improve peoples’ livelihoods as well 
as conservation measures in developing countries, 
the involvement of local or indigenous communi-
ties in decision-making on access to genetic 
resources can be seen as supporting two other 
major development concerns: participation and 
empowerment107. It is mainly the procedure of 
Prior Informed Consent that will give local com-
munities the chance to participate in the negotia-
tions on ABS and empower them to decide over 
the use of their genetic resources. Therefore, this 
section concentrates on the question, in how far 
the existing PIC structures foster these two objec-
tives. 
As yet there is no wide experience available on 
how the PIC procedure performs in practice. The 
most detailed data is available on the two CRAs 
of UP-MSI, introduced in Box 10, above. Despite 
all efforts by UP-MSI to follow the procedure, 
participation during the sector consultations was 
low. Moreover, few of the people interviewed in 
Coron and Panglao were able to recall the meet-
ings and their agendas. Thus it can be concluded 
that participation and empowerment have not been 
achieved to a high degree in these communities. 
Nevertheless, EO 247 may have led to a growing 
discussion of rights for local and indigenous 
communities related to biodiversity which could 
encourage empowerment in the long run. 
Quite a number of PIC consultations are charac-
terized by poor attendance on the part of commu-
                                                 
107 The term participation, as used in this study, is un-
derstood as „...a process through which stakeholders in-
fluence and share control over development initiatives 
and the decision and resources which affect them.“ Kat-
sumoto (2002). The term empowerment describes meas-
ures aimed at strengthening social and political participa-
tion. It can mean giving disadvantaged groups the power 
to participate or that groups themselves obtain such pow-
er. See Nortis Foundation for Sustainable Development 
(2002). 
nity members. Frequently only town officials and 
other representatives from the town proper have 
been present. The low participation of locals in 
the consultation meetings is not caused by a poor 
regulation for the PIC procedure, but by missing 
preconditions needed to ensure the effectiveness 
of such a procedure. The UP-MSI staff advertised 
its projects through local media, information 
flyers and preliminary meetings with local offi-
cials. The sector consultations were announced 
through public notification at least one week in 
advance. All information was given in the lingua 
franca and in local dialects. Thus no reason can be 
seen why community members should not have 
been informed about the planned activities. But 
the lack of knowledge about the value of biodiver-
sity appears to be at the bottom of the lack of 
interest among locals in negotiating bioprospect-
ing activities. 
On the other hand, in communities where aware-
ness-raising on the issues of EO 247 has taken 
place, the interest in protecting the local biodiver-
sity and negotiating its use seems to be high. The 
Palawan NGO Network Inc. has conducted 
awareness-raising activities in several communi-
ties in the municipality of Puerto Princesa. During 
an interview in one of those communities, it 
became obvious that community members there 
had not only learned about the meaning of bio-
prospection and the value of biodiversity but had 
begun to actively observe and check the legality 
of collecting activities within their territory. They 
saw a major empowerment in learning about their 
rights to stop illegal collectors as well as about the 
entities to which they must refer to when illegal 
activities are to be disclosed. 
One issue not precisely set out in the PIC regula-
tions is consideration of customary laws when 
indigenous communities are involved. The law 
only states that such customs have to be acknowl-
edged, but leaves open the way in which this is to 
be done. Collection in Coron took place within the 
ancestral domain of the Tagbanua ethnic group. 
No special measures were undertaken to comply 
with customary law there, but evidently the local 
representatives did not claim that right, either. In 
discussions on the topic, a generous meal is often 
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seen as the best way to comply with customs. But 
this seems to leave important issues like tradi-
tional ways of consensus-building open. Instead 
of fostering participation it could easily contribute 
supporting bribery, especially if processes are not 
monitored. 
Little awareness exists among the stakeholders of 
ABS about the fact that when indigenous groups 
are involved, the PIC regulation under EO 247 is 
repealed by the free and prior informed consent 
(FPIC) regulation under the Indigenous Peoples‘ 
Rights Act (IPRA). IPRA defines its own FPIC 
procedure for all kinds of natural resource uses 
within the ancestral domains of indigenous peo-
ples, including bioprospection. Its relevance in 
practice is still unclear. An alternative approach to 
achieving informed consent, the new FPIC regula-
tion, signed by the National Committee for In-
digenous Peoples in March 2002, is presented in 
Box 13.108 
The multistakeholder approach of the IACBGR, 
including NGOs and Peoples’ Organizations in 
the committee, appears to foster participation and 
empowerment of local communities at the na-
tional level by giving them a voice in decision-
making on regulations. But at present little can be 
said about the impact such organizations may 
have on IACBGR decisions, because the indige-
nous representative does not attend the IACBGR 
                                                 
108 National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (2002). 
Box 13: The Specific PIC of Ancestral Domains: Free and Prior Informed Consent 
The new guidelines on free and prior informed consent (FPIC) are assumed to assure the information and consent of 
indigenous communities for any policies, development programs, projects and plans affecting their needs and 
concerns within their own territory. These activities include bioprospection as well as mining or dam construction. 
The regulation is more complicated than the PIC procedure under EO 247 and places more emphasis on comprehen-
sive participation of the indigenous community affected. 
Before the FPIC-process as such begins, a field-based investigation is required to define whether and to what extent 
ancestral lands are affected by the planned activities. If the involvement of ancestral territories is certified, the 
applicant has to submit a “project operation action plan” to the regional director of the National Committee for 
Indigenous Peoples and must seek FPIC from the indigenous community involved. 
The FPIC process is carried out by officials of the National Committee, while the applicant himself only attends the 
consultative meeting and pays all expenses for FPIC. This begins with a public notification to the council of eld-
ers/leaders concerned. Then a survey is conducted in the community about the recognized leaders to secure genuine 
representation for the community in the negotiations. At a preliminary consultative meeting the applicant can present 
and explain his project proposal and the project operation action plan with all its costs and benefits for the commu-
nity. Opponents to the proposal must be given equal time to present their counter-arguments. Within a period of 15 
days after the preliminary meeting the leaders must have completed their consultations on the proposal involving the 
community members, using their own traditional consensus-building processes. During that time neither the appli-
cant nor any other participant in the preliminary meeting – except officials of the National Committee – is allowed to 
remain in the community. After another 15 days have elapsed, a community assembly of all community members, 
represented by household heads, is conducted. The decision is made known, and voting by hand is used to determine 
the number of voters for or against the proposal. The terms and conditions for approval of the proposal, including 
benefits to be derived by the host community, must be translated into a Memorandum of Agreement to be signed by 
both parties and the National Committee for Indigenous Peoples. The Memorandum is signed at the same time the 
FPIC certificate is issued. The whole process of FPIC should take at least 45 days, though it may in fact take much 
longer. 
The overall process of achieving consent appears to constitute a burden unrealistically high for any bioprospector, 
but it does include some interesting ideas for conducting prior informed consent in a free and participatory way. 
Conducting a survey on community leaders is a potential way of assuring the truly accepted representatives. Presen-
tation of proposals and opposition to it at one meeting can permit discussions that render the pros and contras of a 
project more transparent to the community. Consensus-building behind closed doors is an example of how it is 
possible to minimize outside interventions in community decisions in order to ensure that the consent given is truly 
free. Voting in the community assembly promotes the participation of the community as a whole. Integration of 
FPIC consultation and Memorandum of Agreement provides the community with a clear definition of the sharing of 
benefits. Monitoring of the FPIC process by the regional National Committee of Indigenous Peoples gives the 
community more control over the due conduct of the procedure and eases the applicant's workload. The reverse of 
some of these provisions is, of course, the additional time and expense involved. Since the guidelines have not been 
practiced yet, future experiences will have to show whether they are really workable. 
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meetings. The problem seems not to lie in the 
IACBGR itself, but in a lack of interest on the part 
of the representative chosen. 
4.4 Policy Options 
As a pioneering country for ABS legislation, the 
Philippines has had to pay a price. Neither the 
regulation nor its implementation are perfect, and 
both have led to discontent among certain stake-
holders inside and outside the country. It will not 
be possible to find a regulation on which every-
body agrees, since there are many different inter-
ests involved. However, the preceding analysis 
has shown that there are unnecessary bottlenecks 
which should be removed in order to pave to way 
for more benefits for the country from the use of 
genetic resources. This section offers some policy 
options for the Philippines (Table 6 puts them in a 
nutshell). Measures the international community 
could use to assist countries like the Philippines to 
implement a successful ABS regime will be 
presented in Chapter six, below. 
4.4.1 The Application Procedure 
It is in everybody’s interest to make the applica-
tion process more efficient and less time-
consuming, while preserving the achievements of 
EO 247. Entry barriers for applicants should be 
lowered, responsibilities clarified and the bureau-
cratic procedure streamlined. 
Provide more information to potential appli-
cants: many applicants are still not sufficiently 
aware of the documents to furnish. A renewed 
attempt to inform a broad range of potential 
applicants among Philippine and foreign academe 
and industry will increase information levels and 
lower entry barriers to actually file an application. 
It is important to use different information chan-
Table 6:  Summary of Policy Options 
Proposal Expected Consequence 
Provide more information to potential applicants Lower entry barrier for applicant 
Establish a focal point for applicants Lower transaction costs for applicants 
Facilitate decision-making by means of institutional 
reforms  
Faster application process 
Install a tracking system to monitor the stage of applica-
tion 
Increased transparency of government procedures 
Provide sufficient funding for the agencies involved Efficient and speedy application process 
Go ahead with awareness-raising on bioprospection and 
legal advisory services 
Communities enabled to exert their rights 
Document customary practices regarding bioprospection Increased transparency for applicants 
Support applicants during the PIC process Lower entry barrier and transaction costs for applicants 
Ensure adequate monitoring at the local level All participants follow the rules 
Determine preferences of the local population regarding 
benefits 
Equitable and efficient distribution of benefits according to 
the wishes of the local community 
Develop a distribution scheme for long-term benefits Equitable and efficient distribution of benefits 
Increase spending for research and development A larger share of the value added to genetic resources 
remains in the country 
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nels in order to reach a large number of potential 
applicants. For the Philippines, workshops, letters, 
and info packages on the application process 
could be send to universities, research institutes 
and companies interested in using genetic re-
sources. Furthermore, the regional extension 
offices of the relevant government agencies 
should receive sufficient training and information 
material. This would enable them to better inform 
local applicants and disseminate information to a 
larger group of stakeholders. For foreign research 
institutes and companies, information on the 
application procedure should be made available 
via the Internet. 
Establish a focal point for applicants: at present, 
potential applicants – especially foreigners –are 
unable to perceive one given agency as a focal 
point responsible for dealing with all their con-
cerns. Although most Philippine applicants were 
aware that PAWB plays the role of a central 
agency, in many cases they still had to go to other 
agencies, because applications had become stuck 
there. The installation of a focal point109 would 
provide applicants with a “one-stop-shop option” 
where they can get all the information they need 
concerning the application, submit it, and check 
on the stage of processing. This would greatly 
reduce time, efforts and entry barriers for the 
applicant. 
Facilitate decision-taking by means of institu-
tional reforms: there are overlapping responsi-
bilities involved in taking an informed decision 
about an ABS-application, since too many actors 
are involved. While an applicant must first deal 
with the bureaucracy in the appropriate agencies, 
the IACBGR is the effective advisory body, and 
the Secretaries of the agencies have the final 
power of decision. The most radical solution to 
facilitating decision-taking would be the creation 
of a new independent government office reporting 
directly to the office of the President. This new 
                                                 
109 There might even be two focal points, since responsibili-
ty for resources is split between PAWB and BFAR, de-
pending on whether the resources are terrestrial or aqua-
tic. However, for each type of resource, there should 
then be only one focal point to deal with. 
office would be staffed by professionals, should 
be advised by a multistakeholder body like the 
IACBGR to ensure transparency and participation, 
and would have decision power. If the current 
framework is retained, at least the power to make 
decisions should be concentrated at the focal 
point, at a technical rather than a political level.110 
The IACBGR should be maintained as an advi-
sory body, but its work should be professional-
ized. To this end, only technical people with 
commitment should be included, the body should 
be funded to compensate its members, and the 
voting system should be adapted to the present 
high rates of absenteeism.111 
Install a tracking system to determine the stage 
of application: applicants need secure informa-
tion on which to base their planning. Until now 
the applicants have been left alone to guess how 
long their application may take. A tracking sys-
tem, possibly available via the Internet, could 
provide applicants with information on a) missing 
documents, b) by which agency and since when 
their application has been proceeded, and c) what 
stages it still has to pass through. As a conse-
quence, applicants could improve their further 
research planning, and this would create an incen-
tive for stepped-up processing, making the proce-
dure more transparent. 
Provide sufficient funding for the agencies 
involved: in the literature on public finance there 
is a golden rule: “no new tasks without funding”. 
This rule has been violated in the Philippines, 
where public officials have been tasked with 
additional duties and new bodies have been cre-
ated without ensuring that the necessary funds are 
available. As far as the financing of these tasks is 
concerned, we can distinguish between short, 
medium, and long-term options. In the short-term, 
                                                 
110 This would prevent the long delays caused by the 
different Secretaries who in practice do not sign an 
agreement simultanously but one after another. 
111 A pragmatic and innovative approach has been adopted 
when attendance has failed to reach the necessary num-
ber for a quorum. In these cases, members are asked to 
vote by phone or by text messaging. This practice has, 
however, not yet been institutionalized. 
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bioprospection and application fees should be 
increased. Since these are relatively low112, there 
is considerable room for price increases. Price 
discrimination between ARA and CRA as well as 
between domestic and foreign applications is 
conceivable, but it must be sound. In the medium-
term, the national budget should provide more 
funds for the processing of applications. Since 
more funds could foster more research agree-
ments, this may be regarded as an investment in 
the future. More agreements will ultimately result 
in a higher volume of benefit-generating research. 
As an alternative to the national treasury, the 
Global Environment Facility could increase its 
support to countries like the Philippines in their 
implementation of the CBD. Finally, in the long-
term some of the benefits created by research 
agreements should go to the processing agencies 
to strengthen their financial independence. This 
would work especially well if an independent 
agency for bioprospecting were founded, because 
transparency and public control over resources 
could be maximized in this way. 
4.4.2 Prior Informed Consent and 
Benefit-Sharing 
Preferably, transaction costs for prior informed 
consent should be as low as possible, since they 
represent additional costs to the collector. Never-
theless, PIC has been conceptualized as an impor-
tant means to guarantee community participation 
and empowerment. Thus the two objectives may 
come into conflict with one another. 
Go ahead with awareness-raising on bio-
prospection and legal advisory services: em-
powerment of local and indigenous communities 
will not be achieved by simply conducting PIC 
meetings. Locals need more knowledge about 
their rights, about the value of biodiversity and 
about the national institutions that protect their 
interests. This information is necessary to enable 
                                                 
112 Fees total PhP 1,025 for Philippine nationals and PhP 
2,025 for foreign applicants (around US $ 20 / US $ 40). 
locals to exercise their rights in the PIC process. 
Hence awareness-raising campaigns should be 
carried out by NGOs, government extension 
workers or by the field offices of the National 
Council of Indigenous Peoples. With greater 
awareness about bioprospection, local people are 
more likely to better monitor their territories and 
to prevent illegal bioprospection. In addition, in 
cases of conflict legal advisory services should be 
provided to locals. 
Document customary practices regarding 
bioprospection: thus far, the free and prior in-
formed consent of indigenous communities has 
not been enforced, and only in some cases have 
customary laws been observed. In order to comply 
with the required customary practices, it is rec-
ommendable that these be documented as a means 
of facilitating a proper preparation of the FPIC 
process. Furthermore, this would give applicants a 
more transparent picture of the requirements 
involved. 
Support applicants during the PIC process: the 
overall PIC process can be relatively demanding, 
especially the first time. Scientists often feel 
overburdened by the procedure. In addition, 
cultural differences may impede communication 
and negotiations between collectors and commu-
nities. Applicants could be relieved of tasks they 
are not prepared for with the help of community 
workers, e.g. from universities or NGOs. The 
focal point could provide a network of facilitators 
and bring them into contact with applicants. For 
Philippine academic researchers, this service 
should be funded by the government, others 
should be able to cover the costs themselves. 
These facilitators should also help out during 
discussions about benefit-sharing in order to 
prevent misunderstandings, exaggerated expecta-
tions or any exploitation of the community. 
Ensure adequate monitoring at the local level: 
communities should be able to take their decisions 
about PIC independently. In order to reduce the 
potential for particularist interests to influence the 
PIC process, an authorized person should witness 
the PIC certification. This could be an IACBGR 
56 Klaus Liebig et al. 
and/or an NGO member. The person selected 
should be trusted by the community. 
Determine preferences of the local population 
regarding benefits: short-term benefits for locals 
should be negotiated during the PIC process. This 
is the point in time when locals have a chance to 
express their preferences, which should be docu-
mented. However, if the applicant cannot offer 
any short-term benefits, a redistribution mecha-
nism like a community trust fund would be a 
solution that could bring short-term community 
interests into harmony with the long-term horizon 
of most research projects (see below). Long-term 
benefits can only be determined at the time when 
they occur, since preferences may change in the 
course of time. The entity responsible for the 
distribution of long-term benefits should then 
identify the needs of the community concerned. 
Academic researchers should seek different options 
for community compensation. At the minimum, 
scientists should give local communities feed-back 
on their findings. In this way they would show 
respect to the communities which gave them their 
trust in providing consent for their research.113 
Develop a distribution scheme for long-term 
benefits: thus far, the Philippine government has 
no elaborated policy on how to distribute long-
                                                 
113 Different forms of “giving back“ can be found in the 
interesting article of Shanley / Laird (2002). 
term benefits once they occur. It is unclear which 
share will go to local communities and who will 
decide on their distribution. This opens the door 
for corruption and capture of benefits by influen-
tial groups in the capital region. Thus, as a matter 
of principle, benefits should be distributed on the 
basis of a standardized key (see Figure 8).114 
• Only a small share of benefits should go to the 
specific local community where the collection 
took place. This prevents conflicts between 
communities with similar resources while at 
the same time maintaining a direct relation-
ship between communities and collectors. 
• The majority of royalties should go into a 
fund for local and indigenous communities or 
for protected areas, depending on the “cate-
gory” of the collection itself. The fund should 
be administered by an independent body in a 
transparent manner. A fund would offer the 
advantage of delivering short-term benefits to 
                                                 
114 The proposed distribution key may be considered when 
formulating the implementing rules and regulations for 
shaping the Wildlife Management Fund. See Chapter VI, 
Section 29 of the Wildlife Act: „There is hereby estab-
lished a Wildlife Management Fund to be administered 
by the Department as a special account in the National 
Treasury. It shall finance rehabilitation or restauration 
of habitats affected by acts committed in violation of this 
Act and support scientific research, enforcement and 
monitoring activities, as well as enhancement of capabi-
lity of relevant agencies.“ 
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Figure 8:  Possible Distribution Scheme for Benefits 
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communities from the royalties of different 
collection activities, thus leading to an inter-
communal and intertemporal redistribution of 
benefits. This should lead to a more efficient 
and equitable distribution of benefits.115 
• A share should be used to finance the institu-
tions tasked with bioprospecting. This could 
be the new agency mentioned above or the fo-
cal point or the IACBGR. The share is impor-
tant to guarantee long-term financial sustain-
ability of bioprospecting management and to 
stimulate the respective agencies to work effi-
ciently. 
4.4.3 Pro-Active Approaches to Create 
Benefits from Genetic Resources 
From the point of view of development, it is 
desirable that a country like the Philippines cre-
ates as much value as possible out of its genetic 
resources. Exports of resources – even under an 
ABS agreement – should be accompanied by a 
mid-term strategy to build internal capacities to 
develop products from these resources, thus 
leaving a larger share of the value added in the 
country. Domestic research and development 
needs to be supported to this end. Thus far, how-
ever, the Philippines has not managed to come up 
with a coherent strategy. Three examples of pro-
active approaches have been found in the course 
of the present study; they will be presented here to 
illustrate the chances and the pitfalls of such 
attempts. 
The Philippine Institute of Traditional and 
Alternative Health Care (PITAHC) used to be a 
program of the Department of Health; it became 
an independent government agency in 1992. Its 
objective is to promote scientifically validated 
traditional health care products. This can be seen 
in the light of the governments’ efforts to 
strengthen specific industries: the herbal medicine 
                                                 
115 Examples and principles for the design of trust funds for 
bioprospecting can be found in Guerin-McManus / Nna-
dozie / Laird (2002). 
industry is one of ten selected industries that enjoy 
special government attention. Aside from other 
tasks, PITAHC is engaged in manufacturing 
herbal medicines. Currently, PITAHC is concen-
trating its activities on ten Philippine herbs, two of 
which – Lagundi and Ascof – have already been 
commercialized in a dosable form. Pascual, the 
biggest Philippine drug company, is successfully 
marketing Lagundi as a nutritional supplement 
under a non-exclusive license from PITAHC (see 
above). Here, PITAHC has helped to increase the 
value-added in the country. The recently con-
cluded ABS agreement with a British pharmaceu-
tical company to market Lagundi on a world-wide 
scale indicates its potential. However, the case 
also highlights the limits of the Philippine com-
mitment. Without a joint venture, Pascual would 
be unable to use state-of-the-art technology, 
which would simply be too expensive. In fact, this 
underlines the necessity to foster research and 
development activities by means of tax incentives 
and other measures aimed at decreasing techno-
logical dependence in the medium term. 
Another innovative step was taken by the foun-
ders of GeneSeas, a Manila-based biotech com-
pany. In the late 1990s, some researchers from 
UP-MSI and the University of Utah founded a 
private company to facilitate and support access to 
Philippine genetic resources for domestic and 
foreign biotech companies and commercial users. 
GeneSeas offers advice on bioprospecting regula-
tion and collection regarding aquatic resources as 
well as services on processing of material. In 
other words, GeneSeas allows potential bio-
prospectors to outsource several research stages. 
GeneSeas has acquired its knowledge on the 
Philippine regulations through its own experience 
with research proposals. The founders guarantee 
that they are willing to follow the existing bio-
prospecting regulations in possible future con-
tracts. Their aim is to actively use this knowledge 
as a comparative advantage vis-à-vis foreign 
bioprospectors. The business model of GeneSeas 
seems to be an innovative way to benefit from 
specific knowledge through the provision of 
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unique services.116 However, thus far GeneSeas 
remains a concept rather than a working company, 
and its future remains open. 
The Philippine regulations on bioprospection aim 
at technology transfer. Foreign bioprospectors 
are encouraged to share both the actual research 
and the results with the Philippine collaborator. 
As a “minimum provision”, all bioprospectors 
have to deposit copies of collected specimens at 
the Philippine National Museum. This guarantees 
that the collected material is at least available for 
taxonomy. The objective of the regulation is 
laudable and is backed by numerous international 
agreements, among them the CBD and the TRIPS 
agreement, which aim to increase technology 
transfer to developing countries. Experience, 
however, has shown, not only in the Philippines, 
that a real sharing of knowledge is more the 
exception than the rule. Smaller developing coun-
tries with a limited technological base have little 
leverage to force companies or research institu-
tions from industrialized countries to transfer 
technology, since this decision will be based on a 
profit-maximizing calculation. Hence the only 
workable strategy is to build up human capital and 
technology through public incentives geared to 
attracting foreign companies with specific com-
parative advantages (like in the case of Gene-
Seas). Only through such an integrated approach 
will it be possible to foster technology transfer via 
ABS agreements. 
5 Prospects for Multilateral Access and 
Benefit-Sharing in the Philippines 
Contrary to the assessment of bilateral access and 
benefit-sharing presented in Chapter four, no 
practical experience has yet been made with 
multilateral ABS. The present chapter therefore 
discusses the prospects for the implementation of 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
                                                 
116 For more information on GeneSeas, see www.compass. 
com.ph/~giselapc/webpage.html. 
sources (ITPGR) in the Philippines as an example 
of multilateral benefit-sharing of genetic re-
sources. Since the principles of multilateral bene-
fit-sharing differ fundamentally from those of 
bilateral benefit-sharing, this is also the case with 
the options to benefit from this treaty. As the 
present chapter shows, however, stakeholders in 
the Philippines are not yet wholly aware of the 
possible benefits of the International Treaty. 
Nevertheless, some key elements of the ITPGR, 
such as Farmers’ Rights, conservation and bene-
fit-sharing at the national level, have been taken 
up in the drafting process of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act. Therefore, the relationship be-
tween this Act and the concepts and goals of the 
ITPGR is analyzed here. The chapter concludes 
with policy recommendations relating to the 
implementation of the ITPGR and the Plant Vari-
ety Protection Act in the Philippines. 
5.1 Background Information 
Access and benefit-sharing as regulated by the 
ITPGR and the Plant Variety Protection Act – 
both on the verge of implementation – are likely 
to have a significant impact on farmers and agri-
cultural biodiversity alike. The following section 
therefore depicts the particular setup of the Phil-
ippines, focusing on the influence of these regula-
tions: the current state of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture (PGRFA) in the Philip-
pines, the relevant stakeholders and the institu-
tional setting. 
5.1.1 The State of Agricultural 
Biodiversity 
The Philippines is comparatively rich in plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture.117 
PGRFA are defined as the genetic material of 
food and agricultural plants of actual or potential 
                                                 
117 See Department of Agriculture of the Philippines (1995), 
p. 23. 
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value.118 They comprise plants for human and 
animal food consumption such as rice and maize 
as well as plants for technical and medical uses 
such as cotton and rubber. PGRFA are also a key 
to further productivity increases in agriculture, 
half of which are commonly attributed to genetic 
improvement.119 
PGRFA can be classified by location in in situ and 
ex situ PGRFA. In situ PGRFA refers to material 
grown in farmers’ fields and its wild and weed-
like relatives, whereas the material stored in 
genebanks is termed ex situ PGRFA. PGRFA 
comprise (1) traditional varieties such as hetero-
geneous varieties that were developed and se-
lected by farmers in the past and the origin of 
which cannot be traced, (2) farmers’ varieties such 
as varieties bred by a single farmer or a farming 
community which can be identified as the breed-
ers, and (3) commercial varieties resulting from 
the breeding efforts of the public and commercial 
breeding sector. 
Ex situ and in situ conservation methods are 
complementary strategies. If properly managed, 
genebanks are the most secure and cost-effective 
method of PGRFA conservation.120 Besides, they 
provide easy and quick access to PGRFA for 
researchers and breeders. However, this conserva-
tion method is static and halts evolutionary proc-
esses. These evolutionary processes lead to the 
further diversification and ongoing environmental 
adaptation of varieties and thus provide a dynamic 
base for PGRFA. Many breeders believe this 
dynamic base of PGRFA to be the indispensable 
resource for sustained productivity increases. 
Therefore, in situ conservation – though more 
complicated and more costly – is increasingly 
viewed as a necessary complementary conserva-
tion strategy by breeders and conservers.121 
                                                 
118 See FAO (1997), p. 24. 
119 See Koo / Wright (1999), p. 5. 
120 See Virchow (1999b). 
121 See Virchow (1999a), p. 42. 
As far as the state of ex situ PGRFA in the Philip-
pines is concerned, the national germplasm collec-
tion comprises more than 400 different species in 
45898 accessions.122 Of these, 32446 accessions 
of 396 species are stored in the National Plant 
Genetic Resources Laboratory. The remaining 
accessions are kept in 14 smaller genebanks. The 
Laboratory collection covers wild relatives of 
cereals, fibers, forage and pasture crops, fruit 
trees, legumes, nut trees, oil crops, plantation 
crops, root crops, small fruits and vegetables. 
75 % of the accessions are of domestic origin. The 
Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice) has 
the national mandate for the conservation of rice. 
It holds 3123 accessions of 7 species of rice.123 
The Philippines also hosts the International Rice 
Research Institute, which holds the world’s largest 
ex situ collection of rice, embracing over 90000 
accessions of cultivated and wild rice species, 
which have been collected in more than 100 
different countries.124 
As for the state of in situ PGRFA, there is no 
reliable data on how much diversity actually 
exists and how much diversity has already been 
lost, because no comprehensive survey has ever 
been conducted.125 In the case of rice, the Philip-
pines’ most important and diverse crop, it is 
estimated that more than 3500 varieties existed 
prior to the green revolution in the 1960s.126 It is 
also estimated that high-yielding varieties have 
displaced more than 300 traditional rice varie-
ties.127 Even though no comprehensive study of in 
situ agricultural biodiversity has ever been con-
                                                 
122 An accession is the planting material of a variety stored 
in a conservation facility. It represents the smallest sto-
rable unit of a crop variety. For cereals, an accession 
consists of approximately 500 to 1000 seeds, which are 
dried and usually conserved cold or frozen. 
123 See Department of Agriculture of the Philippines (1995), 
pp. 73-76. 
124 See IRRI (1998). 
125 See Department of Agriculture of the Philippines (1995), 
p. 28. 
126 See SEARICE (2001b). 
127 See Wood et al. (2000). 
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ducted in the Philippines, it appears that the 
diversity of rice varieties in situ is still enormous: 
A conservation and breeding project in Mindanao 
led by SEARICE identified 298 different rice 
landraces on only 1/25th of Mindanao’s land area, 
while IRRI’s genebank contains only 135 rice 
landraces from Mindanao in total. 
5.1.2 Philippine Stakeholders in 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Biodiversity 
The ITPGR and the Plant Variety Protection 
(PVP) Act will affect various actors differently 
and set a new stage for their activities. The De-
partment of Agriculture (DA) is the central 
political actor in relation to the ITPGR and the 
PVP Act. The Philippines is a member of the FAO 
and voted in favor of the ITPGR at the 31st FAO 
Conference in November 2001. As soon as the 
Philippines ratifies the International Treaty, the 
DA will be responsible for conceptualizing the 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights at the national 
level. Some elements have been integrated in the 
PVP Act, which the DA has to implement. Fur-
thermore, the DA has to establish the rules for 
facilitated access to PGRFA, taking into account 
its benefit-sharing provisions.128 The DA is also 
responsible for the implementation of a national 
PGRFA conservation strategy in accordance with 
the Leipzig Global Plan of Action. This involves 
coordinated in situ and ex situ approaches, which 
can be financially supported by the future ITPGR 
fund for multilateral benefit-sharing. 
The National Network for the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture (National 
Network) is the central coordinating institution 
for in situ and ex situ conservation activities 
conducted by the government and by science. It 
was created in 2001 to give a new impulse to the 
conservation of agrobiodiversity in the Philip-
pines. It holds the country’s national ex situ col-
lections of PGRFA. All formerly independent 
                                                 
128 See Article 13 of the ITPGR. 
crop-specific networks have now joined the Na-
tional Network. The Network has been mandated 
by the DA to implement the ITPGR in the Philip-
pines. Therefore, it has to guarantee free access to 
its collections. Moreover, it could apply for sup-
port for in situ and ex situ conservation from the 
ITPGR trust fund. Institutionally, the National 
Network is headed by the Bureau of Plant Indus-
try and includes governmental and scientific 
institutions. NGOs and commercial breeders are 
not included, although participants stated their 
intention to do so in the future.129 
The International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) is one of the world’s largest international 
agricultural research centers and a member of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research, and as such it is mainly financed by 
donors from developed countries. IRRI is a public 
institution and its mandate crop is rice. High-
yielding rice varieties from IRRI triggered the 
Green Revolution in Asia. IRRI’s mission is to 
provide better rice varieties as a public good. IRRI 
is also a key player in the conservation of rice 
genetic resources, since it hosts the world’s largest 
rice genebank. As a consequence of the Interna-
tional Treaty, IRRI has to provide free access to 
its rice collection for the public. IRRI is currently 
bringing its Material Transfer Agreements in line 
with the requirements of the ITPGR. These 
agreements make is possible for IRRI to track 
what is being done with its accessions. IRRI also 
profits from the Multilateral System in that it can 
continue to freely collect in situ PGRFA in the 
Philippines and in other rice-growing countries as 
well as to access public ex situ collections of 
ITPGR member countries. IRRI does not conduct 
in situ conservation activities. It could, however, 
apply for support for ex situ conservation activi-
ties from the ITPGR trust fund. 
                                                 
129 The predecessor of the National Network, the Commit-
tee on Genetic Resources for Agriculture, included 
NGOs. However, founding the Network has rendered 
this institution meaningless. NGOs therfore interpret the 
new institution partly as an attempt to lower the influ-
ence of critical voices from civil society towards geneti-
cally modified organisms, which is one of the most con-
troversial issues in current PGRFA discussions. 
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Philippine NGOs like SEARICE and MASIPAG 
are key players in in situ conservation as well as in 
policy-making regarding PGRFA. They have been 
shaping the discussion on the formulation of 
Farmers’ Rights and could play an important role 
in formulating policies for the implementation of 
Farmers’ Rights on the national and local level. 
NGOs are a central vehicle for the participation of 
farmers in decision-making processes in relation 
to PGRFA, as outlined in Article 9 of the ITPGR. 
Hence if Farmers’ Rights are implemented in the 
Philippines in accordance with the ITPGR, the 
importance of NGOs as advocates of the farmers’ 
interests will continue to grow. NGOs have also 
initiated in situ conservation and breeding pro-
jects, such as participatory plant breeding projects. 
They can become an important player in the 
planning and implementation of in situ conserva-
tion projects financed by the ITPGR trust fund. 
The Commercial Breeding Sector is still in an 
early stage of development in the Philippines. The 
Seed Industry Development Act of 1992 
(RA 7308) and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 
2002 (RA 9168) were promoted in order to attract 
domestic and foreign investment in the breeding 
sector. The commercial breeding sector benefits 
from the Multilateral System because it can con-
tinue to freely access ex situ and in situ PGRFA 
collections covered by the system. Commercial 
breeders are also allowed to apply for intellectual 
property protection for transformed material 
originating from the Multilateral System.130 How-
ever, if such intellectual property protection 
restricts other breeders’ access to the material, 
they are required to pay a financial contribution 
into the ITPGR fund. In the context of the PVP 
law, the Philippine government is creating a 
national trust fund, which is financed by the fees 
and charges that breeders pay in order to obtain 
protection for their varieties. These contributions 
resemble a tax for Farmers’ Rights. 
                                                 
130 The commercial breeders are not allowed to get intellec-
tual property protection for PGRFA “in the form re-
ceived” from the Multilateral System, since this is not in 
accordance with the ITPGR (ITPGR, Art. 12.3(d)). 
Traditional Farmers are defined here as small-
scale farmers who predominantly use traditional 
inputs such as traditional seeds and organic fertil-
izers. They are the actors of in situ conservation 
and development of PGRFA. They are also the 
main holders of Farmers’ Rights. The ITPGR 
requires signatory governments to take measures 
to protect the traditional knowledge of traditional 
farmers, to facilitate for them fair participation in 
the benefits arising out of PGRFA use and partici-
pation in political processes relating to PGRFA. 
Traditional farmers could profit from new in situ 
conservation projects through increased produc-
tivity resulting from integrated in situ conserva-
tion and participatory plant-breeding projects. 
Commercial Farmers are defined here as those 
farmers who predominantly use external inputs 
and sell the largest share of their produce on the 
market. They will in the long run profit from the 
ITPGR through enhanced commercial varieties, 
because the ITPGR ensures breeders free long-
term access to basic PGRFA inputs. On the other 
hand, the price for commercial varieties will rise 
if breeders have to make monetary contributions 
to the ITPGR fund. The same holds if a national 
Farmers’ Rights fund is established.  
5.2 The Philippine Role in an Internatio-
nal System of Multilateral ABS – 
ITPGR 
The content of the ITPGR was agreed upon in 
November 2001. Now, the relevant stakeholders 
were expected to be in the process of formulating 
a position or a strategy vis-à-vis the treaty. The 
interviews revealed, however, that most potential 
stakeholders were not even aware of being stake-
holders in the ITPGR. Nonetheless, some key 
stakeholders have come up with some elaborate 
assessments of and strategies to benefit from the 
treaty. 
The International Treaty has generally been wel-
comed because it keeps PGRFA in the public 
domain, establishes a system of multilateral 
benefit-sharing and strengthens Farmers’ Rights. 
Criticism of the ITPGR has been based on the 
62 Klaus Liebig et al. 
grounds that it legitimizes patents on PGRFA and 
makes the creation of monetary benefits depend-
ent on patents. This criticism has mainly been 
voiced by NGOs, which strictly oppose patents on 
life and which regard any benefit-sharing that 
relies on patents as “shaking hands with the 
devil”. Moreover, NGOs criticize the article on 
Farmers’ Rights as being too weak, because 
implementation is left to the discretion of national 
governments – a provision that clashes with the 
position of advocates of small farmers, who 
regard Farmers’ Rights as inherent human rights. 
The following sections discuss the expected 
benefits of the ITPGR for the Philippines in the 
view of stakeholders, but also with an eye to the 
criticism expressed towards the treaty. The ex-
pected benefits can be grouped into four catego-
ries: free access to PGRFA, non-monetary bene-
fits, monetary benefits and the promotion of 
Farmers’ Rights. 
5.2.1 Free Access to PGRFA 
The multilateral system of access and benefit-
sharing ensures free access to 35 food crop spe-
cies and 29 forage species. The free and expedi-
tious access to these species is to be regulated by 
standard material transfer agreements. This en-
sures that users and providers do not have to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of access and 
benefit-sharing for each transaction, but agree to 
accept the benefit-sharing standards established 
by the ITPGR’s governing body. 
A large majority of the stakeholders generally 
welcomes the idea of free access as stipulated in 
the treaty. However, most interviewees reckon 
that the crop list of the ITPGR needs to be ex-
panded in the future to include more relevant 
crops and to prevent bilateral appropriation of 
benefits. Salazar (see Box 14) called the coverage 
of the current crop list of the MLS “embarrass-
ing”. 
Large public breeders and the academic commu-
nity are the most prominent users of foreign 
PGRFA in the Philippines (PhilRice, UPLB and 
IRRI). They see free access to this material as a 
highly important benefit of the ITPGR. Free 
access is regarded as indispensable for their work, 
namely productivity increases in agriculture 
through improved genetic material. For the Na-
tional Network, free access is a necessary condi-
tion for it in reaching its goal of enlarging and 
securing the national PGRFA base via different 
crop networks. 
Some breeders fear, however, that the ITPGR will 
not have the leverage to ensure free access to 
PGRFA, because even with the treaty in place, 
national PVP laws will make access ever more 
complicated. They witnessed that some countries 
which have large genetic diversity, especially in 
rice, seem to be reluctant to share these resources 
internationally. Two reasons are conceivable for 
this conduct: on the one hand, these countries 
seem to fear misappropriation of their genetic 
resources due to intellectual property rights 
Box 14:  The Philippine Role in the Negotiations of the ITPGR 
The Philippines played an active role in the negotiations leading up to the treaty. Remarkably, a representative of an 
NGO (Mr. Rene Salazar, SEARICE) has been mandated as principal negotiator for the Philippines by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (DA). The DA, actually the legitimate negotiator, showed little interest in the negotiations and 
did not have the capacity to pursue a negotiating strategy coherent in thematic or personnel terms. 
The Philippines sought to secure internationally enforceable Farmers` Rights and argued for the inclusion of as 
many species as possible in the crop list of the multilateral system. Many other developing countries, on the other 
hand, sought to keep certain endemic species off the list, hoping to be able to sell them bilaterally. Therefore, con-
trary to the common assumption, the dividing lines in the negotiations did not always run between developing and 
developed countries, but between different developing countries. This led to a certain blockade in the negotiations 
and prevented the inclusion of many important crops in the crop list and worked counter to the definition of interna-
tionally binding Farmers` Rights. 
Strikingly, the active role of the Philippines in the negotiations has thus far not translated out into an active discus-
sion of the issue at the national level. Evidently, national policies on PGRFA are quite disconnected from the nego-
tiations in international fora. The weak wording of the International Treaty will hardly alter the internal power 
relations which ultimately decide upon the concrete formulation of policies in a country like the Philippines. 
Governing Biodiversity 63 
 
 
claimed by other countries. On the other hand, 
these countries may be eager to sell their re-
sources via bilateral contracts, hoping for greater 
benefits than under the multilateral system. NGOs 
regard PVP laws and the increasing patenting of 
genetic resources as the main threat to a free 
exchange of seed material. They also doubt that 
the ITPGR will counter this tendency. 
What is important to the seed industry is that the 
ITPGR has defined the rules by which global 
exchange and benefit-sharing in relation to 
PGRFA will be governed. Now that patents have 
not generally been ruled out, they seem to be 
willing to make contributions to the fund. Al-
though the private sector currently requests very 
few materials from the multilateral system, it is 
assumed that the situation will change in the 
future. 
5.2.2 Non-Monetary Benefits 
According to the ITPGR, non-monetary benefits 
of the multilateral system should comprise (1) 
exchange of information, (2) access to and trans-
fer of technology, and (3) capacity-building 
(Article 13.2 (a) – (c)). Member states and breed-
ers are encouraged to share these benefits with the 
providers of PGRFA. 
Stakeholders who participated in the international 
negotiations perceive non-monetary benefits as an 
important part of the ITPGR. One of them ex-
pressed a preference for these non-monetary 
benefits over monetary benefits, stating that the 
National Network should be supported by means 
of training and the transfer of technology and 
equipment. Salazar mentioned genebanks and also 
national PGRFA networks (now joined in the 
National Network) as potential recipients of non-
monetary support. He also critically remarked that 
the reasons why the ITPGR negotiations were so 
tedious was that too much attention was paid to 
monetary benefit-sharing as opposed to the shar-
ing of non-monetary benefits. 
A member of a public agricultural research foun-
dation critically remarked that the value of access 
to foreign genetic resources is very closely linked 
to the domestic capacity to process and improve 
these resource. In her opinion, knowledge, skilled 
personnel and technical capacities are insufficient 
in the Philippines. Free access can therefore only 
live up to its potential if it goes hand in hand with 
training and the transfer of technology and infor-
mation: the non-monetary benefits of the ITPGR. 
All stakeholders, however, appeared to share a 
skeptical attitude towards the likelihood that the 
envisaged non-monetary benefits will ever mate-
rialize. These are mainly dependent on the good-
will of private companies or developed countries’ 
governments, and the ITPGR has no enforceable 
rules to induce transfers. 
5.2.3 Monetary Benefits –  
The International Trust Fund and 
Potential Recipients 
The ITPGR will establish a monetary benefit-
sharing mechanism under the multilateral system 
(Article 13.3 (d)). Monetary benefits are to be 
used for PGRFA conservation, and “farmers in 
developing countries who conserve PGRFA 
should primarily, directly and indirectly receive 
the benefits” (Article 13.3). Thus the treaty desig-
nates farmers and organizations who directly 
support the conservation activities of farmers, as 
the principal recipients. However, other actors 
who conserve PGRFA (genebanks, conservation 
networks) also qualify. 
Many stakeholders see the trust fund as a useful 
tool to promote benefit-sharing and conservation. 
But NGOs have criticized the multilateral system 
on the grounds that the generation of monetary 
benefits is completely contingent upon legitimiz-
ing and granting of intellectual property rights to 
PGRFA. Although all actors who conduct PGRFA 
conservation are in principle conceivable as 
recipients of monetary benefits from the fund, 
only three of the interviewees were aware of these 
new opportunities, and find themselves eligible: 
The National Network regards itself as a poten-
tial recipient of monetary benefits from the 
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ITPGR to strengthen its PGRFA ex situ and in situ 
conservation and development activities. The 
National Network regards itself as the principle 
agency responsible for the implementation of the 
ITPGR in the Philippines, and therefore as the 
only due recipient of monetary benefits. The 
Network’s position is that the benefits should flow 
principally to the Network’s focal agency, the 
Bureau of Plant Industry, which will then redis-
tribute them within the country. 
The National Network appears to be well geared 
for the ITPGR, because it meets many of its goals 
and demands. Various interviews indicated that 
the Network has created a general consciousness 
for the topicality of PGRFA conservation and 
given new impetus to related activities. Besides, 
one of the persons instrumental in conceptualizing 
the National Network was also temporarily nego-
tiating the ITPGR for the Philippines and is there-
fore most likely very well aware of what it would 
take to benefit from the treaty. However, it must 
be noted critically that NGOs, also important 
actors of and stakeholders in PGRFA conserva-
tion, are not included in the Network. This is 
especially relevant for the field of PGRFA poli-
cies such as Farmers’ Rights as well as for in situ 
conservation. The Network should therefore 
include all relevant stakeholders and should 
develop policies for the promotion of Farmers’ 
Rights. 
Box 15:  The CBDC Project in Bohol 
The Community Biodiversity Conservation and Development project (CBDC) in Bohol aims at fostering farmers’ 
capabilities to manage plant genetic resources (especially rice), at conserving and broadening the genetic resource base 
in the communities, and at the general empowerment of farmers. It forms part of an international program carried out 
jointly by 14 partner organizations.a SEARICE coordinates and administers the South East Asian part. The project 
relates in various ways to the ITPGR. It promotes goals of the ITPGR, such as in situ conservation of genetic resources 
and promotion of Farmers’ Rights. It therefore qualifies for support from the ITPGR multilateral trust fund. Besides, it 
could serve as blueprint for similar projects to be financed by the fund. 
The project operates in an environment of subsistence farmers. These farmers were predominantly using a single 
certified IRRI rice variety (IR 66) with modern inputs when the project started out in 1996. The farming systems were 
therefore scarcely diversified and highly dependent on external inputs. The project seeks to improve the farming 
systems and living conditions of farmers in three ways: first, the genetic material used by farmers is to be diversified in 
order to increase farmers' options to find and develop varieties which are better suited to local conditions. Second, the 
project promotes organic farming methods, thus enabling farmers to live and farm in an ecologically more sound 
manner and to lessen their dependence on external inputs. Third, the project educates farmers in organizational and 
agronomic matters, in order to enable them to more independently manage their resources and more effectively partici-
pate in local politics. All aspects of the project aim to contribute to the empowerment of the marginalized target group. 
Four elements are especially noteworthy in the present context: a cornerstone of the project is the free exchange of 
seeds between project members, non-members, and other CBDC projects in Thailand and Vietnam. Free exchange is 
regarded as an inherent right of farmers and as indispensable for improving seeds. An important function is served by 
the Farmers’ Field School, where SEARICE staff members and scientists from a local college teach a number of 
subjects, e.g. farm management, organic farming, and breeding techniques. The project distinguishes between breed-
ers and producers, who work in tandem to improve the seeds in the community. The breeder group crosses farmers’ 
selections with modern and traditional varieties, or the latter with modern varieties. Once a breeding line is stabilized, 
the seeds are passed on to the plant variety selection group. This group, to which almost all farmers belong, screens, 
characterizes, and selects new materials on their fields. After further testing, criteria like yield, pest resistance, and 
taste are applied to determine whether the seeds are appropriate for inclusion in the community seed bank. A bank of 
this kind is operated in every community, and a central back-up collection is located at the local agricultural college. A 
community seed bank contains both existing and newly developed varieties. The knowledge related to a specific 
variety is kept in a seed catalog available to all communities. The catalog facilitates the choice of seeds for production 
in that it maintains and broadens the knowledge base of farmers. Moreover, it documents local knowledge with an eye 
to preventing any misappropriation by intellectual property rights. 
Interviews revealed that farmers benefit in different ways from the project: the use of genetic material by farmers has 
undergone significant diversification. Farmers stated that they regard mutually free access to local and external genetic 
resources as perfectly natural and highly important. The project imparts new knowledge and skills related to PGRFA to 
farmers. Through the Farmers’ Field School and the community seed bank the project expands and protects traditional 
knowledge. Moreover, farmers have a say in issues surrounding PGRFA. All in all, the project promotes Farmers’ 
Rights as stipulated in the ITPGR and shows how in situ conservation can work together with community develop-
ment. 
a For information about the CBDC program, see www.cbdcprogram.org and Manicad (1996). 
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IRRI argues that it is a legitimate recipient of 
monetary benefits of the fund because it is the 
largest ex situ conserver of rice and because it has 
the technical and personnel capacity to conduct 
effective and efficient conservation activities. 
IRRI stresses that it is important to have a stable 
and long-term commitment to conduct PGRFA 
conservation effectively. IRRI is of the opinion 
that in situ conservation is not an efficient way to 
ensure PGRFA conservation, except for wild 
species. Employing farmers systematically as in 
situ conservers is seen as bureaucratic and com-
plicated, because “farmers primarily farm, they 
don’t primarily conserve”. For IRRI, it is impor-
tant to provide the legal framework needed, to 
permit natural in situ conservation to continue, but 
the organization notes that any attempt to deliber-
ately support it would be a waste of resources and 
only create more red tape. 
IRRI is certainly in a strong position, having the 
worldwide largest genebank for rice and proven 
capabilities for conservation and collection activi-
ties. Yet IRRI is neither willing nor able to engage 
in situ conservation, which is clearly required by 
the ITPGR. More importantly, IRRI has always 
received considerable funding from developed-
country governments and philanthropic founda-
tions. Benefits for IRRI from the ITPGR could be 
used by donors as an excuse to cut the level of 
funding, resulting in no or only few additional 
conservation activities. Besides, IRRI is not a 
developing-country organization and its work has 
few direct links to farmers. Yet the ITPGR re-
quires that benefits should flow primarily to 
developing countries and especially to farmers in 
developing countries. 
SEARICE is conducting two in situ conservation 
and development projects in the Philippines: 
CBDC in Bohol and CONSERVE in Mindanao. 
In its view, the fund should support these projects 
and/or future projects of a similar design. The 
merit of the projects is seen in realizing in situ 
conservation and development of PGRFA and in 
promoting elements of Farmers’ Rights (see Box 
15). SEARICE has considerable experience with 
these projects, but other NGOs are active in in situ 
conservation as well and could therefore also seek 
support of these activities through the ITPGR trust 
fund. 
5.2.4 National Obligation to Implement 
Farmers’ Rights: A Benefit from 
the ITPGR? 
The ITPGR incorporates Farmers’ Rights for the 
first time in a binding treaty under international 
law. Yet the responsibility for the implementation 
of Farmers’ Rights is left with national govern-
ments. Stakeholders in the Philippines did not 
regard the Farmers’ Rights provisions in the 
ITPGR as an important element in shifting power 
to small farmers. It is questionable, therefore, 
whether and how the new entitlements accorded 
to farmers (see Box 3) will actually be imple-
mented. 
Almost all interviewees had some idea of Farm-
ers` Rights, but only few were aware of the defini-
tion established by the ITPGR. Perceptions of 
Farmers’ Rights were very diverse, ranging from 
the right to seeds to comprehensive socio-
economic rights. Most frequently, Farmers’ 
Rights were understood as the right of farmers to 
freely decide what to do with seeds, including free 
access, free exchange and re-use and the right to 
sell their crops. Rights to land, of freedom of 
choice, to protection of knowledge, to technology, 
protection from cheap rice imports and to political 
participation were also mentioned repeatedly. It 
was, however, often unclear to which farmers the 
rights should extend (small farmers, all farmers, 
tenants, landowners). Various public entities and 
NGOs also regard their own work as a realization 
of Farmers’ Rights, according to their own defini-
tion. 
In any case, the study noted no consciousness 
among civil society and advocates of small farm-
ers that the ITPGR is a potential lever to pressure 
the government to promote Farmers’ Rights. The 
government itself expressed no additional neces-
sity to foster Farmers’ Rights because of the 
ITPGR. Moreover, various governmental institu-
tions argue that they are already realizing Farm-
ers’ Rights. Yet this is contestable, and the fact 
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that the ITPGR establishes Farmers’ Rights for 
the first time in an international treaty gives 
political advocates of Farmers’ Rights – such as 
NGOs – new legitimacy and support. However, 
given the lack of consciousness on the part of civil 
society and the weak wording of the provisions in 
the ITPGR, there is reason to doubt that Farmers’ 
Rights will be implemented in the spirit of the 
International Treaty. 
5.3 Elements of the ITPGR in National 
Legislation: the Plant Variety 
Protection Act 
Farmers’ Rights are currently being discussed 
most actively in a specific legislative context: the 
drafting process of the PVP bill. The bill was 
enacted as Republic Act No. 9168 in June 2002. 
This section takes a closer look at the PVP Act 
and examines the extent to which important 
objectives of the ITPGR have been included in the 
Act. In theory, a bill designed as a comprehensive 
law for PVP, Farmers’ Rights and the conserva-
tion of agrobiodiversity has the potential to recon-
cile and balance modernization and conservation 
goals. However, the Philippine Act includes only 
a limited number of certain elements conducive to 
the goals of the International Treaty. It focuses on 
PVP, thus failing to adequately balance the differ-
ent objectives of the ITPGR. 
5.3.1 Discussions over Farmers’ Rights 
and Multilateral Benefit-Sharing in 
the Drafting Process of the PVP Act 
Farmers Rights as stipulated by the ITPGR com-
prise four elements (1) the right to exchange, re-
use and sell seeds, (2) the right to participate in 
policy-related concerns associated with PGRFA at 
the national level, (3) the protection of traditional 
knowledge, and (4) the right to share the benefits 
arising from PGRFA use. This sections examines 
the extent to which the PVP Act promotes these 
elements. 
Farmers’ Rights to exchange, re-use and sell 
seeds: A PVP law necessarily limits the free 
exchange, re-use and sale of seeds by farmers. 
However, in the Philippines small farmers are in 
principle exempt from these restrictions.131 While 
                                                 
131 Republic Act No. 9168, Sec 43 “Exceptions to Plant 
Variety Protection. – The Certificate of Plant Variety 
Protection shall not extend to [...] (d) The traditional 
right of small farmers to save, use, exchange, share or 
sell their farm produce of a variety protected under this 
Act, except when a sale is for the purpose of reproduc-
tion under a commercial marketing agreement. The 
Board shall determine the condition under which this 
exception shall apply, taking into account the nature of 
the plant cultivated, grown or sown. This provision shall 
also extend to the exchange and sell of seeds among and 
between said small farmers; Provided that the small 
farmers may exchange or sell seeds for reproduction or 
replanting in their own land. 
Box 16:  Discussions surrounding the General Rationale for a PVP Bill 
Enacting PVP bills in developing countries is usually a controversial issue. This also holds true for the Philippines, 
with its diversity of farmers, NGOs and interest groups of different colors. 
We can identify two areas of discussion concerning the introduction of the PVP bill: at the international level, the 
Philippines is a member of the WTO, which requires all member states to enact PVP legislation (Article 27.3 (b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement). As a developing country, the Philippines was due to have the legislation in place by 1 Jan. 2000. 
While NGOs usually blame WTO membership for the need to introduce the unpopular PVP legislation, our interviews 
have shown that there is also a discussion underway at the national level on its introduction: the government and 
commercial breeders see the PVP bill as a necessary instrument to attract investments in the breeding sector and to 
modernize agriculture. Critics from NGOs and small farmers’ organizations claim, however, that PVP will restrict the 
traditional practices of farmers and lead to the erosion of agrobiodiversity due to the increased use of modern and 
uniform varieties. 
While the first version of the PVP bill started off basically as a copy of UPOV 1991, the scope of the bill has been 
broadened to accommodate elements in favor of small farmers and Farmers’ Rights. While some welcome this devel-
opment, others – most notably the seed industry – prefer a “lean” PVP bill and want to treat other issues (Farmers’ 
Rights, Benefit-Sharing, Biosafety, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights) separately. Most NGOs would prefer to have no PVP 
bill at all and to deal with the above-mentioned issues in a separate law. 
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the political discussion about PVP and Farmers’ 
Rights is controversial, the interviews found a 
general consensus among stakeholders indicating 
that small farmers should be granted these rights. 
Nevertheless, opinions differ in regard to what is 
meant by small farmers. Some argue that small 
farmers should be defined by income. Others 
think that all marginal and subsistence farmers, 
upland farmers and indigenous peoples should 
have these rights. The breeding industry in par-
ticular opposes the right of small farmers’ to sell 
their crops to others. 
Stakeholders disagree about the possible conse-
quences of the PVP Act. NGOs criticize the Act 
for interfering with small farmers’ natural activi-
ties. They are especially critical towards the 
provision that a PVP board, which is institutional-
ized by the Act, has the power to determine who 
actually qualifies for “traditional rights”. In the 
worst case, decisions of this board would reduce 
the rights of small farmers to mere legislative 
rhetoric. On the other hand, stakeholders closer to 
the government argued that the poor capacity of 
the state to enforce a law like the PVP Act will in 
any case make it unlikely that these rights of small 
farmers are affected. It was pointed out that re-
strictions on the re-use, exchange and sale for 
small-scale farmers would neither be acceptable 
nor politically feasible for countries with a large 
number of small farmers and that these restric-
tions could only apply for large land holdings. 
Farmers’ Right to participate in policy issues 
concerning PGRFA at the national level: The 
PVP Act creates a National Plant Variety Protec-
tion Board for the implementation of the Act 
(Section 66). The board (8 members) is composed 
of representatives of government (4), science (2), 
breeders (1), and a representative of a small 
farmers’ organization. The representative of the 
small farmers’ organization is to be nominated by 
the Secretary of Agriculture. Due to the limited 
representation of small farmers’ organizations and 
due to the process of nomination by the Secretary 
instead of an election among small farmers’ 
organizations, the board can hardly be seen as 
promoting the participation of small farmers. 
Farmers’ Right to the protection of traditional 
knowledge: The PVP Act states that “The State 
shall respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practice of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity and promote wider applica-
tion with the approval and involvement of holders 
of such knowledge, innovations and practices and 
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising form the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices” (Section 2(g)). Most 
stakeholders judge the protection of traditional 
knowledge as very important, but they often lack 
ideas as to how this could be achieved. One stake-
holder argues that this knowledge is automatically 
protected when the right of farmers to exchange 
and replant seeds is protected. Public breeders fear 
that the protection of traditional knowledge could 
lead to further access restrictions and instead 
recommend respecting and to promoting it rather 
than protecting it. 
In the process of drafting the PVP bill, two con-
crete measures for the protection of traditional 
knowledge were envisaged: first, the requirement 
of prior informed consent from communities in 
which requested plant genetic resources are en-
demic (Section 2(f)), and second, the setup of 
community registries for traditional varieties 
(Sections 71 & 72).132 As regards PIC, SEARICE 
argued that it makes no sense in a PVP bill be-
                                                 
132 Sec. 71 “Gene Trust Fund – There shall be an independ-
ent and separate trust fund established under this Act, to 
be administered by the Board, for the benefit of bona 
fide organizations or institutions managing and operat-
ing an accredited gene bank. An amount to be deter-
mined by the Board but not to exceed twenty percent 
(20 %) of the fees and charges, shall be used for the 
purposes of the gene trust fund. The trust fund may also 
accept donations from national and international institu-
tions and other organizations and individuals interested 
in genetic conservation.” 
 Sec. 72 “Farming Communities and Bona Fide Farmers’ 
Organizations - Farming communities and bona fide 
farmers’ organizations are encouraged to build an in-
ventory of locally-bred varieties as an option to protect 
these resources from misappropriation and unfair mo-
nopolization.” 
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cause it is in conflict with the ITPGR principle of 
free and expeditious access to PGRFA and that 
PIC is only relevant for non-agrobiodiversity. One 
scientist even stated that PIC could actually hinder 
PGRFA conservation, because the procedure is 
too bureaucratic and therefore has the potential to 
obstruct conservation-related PGRFA collections. 
As regards the registration of farmers’ and tradi-
tional varieties in community registries, this 
element has been welcomed by NGOs, since it 
could serve the protection of traditional knowl-
edge by preventing any misappropriation of 
resources. However, in the final reading of the bill 
these provisions were considerably weakened. 
The focus in the Act is now set less on support for 
small farmers and their communities. It remains to 
be seen how the provisions will be implemented 
in practice. 
A further issue under discussion and relating to 
the protection of traditional knowledge is the 
protection of farmers’ varieties through PVP 
certificates. Since PVP allows breeders to protect 
their varieties, the question arises whether farmers 
who have also been developing useful varieties 
should not be equally entitled to protection. But 
even though the PVP Act explicitly acknowledges 
farmers as breeders (Section 3), farmers’ varieties 
usually do not fulfill the UPOV criteria for protec-
tion (DUSN), which are geared to the standards 
and methods of the modern breeding industry. The 
most elaborate proposal concerning these issues 
was advanced by Rene Salazar, who proposed a 
three-tiered system of protection (see Section 5.4). 
Farmers’ Right to get a share of the benefits 
arising from PGRFA use: Section 71 of the PVP 
Act establishes an independent trust fund to 
support bona fide farmers’ organizations or insti-
tutions managing and operating an accredited 
genebank. Farming communities and bona fide 
farmers’ organizations (e.g. NGOs) are encour-
aged to set up inventories of locally bred varieties 
(Section 72). The Community Gene Trust Fund 
can be interpreted as a multilateral system of 
benefit-sharing at the national level: it uses fees 
and charges of breeders paid for the protection of 
modern varieties to support the conservation and 
documentation of traditional PGRFA by farmers. 
Those stakeholders who were aware of the fund 
saw it as a useful tool to contribute to conserva-
tion and to give benefits to farmers. Community 
registries were seen as an instrument to protect 
traditional varieties from misappropriation and to 
improve the knowledge, exchange and use of 
these varieties. One key stakeholder proposed that 
farmers who register traditional varieties in the 
community registry should qualify for subsidized 
government loans and training. SEARICE sees 
itself as a potential recipient of financial means 
from the national trust fund which would be 
channeled to the small farmers it represents, e.g. 
by setting up more community PGRFA registries. 
5.3.2 The Relation of the PVP Act to the 
ITPGR 
Legislators in the Philippines were under heavy 
pressure from the national and international breed-
ing industry to introduce a PVP bill. At the same 
time, NGOs and small farmers’ organizations 
opposed the passage of the bill, citing its allegedly 
detrimental effects on agrobiodiversity and on 
small farmers. The final Act shows some signs of 
a political compromise between the different 
stakeholders but maintains its focus on plant 
variety protection rather than on an encompassing 
law for PVP, Farmers’ Rights and the conserva-
tion of agrobiodiversity. While some parts of the 
Act support elements of the ITPGR, others have 
not been implemented in the spirit of the ITPGR. 
Farmers’ Rights have been guaranteed in that the 
Farmers’ Right to exchange, re-use and sell to 
small farmers is in accordance with the ITPGR. 
Moreover, the Community Gene Trust Fund aims 
at the protection of traditional knowledge and 
benefit-sharing. However, it remains to be seen 
whether the PVP board will ensure that these 
rights are actually implemented or whether it will 
tend more to restrict them. As regards the conser-
vation objective of the ITPGR, the net effect is not 
clear yet: on the one hand, PVP will increase the 
use of uniform commercial varieties, thus reduc-
ing agrobiodiversity. On the other hand, the 
Community Gene Trust Fund is used for measures 
aimed at conserving PGRFA. Finally, the PIC 
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provision of the PVP Act is clearly in conflict 
with the ITPGR. PIC for access to genetic re-
sources hinders the “easy and expeditious access” 
demanded by the ITPGR. 
5.4 Policy Options 
Policy Proposals Related to the ITPGR 
The following policy proposals are addressed to 
national stakeholders in agrobiodiversity, who 
should take up their opportunities to benefit from 
the ITPGR.133 
National options to benefit from the trust fund: 
few actors are aware of the content and the poten-
tial benefits of the ITPGR. Therefore raising 
awareness for the potential monetary and non-
monetary benefits of the ITPGR could be a step 
toward fostering innovative strategies to benefit 
and to prevent the “monopolization” of benefits 
by one actor (National Network). NGOs and the 
National Network should apply to the trust fund 
for support of their conservation activities. The 
National Network has a comparative advantage in 
ex situ conservation. NGOs have a comparative 
advantage in in situ conservation and in working 
directly with farmers. Therefore, their PGRFA 
conservation activities are rather complementary 
than competing. 
However, the National Network claims to be the 
agency responsible for the implementation of the 
ITPGR in the Philippines, including in situ con-
servation. Since NGOs play a leading role in in 
situ conservation and the promotion of Farmers` 
Rights, and since they are important representa-
tives of farmers in policy matters, they should be 
appropriately represented in the National Net-
work. If other relevant stakeholders such as the 
seed industry were to be included as well, the 
National Network could become the relevant 
                                                 
133 Policy proposals with regard to the ITPGR governing 
body as the implementing authority on the international 
level are presented in Chapter six. 
multistakeholder agency for PGRFA policy mat-
ters in the Philippines. 
Options to benefit from the recognition of 
Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGR: the ITPGR sets 
out a definition of Farmers` Rights and puts the 
responsibility for their realization in the hands of 
national governments. Since the ITPGR is a 
legally binding treaty, it provides advocates of 
Farmers’ Rights with a new lever to pressure for 
national implementation. The new international 
codification of Farmers’ Rights could thus be used 
to support targeted lobbying. 
Policy Proposals Related to the PVP Act 
Since many PGRFA policy issues are interlinked, 
it would have been possible to use the passage of 
the PVP bill to deal with other PGRFA issues at 
the same time. Thus the law could have become 
an encompassing sui generis law for PVP, Farm-
ers’ Rights and the conservation of agrobiodiver-
sity. With such a law, the Philippines could have 
complied simultaneously with its obligations 
under the WTO and the ITPGR. Some elements of 
Farmers’ Rights and agrobiodiversity conserva-
tion have been included in the Act. The following 
policy proposals could make the law a compre-
hensive sui generis law and could be included in 
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the 
Act. 
Farmers’ Rights: the Farmers’ Right to freely 
exchange, re-use and sell their harvest should be 
firmly anchored for all small farmers. A clear 
definition of small farmers should be codified, 
including subsistence farmers and all farmers, 
landowners and tenants alike, below a fixed 
income level. These definitions should not be left 
to the discretion of the board. The Farmers’ Right 
to get a share of the benefits from PGRFA use 
could be further promoted by allocating a larger 
share of the fees and charges of the Community 
Gene Trust Fund to measures that support farmers 
who conserve PGRFA. The Farmers’ Right to the 
protection of traditional knowledge should be 
operationalized by means of concrete measures. 
One promising option would be to support the 
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setup of community seed registries with the simul-
taneous setup of registries for traditional knowl-
edge. In this way traditional knowledge would be 
made publicly available and protected against 
misappropriation. An additional share of the fees 
and charges should be allocated to support this 
end. 
PVP board: the PVP board should include all 
relevant stakeholders. The Farmers’ Right to 
political participation in PGRFA issues should be 
strengthened by raising the number of small 
farmers’ representatives and NGOs on the PVP 
board. These should not be nominated by the 
Department of Agriculture but be elected in a 
democratic and transparent process to be initiated 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Community Gene Trust Fund: the percentages 
of the fees and charges to be paid out to the 
Community Gene Trust Fund should be increased 
in order to make benefit-sharing effective. The 
share should be clearly established in the Imple-
menting Rules and Regulations and not left to the 
discretion of the board. 
Prior informed consent: the PIC provision 
should be removed, since it is in conflict with the 
requirement of free and expeditious access under 
the ITPGR. 
Protection of traditional varieties and incen-
tives for farmers to breed new varieties - three-
tiered system of protection: a three-tiered system 
of protection could be established to protect 
existing agrobiodiversity and to give incentives to 
farmers and breeders alike to continue to develop 
new varieties: (1) UPOV requirements (DUSN) 
and protection for modern varieties, including 
royalty payments by seed propagators and large-
scale farmers, (2) more lax protection requirement 
for farmers’ varieties, e.g. protection if they are 
distinct, identifiable and new (DIN). If seeds 
protected by these criteria are multiplied and 
spread by others, there should be some form of 
remuneration for the individual breeder or to the 
community as a whole, but no requirement for 
royalty payments for the use of these varieties by 
others, (3) a registration of existing traditional 
varieties in community registers in order to pre-
vent modern breeders from claiming these varie-
ties as their own discoveries or inventions (misap-
propriation regime). The first tier is fully, the third 
one only partly realized in the PVP Act. Training 
of farmers in breeding techniques financed by the 
Trust Fund could be a step towards the realization 
of the second tier. 
Governing Biodiversity 71 
 
 
PART III:  
REFLECTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6 Reflections and Recommendations 
The findings of the study presented in Chapters 
four and five have focused on the reality of bilat-
eral access and the potential for multilateral 
access and benefit-sharing in the Philippines, on 
obtained achievements, identified constraints, as 
well as on policy options suitable to overcoming 
them. The following synthesis is derived from the 
findings: first, a confrontation of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and multi-
lateral ABS, second, lessons learned from the 
Philippine experience for the international debate 
on ABS, especially within the CBD, and third, 
recommendations for international cooperation on 
different levels. 
6.1 Bilateral and Multilateral Access and 
Benefit-Sharing 
It would be premature to compare the bilateral 
approach with the multilateral approach. While 
some experiences has already been made with 
bilateral ABS, the multilateral approach is still in 
a conceptual stage. Moreover, the two approaches 
do not present alternative options for policy-
makers in developing countries. Biodiversity falls 
under bilateral ABS, whereas agrobiodiversity is 
to be accessed and shared under a multilateral 
system. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of 
view it makes sense to use the findings of the 
present study to analyze comparative strengths 
and weaknesses of both approaches and the condi-
tions needed for them to live up to expectations. 
Five areas deserve particularly to be highlighted: 
transaction costs for the user, implementing costs 
for the provider, effects on research and innova-
tion, effects on technology transfer, and effects on 
local communities in terms of empowerment and 
economic development. 
Transaction Costs for the User 
Transaction costs for the user are higher under the 
bilateral approach, for theoretically anticipated 
reasons such as the need to negotiate each particu-
lar contract, as well as for unforeseen reasons 
such as slow processes involving government 
bureaucracy and multiple stakeholders. This 
proposition would, however, apply only if gov-
ernments resist to building unnecessary bureau-
cracies in implementing the multilateral system of 
exchange in their countries. 
Bilateral Approach: in contrast to the theoretical 
notion of “bi”-lateral negotiations, the total pro-
cess from access determination to benefit-sharing 
comprises several, sequential negotiations, each of 
which entails transaction costs. The present study 
has found four types of negotiations to be impor-
tant: (1) Principal Collector – Co-collector: a 
foreign institution (Principal Collector) negotiates 
with a partner institution in the source country 
(Co-collector) to reach mutually agreed terms 
stipulated in the CBD. (2) Applicants – 
IACBGR/government: the applicants have to 
convince multiple stakeholders and the govern-
ment of their research proposal. To provide for 
government control, one department is even to 
become a party to research agreements, making, 
de facto, for trilateral contracts. (3) Co-collector – 
Local Community: as implied in the Bonn Guide-
lines on ABS, local communities are to be in-
volved by acquiring their prior informed consent. 
(4) Principal Collector – Third Party: to develop 
genetic resources to a point where benefits arise, 
the parties to an ABS-agreement usually collabo-
rate with a third party, mostly a private company, 
on the basis of a material transfer agreement. 
Multilateral Approach: under the multilateral 
approach, the user receives genetic resources from 
the open multilateral system under a standardized 
material transfer agreement, leaving no space for 
negotiation. Transaction costs for the user are 
therefore minimal, at least in theory. In practice, 
interview partners stated that national patent and 
PVP laws have increasingly led to restricted 
access to genetic resources, since private actors 
have stopped contributing materials to the multi-
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lateral system. In addition, experience with regu-
latory policy in the Philippines has led stake-
holders to anticipate that new regulatory bodies 
might be created as part of the implementation 
process for ITPGR. Thus, under the multilateral 
approach transaction costs may increase, frustrat-
ing the Treaty’s objective of free and expeditious 
access to agrobiodiversity. 
Implementing Costs for the Provider 
The bilateral approach burdens the implementing 
country with higher costs, since it is necessary 
here to create additional institutions for access 
determination and benefit-sharing as well as 
surveillance mechanisms, whereas the multilateral 
approach mainly requires legal recognition of 
ITPGR provisions. 
Bilateral Approach: implementation of the 
bilateral approach has been shown to require 
additional resources. One of the results of the 
present study is that the bilateral approach to ABS 
in the Philippines faces problems because the 
costs of its implementation have not sufficiently 
been met. It is necessary to create laws regulating 
bioprospection and to allocate funds for adminis-
trative activities related to their efficient imple-
mentation.134 To reach the goals of sustainable use 
and equitable and fair sharing of benefits at the 
local level, additional educational measures are 
necessary. All these costs can be seen as a major 
obstacle to the implementation of the CBD at the 
national level. In the long run, once a functioning 
regulatory framework has processed sufficient 
research agreements that produce benefits, the 
Philippine government may be able to recoup at 
least part of the implementation costs through its 
participation in benefit-sharing. 
Multilateral Approach: Participation in the open 
multilateral system does not burden the imple-
menting country with additional costs, aside from 
                                                 
134 Although different agencies had promised to allocate 
funds for the implementation of EO 247, the political 
will has not been sufficient for these resources actually 
to flow. 
the need to recognize ITPGR provisions in na-
tional law. Additional institutions are not neces-
sary per se, although a country like the Philip-
pines might consider installing a body to screen 
applications to the ITPGR fund with an eye to 
fostering coherence in agricultural policy. 
Effects on Research and Innovation 
While the bilateral approach creates restrictions 
before research starts, the multilateral approach 
steps in only following successful research, when 
intellectual property rights are acquired for the 
results. The multilateral approach therefore puts 
few restraints on research and innovation, while 
the bilateral approach entails adverse effects. 
Bilateral Approach: Academic and commercial 
research are in need of acquiring research agree-
ments prior to accessing genetic resources, thus 
placing regulatory restrictions upstream of the 
research process itself. Given the transaction costs 
involved in obtaining research agreements, as 
analyzed in Chapter four, research and innovation 
based on genetic resources from the Philippines 
are relatively costly. Nevertheless, it should be 
kept in mind that regulatory requirements like PIC 
can prove to be beneficial in terms of both devel-
opment and academic research. 
Multilateral Approach: Scientific and commer-
cial researchers are free to access genetic materi-
als from the multilateral system on the basis of 
standardized material transfer agreements. When 
marketable products emerge which fall under 
exclusive intellectual property rights, benefits are 
paid into a common fund. The multilateral ap-
proach thus places regulatory restrictions at a 
point following the research process, leaving 
research itself unrestricted. As a consequence, 
research on genetic resources involves fewer 
costs. This is in line with the ITPGR goal of food 
security, since it encourages research on the 
improvement of plant varieties. 
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Effects on Technology Transfer 
The bilateral approach gives providers the option 
to discuss technology transfer with partners in 
ABS agreements, making this a more concrete 
option than the mere postulations contained in the 
ITPGR. However, it must be borne in mind here 
that institutions in the North are reluctant to 
transfer technology. 
Bilateral Approach: since the contract between 
user and provider is freely negotiable, providers 
have a say on the technology they would like to 
see included as a type of benefit. However, lim-
ited bargaining power and lack of financial means 
to maintain expensive machinery frequently make 
this a rather theoretical option. Since companies in 
the North can hardly be forced to transfer technol-
ogy, it is important for developing countries to 
build up a stock of knowledge and capital with a 
view to making themselves attractive as coopera-
tion partners. This could induce technology trans-
fer because it would be in the self-interest of a 
company in the North to outsource certain activi-
ties. 
Multilateral Approach: although technology 
transfer plays a role in the text of the ITPGR, it 
appears to be no less pure rhetoric than in the case 
of many other international agreements. Develop-
ing countries should not expect too much from 
this option. 
Effects on Local Communities in Terms of 
Empowerment and Economic Development 
Both approaches have the potential to contribute 
to local empowerment and development. Never-
theless, it is obvious that the intended positive 
outcomes can only be reached if additional educa-
tional measures accompany activities related to 
ABS. 
Bilateral Approach: effects on local communi-
ties can assume two forms: first, PIC, the “fact of 
being asked permission”, may contribute to em-
powerment in the sense of command over own 
resources as well as to sustainable use by raising 
awareness of the value of biodiversity. Second, 
monetary and non-monetary benefits can contrib-
ute to all of the above-mentioned goals if appro-
priately used (e.g. by transforming them into 
public goods like education or health). As the 
present study points out, however, neither PIC by 
itself nor the disbursement of benefits leads di-
rectly to the intended effects. PIC can be obtained 
without awareness at the local level of the value 
of genetic resources, and benefits are of an am-
biguous nature, since they can promote local 
development, though they may also lead to so-
cially and ecologically adverse effects if used 
inappropriately. 
Multilateral Approach: effects on local commu-
nities may come about through in situ conserva-
tion projects in specific communities as well as 
through implementation of Farmers’ Rights in 
national legislation. In situ conservation of agro-
biodiversity means supporting communities that 
maintain farming systems which employ land-
races and agricultural techniques associated with 
them. In situ conservation may also include rein-
troduction of landraces in farming systems that 
switched to monocultures at the time of the green 
revolution.135 In both cases, in situ conservation 
will be promoted by projects with a comprehen-
sive agenda aimed at improving living and farm-
ing conditions in the community. The institution-
alization of Farmers’ Rights at the national level 
opens up chances for communities to protect 
traditional and farmers’ varieties against misap-
propriation and to gain more influence in political 
issues concerning plant genetic resources. The 
extent to which these chances can be used to 
realize concrete effects on the local level is a 
question that remains to be seen. The ITPGR in 
itself will not change the power relations in a 
society. 
                                                 
135 The CBDC project presented in Box 15 in Chapter five 
is an example of such a project. 
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6.2 Lessons Learned from the Philippine 
Experience with Bilateral ABS 
Since the CBD was adopted, an international 
debate has sought to refine the interpretation of 
the treaty’s provisions and the means for its 
implementation. One central document intended 
to help governments to implement the CBD in 
national ABS legislation is the Bonn Guidelines 
on access and benefit-sharing, adopted in April 
2002 (see Section 3.1.2). This section relates some 
of the lessons learned from the Philippine experi-
ence to specific points mentioned in the Bonn 
Guidelines.136 Aspects of ABS discussed below 
include roles and responsibilities of governments 
of provider countries, participation of stake-
holders, and steps involved in the ABS process. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
National focal point (Bonn Guidelines, para. 13): 
“Each party should designate one national focal 
point for access and benefit-sharing and make 
such information available through the clearing-
house mechanism. The national focal point should 
inform applicants [...] on procedures for acquir-
ing PIC and MAT, including benefit-sharing, and 
on competent national authorities, relevant in-
digenous and local communities and relevant 
stakeholders [...].” 
According to the findings of the present study, the 
existence of one clearly visible focal point is 
essential for a country to lower transaction costs 
for applicants. In the Philippines, two agencies see 
themselves as focal points in practice, while the 
Department of Foreign Affairs formally appears 
as a focal point on the CBD homepage.137 As a 
consequence, foreign stakeholders state informa-
tion problems when asked about major hindrances 
concerning ABS in the Philippines. Countries 
choosing a multi-stakeholder approach, like the 
Philippines, to regulate ABS should therefore be 
aware of the necessity to clearly define one 
                                                 
136 Decision VI/24 is available at www.biodiv.org/deci-
sions. 
137 See www.biodiv.org/world/map.asp. 
agency as a primus inter pares to act as a focal 
point. 
Competent national authorities (Bonn Guide-
lines, para. 14, 15): “Competent national authori-
ties, where they are established, may [...] be 
responsible for granting access and be responsi-
ble for advising on (a) the negotiation process; (b) 
requirements for obtaining prior informed consent 
and entering into mutually agreed terms; [...] (g) 
mechanisms for the effective participation of 
different stakeholders [...].” 
The case of the Philippines has shown that compe-
tences have to be well defined and demarcated 
between the different government agencies if the 
ABS process is to operate efficiently. The defini-
tion and assignment of additional competences, 
however, must be accompanied by measures to 
ensure that the agencies concerned have the 
necessary capacities to assume their new tasks. As 
happened in the Philippines, agencies that lack 
capacities can be an obstacle to ABS agreements. 
Responsibilities: Countries of origin (Bonn 
Guidelines para. 16 a)): “Contracting Parties 
which are countries of origin of genetic resources 
[...] should [..] establish mechanisms to ensure 
that their decisions are made available to indige-
nous and local communities and relevant stake-
holders,[...] [and] support measures [...] to en-
hance indigenous and local communities’ capac-
ity to represent their interests fully at negotia-
tions.” 
According to the findings of the present study, 
NGOs assume important roles in the areas defined 
by the guidelines as the responsibility of govern-
ments. The reasons for this lie in a lack of capaci-
ties on the part of state agencies (funds and know-
how) as well as in a lack of political will. Judging 
from the Philippine experience, we are skeptical 
about the ability of most developing countries to 
live up to the responsibilities set out in the guide-
lines. Notwithstanding, governments might con-
sider using collaboration to draw on the capacities 
and know-how of NGOs with an eye to increasing 
the chances of compliance. 
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Participation of Stakeholders 
Consultative national body (Bonn Guidelines, 
para. 19): “To facilitate the involvement of rele-
vant stakeholders, including indigenous and local 
communities, appropriate consultative arrange-
ments, such as national consultative committees, 
comprising relevant stakeholder representatives, 
should be made.” 
In the Philippines, stakeholder participation has 
been institutionalized in a committee which must 
be consulted for access, mutually agreed terms 
and benefit-sharing and which was even intended 
to work in policy formulation. As was shown, it is 
essential to provide sufficient funds and to ensure 
that a functional organizational setup is in place if 
such a committee is to work smoothly. Otherwise, 
significant delays in ABS procedures can be 
expected to lead to prohibitive transaction costs 
for applicants, and important questions of policy 
and national strategy will remain unresolved. 
Promotion of stakeholder participation (Bonn 
Guidelines, para. 20): “The involvement of rele-
vant stakeholders should be promoted by: (a) 
providing information, especially regarding 
scientific and legal advice, in order for them to be 
able to participate effectively; (b) providing 
support for capacity-building.” 
According to the findings of the present study, 
indigenous and local communities in fact are 
faced with significant difficulties in participating 
in a meaningful way in ABS negotiations, since 
they lack the capacity to judge the value of their 
resources and the scientific advice needed for the 
purpose. Capacity-building has also been found to 
be essential for using PIC as a vehicle for empow-
erment as well as a necessary measure to promote 
the goals of conservation and sustainable use. 
Steps in the ABS Process 
Competent authority(ies) granting prior in-
formed consent (Bonn Guidelines, para. 28-32): 
“[...] In accordance with national legislation, PIC 
may be required from different levels of Govern-
ment. [...] Respecting established legal rights of 
indigenous and local communities [...], the prior 
informed consent of indigenous and local commu-
nities and the approval and involvement of the 
holders of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices should be obtained, in accordance with 
their traditional practices, national access poli-
cies and subject to domestic laws.” 
It has been shown that requiring prior informed 
consent from local and indigenous communities 
could work as a vehicle for empowerment if is 
accompanied by additional measures. However, 
requiring PIC at different government levels 
requires additional efforts to provide local gov-
ernment units with the capacity to fulfill their 
newly acquired responsibilities. Otherwise, sig-
nificant delays may be imminent and/or local 
governments may not be able to act in accordance 
with the objectives of the CBD. Specifying PIC 
for indigenous communities according to their 
respective traditional practices implies harmoniza-
tion of the national legislation defining rights for 
indigenous communities (where existent) with 
ABS legislation in such a way that the provisions 
are complementary in nature. It would be helpful 
for users if customary practices of indigenous 
communities were well documented, which would 
increase the transparency of the requirements 
users are obliged to meet. 
Types of benefits (Bonn Guidelines, para. 46 and 
Appendix II): the guidelines merely list possible 
benefits as potentially conducive to conservation 
and sustainable use. In the Philippines, stake-
holders representing local and indigenous com-
munities have frequently warned against overly 
concentrating on monetary benefits. They have 
even referred to this an “obsession” of researchers 
in the North. Instead of contributing to the objec-
tives of the CBD, it is feared that such benefits 
may corrupt social coherence in source communi-
ties. The discussion about benefits should concen-
trate more on empowerment and respect for the 
rights of marginalized peoples. The international 
debate should be aware of the ambiguous charac-
ter of monetary benefits and place emphasis on 
the complementary nature of benefit-sharing and 
awareness-raising of the value of biodiversity. 
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Distribution of benefits (Bonn Guidelines, para. 
48): “[...] benefits should be shared fairly and 
equitably with all those who have been identified 
as having contributed to the resource manage-
ment, scientific and/or commercial process. The 
latter may include governmental, non-
governmental or academic institutions and in-
digenous and local communities. Benefits should 
be directed in such a way as to promote conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biodiversity.” 
According to the findings of the present study, it 
is important for a country to have a clear policy on 
how benefits are to be distributed and who is to 
decide on distribution. The more transparent the 
mechanism is designed, the better are the chances 
to avoid corruption and inefficient use of funds. 
Communities should have a possibility to obtain 
benefits according to their preferences. However, 
benefits should not be shared exclusively with the 
source community that has provided the re-
sources. Trust funds are an adequate mechanism 
for an interpersonal and intertemporal redistribu-
tion of benefits. 
6.3 Recommendations for International 
Cooperation 
The present study is about the attempt of a devel-
oping country to implement international conven-
tions with a view to benefiting from the use of 
genetic resources. The international community 
has an interest in supporting developing countries 
in the implementation of global rules. Biological 
diversity and agrobiodiversity are typical global 
public goods whose conservation and sustainable 
use require global governance. In a first step, this 
means to develop global policies of the type 
achieved with the adoption of the CBD and the 
ITPGR. In a second step, it is necessary to move 
from policy definition to policy implementation. 
We have pointed out that the implementation of 
globally defined policies is still deficient and in 
need of reform. This section aims to show how 
and where the international community can con-
tribute to the reforms needed to make global 
governance work. 
6.3.1 Recommendations for German 
Bilateral Development Cooperation 
with Countries Implementing the 
CBD and the ITPGR 
German bilateral development cooperation should 
contribute to the implementation of the CBD and 
the ITPGR by providing technical assistance, by 
facilitating public private partnership projects and 
by fostering scientific cooperation. 
• Technical and/or personnel cooperation in the 
implementation of the CBD: provide funding 
for German, international or local short-term 
experts, as appropriate. The projects/experts 
should (1) advise governments in designing 
simple but comprehensive ABS legislation 
based on the Bonn Guidelines on ABS and tak-
ing into account the findings of the present 
study, (2) advise and train competent national 
authorities to gain the capacities needed to 
implement the CBD, as listed in the Bonn 
Guidelines on ABS, (3) organize and conduct 
workshops in different regions to train NGOs 
that act as multipliers for awareness-raising 
among local communities. The workshops 
should at the same time foster South-South 
cooperation between competent NGOs. 
• Technical cooperation regarding the imple-
mentation of the ITPGR: fund international or 
local experts to assist local NGOs in concep-
tualizing and implementing in situ conserva-
tion projects. A special focus could be set on 
in situ conservation projects which pursue a 
holistic approach including conservation, edu-
cation and enhancement of livelihoods. 
• Financial and/or technical cooperation agen-
cies: support implementing agencies in source 
countries by funding local long-term experts 
to organize a focal point for bilateral ABS 
(this could, alternatively, be financed through 
the Global Environment Facility). Locals, in-
cluding NGOs, should be advised on how to 
apply for funding from the fund to ensure that 
they benefit from the new ITPGR trust fund. 
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• Technical cooperation agencies: facilitate 
public-private partnership (PPP) projects for 
German and source country companies in 
fields such as natural health, cosmetic prod-
ucts and breeding. Involving the public in pri-
vate business activities is justified in this con-
text because some profitable partnerships 
could fail to materialize due to temporarily 
high transaction costs, which a public agency 
could shoulder. Moreover, medium-sized 
companies from the North could see too large 
a risk in cooperation projects of this kind. Fi-
nally, the analysis in Chapter four has shown 
that it is extremely important to generate posi-
tive examples of benefit-sharing in order to 
build trust in local communities in the South. 
PPP projects should therefore induce collec-
tive learning processes and aim at facilitating 
technology transfer and creating benefits to be 
shared. 
• National research-funding institutions: sup-
port academic cooperation and technology 
transfer by financing capacity-building and 
equipment for scientific institutions in source 
countries. It would be important to streamline 
existing programs with ABS policies and ad-
just them to development goals such as trans-
fer of technology and knowledge. 
6.3.2 Recommendations for International 
Policy  
International organizations can contribute to the 
implementation of CBD and ITPGR by facilitat-
ing communication among implementing coun-
tries by means of conferences and regional initia-
tives and by refining the Treaty/Convention. 
• UNEP and FAO: facilitate South-South 
conferences to promote an exchange of ex-
perience regarding ABS legislation, realiza-
tion of in situ and ex situ conservation proj-
ects, and implementation of Farmers’ Rights 
in national legislation. 
• Regional organizations (ASEAN, OAU, etc.): 
set up regional initiatives to develop uniform 
procedures in ABS legislation designed to 
head off substitution strategies by users of ge-
netic resources. 
• Conference of the Parties to the CBD: intro-
duce deadlines for the implementation of ABS 
regulations following the Bonn Guidelines to 
avoid punitive effects for pioneering countries 
through substitution strategies by users of ge-
netic resources. 
• Governing body of the ITPGR: design trust 
fund for ITPGR in such a way that it is open 
to applications from all PGRFA stakeholders 
(government, science, NGOs, national and in-
ternational agricultural research centers) to 
encourage project funding and a “competition 
of ideas”. There should be separate budgets 
for in situ and ex situ conservation. Allocation 
of financial support to projects or institutions 
should be based on three criteria: (1) effi-
ciency of PGRFA conservation, (2) direct and 
indirect benefits for farmers in developing 
countries, and (3) promotion of Farmers’ 
Rights. It should be ensured that only new 
conservation activities are supported in order 
to avoid the emergence of donor substitution 
strategies. 
6.3.3 User Measures 
User countries should undertake efforts to adapt 
procedures and regulations related to access and 
benefit-sharing in a way supportive of implemen-
tation of the CBD. 
• National patent offices, the World Trade 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization: require patent applicants to 
document source materials and prove compli-
ance with source country laws, esp. ABS leg-
islation. Such measures would ease the pres-
sure on developing countries to monitor the 
use of materials received from them and en-
able them to rely on material transfer agree-
ments. This would reduce the need for gov-
ernments to “overregulate”, leading to both 
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lower implementing costs for the provider as 
well as lower transaction costs for the user. 
• National research funding institutions: induce 
researchers from developed countries to in-
clude ABS-related activities such as PIC in 
their research applications and guarantee 
separate funding for these activities. Institu-
tions should generally develop a policy re-
garding access and benefit-sharing. Such a 
policy should include a regular check of ap-
plicants for compliance with source country 
ABS legislation. The ABS policy of the Na-
tional Cancer Institute (USA) can be con-
sulted as a model.138 Moreover, funding insti-
tutions should foster technology transfer to 
developing-country institutions by requiring 
researchers in the North to provide as much 
capacity-building and knowledge-sharing as 
possible. 
• National departments of environment: pro-
mote awareness-raising campaigns in devel-
oped countries among potential users of ge-
netic material, both academic and private, re-
garding their roles and responsibilities in ac-
cessing genetic material in foreign countries. 
 
                                                 
138 See ten Kate / Laird (2000a), pp. 310-311. 
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7 Annex 
7.1 Table A-I: Research Applications under EO 247 
 
Applicant Typ of RA Begin of 
Application 
Status Remark 
Approved Applications 
UP-MSI Concepcion CRA February 97 Approved in 
January 98; 
Signed in June 98  
First CRA signed 
 
UP System ARA September 98 Approved in March 
99; 
Signed at end of 00 
DENR, DA, DOST, DOH had to sign; 
documents long delayed particularly with 
DOST 
UP-MSI Cruz CRA October 98 Approved by end 
00; 
Signed in April 02 
Long processing period for documents in 
BFAR  
IRRI ARA end of 98 
 
Approved in 
August 01; 
Still not signed 
DENR, DA, DOST and DOH as signatories; 
2 signatures still missing; 
document long delayed with DOST 
UP-MSI Concepcion CRA/ 
Renewal 
February 01 Approval in March 
02; not signed 
PIC certificates submitted in November 2001;
Signing expected before June 02 
Pascual Laboratories 
Inc. 
CRA July 01 Approved in 
January 02; signed 
end of April 02 
DOST and DOH as signatories;  
DOH signature by fast track; 
DOST signed April 2002 
Withdrawn Applications 
PNM/NCI/CRRF CRA January 96 Withdrawn According to BFAR, NCI rejected negotia-
tions on benefit-sharing and collected in other 
Asian countries instead (country substitution)
PNM, however, accused BFAR of delaying 
negotiations 
Kagoshima Univer-
sity, Japan 
CRA November 96 Withdrawn Application withdrawn right after informa-
tion was provided on procedures, which were 
regarded as too complicated 
Silliman University / 
UC San Diego / NCI 
CRA December 96 Withdrawn US collaborators NCI and UC San Diego 
terminated the cooperation contract with 
Silliman at the end of 98, because of long 
procedures; documents long deleyed with 
BFAR 
West Visayas State 
University 
CRA June 97 Withdrawn  
Pending Applications / Applications with unclear status 
Rizal Technological 
Colleges 
CRA November 96 Not concluded No applicant response; 
PAWB waiting for required documents 
University of Hong-
kong 
CRA January 97 Not concluded No applicant respnse; 
Awaiting required documents, especially PIC 
certificates, since 1998 
Batgi Producers 
Association 
CRA 1999 Initial review by 
TS in June 01 
Required documents not completed, PAWB 
waiting for reply; 
On the opposite side, the applicant claims to 
have complied with all requirements and 
expects CRA to be signed by mid-2002 
(Interview Rose Bellow) 
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Central Luzon 
Agriculture and 
Resources R & D 
Consortium 
CRA No information
(before June 
01) 
Initial review by 
TS in June 01 
Required documents not completed, PAWB 
waiting for reply 
De la Salle Universi-
ty 
ARA No information No information  
Research Institute 
for Tropical Medi-
cine (RITM) 
ARA No information No information Long decision-making process in IACBGR: 
at first, a MoU was suggested, after one year 
a new decision was taken, that ARA is 
requested 
Tibotec CRA No information No information  
Aurora State College 
of Technology 
ARA No information No information  
Central Mindanao 
University  
ARA No information No information  
Application referred to PalCSD 
State Polytechnical 
College Palawan 
(SPCP) 
ARA 2001 No ARA required TS decided in June 01, that ARA is not 
needed; instead a MoU with the PalCSD is 
required; 
On the opposite side, SPCP is waiting for 
reply from PAWB and signing of the ARA 
Sources: PAWB (2001); PAWB (1996-2002) 
 
7.2 Table A-II: Basic information about the Commercial Research Agreements between 
University of Utah, University of the Philippines - Marine Science Institute and the 
Department of Agriculture 
 
 CRA 1998 CRA 2002 
Project Title “Anticancer Agents from Unique 
Natural Products Sources” 
“Conus peptides and their receptor targets” 
Duration of Agreement July 1998 – June 2001 March/April 2002 – March 2005 
Research Objective Examination of marine organ-
isms as source of extracts and 
compounds with potential 
anticancer activity 
Examination of conus specimen (for comparison also 
turridae and terribridae) as source of venom for the 
search for neurologically and other biologically active 
compounds 
Principal Collector (PC) University of Utah 
Dr. Lynne Chronister (Director 
of the Office of Sponsored 
Projects) 
Dr. Chris Ireland (Principal 
Investigator) 
University of Utah 
Dr. Raymond F. Gesteland (Vice-President for Re-
search) 
Dr. Baldomero Olivera (Principal Investigator) 
Co-collector (CC) UP Marine Science Institute 
(MSI) 
Dr. Claro T. Llaguno (Chancel-
lor) 
Dr. Gisela P. Concepcion  
Dr. Porfirio M. Aliño 
UP Marine Science Institute (MSI) 
Dr. Emerlinda R. Roman (Chancellor) 
Dr. Lourdes Cruz 
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Philippine Government Partner Agency Department of Agriculture (DA)
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR) 
Salvador H. Escudero III (Secre-
tary) 
Department of Agriculture (DA) 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) 
Leonardo Q. Montemayor (Secretary) 
Funding Agency National Cancer Institute (USA)
through National Cooperative 
Natural Product Drug Discovery 
Group 
National Institutes of Health (USA) 
Third parties involved Wyeth-Ayerst, formerly Ameri-
can Cyanamid 
(receives materials through MTA 
for further research and commer-
cialization) 
n.n. 
(receives materials through MTA for further research 
and commercialization) 
Main responsibilities of Principal 
Collector 
- direct and lead collection 
- chemical investigation 
- transfer of samples to third 
parties for further anti-cancer 
testing 
- prepare, prosecute, enforce, 
maintain patents 
- take lead in identifying poten-
tial licensees and negotiating 
license agreements 
- direct and lead collection 
- chemical investigation 
- transfer of samples to third parties for further anti-
cancer testing 
- prepare, prosecute, enforce, maintain patents 
- take lead in identifying potential licensees and negoti-
ating license agreements 
Main responsibilities of  
Co-collector 
- apply for CRA  
- secure all permits and submit 
all reports required by IACBGR 
or involved government agencies
- conduct PIC campaigns 
- collect samples 
- conduct preliminary investiga-
tions  
- export materials to principal 
collector  
- apply for CRA  
- secure all permits and submit all reports required by 
IACBGR or involved government agencies 
- conduct PIC campaigns 
- collect samples 
- conduct preliminary investigations 
- export materials to principal collector 
Main responsibilities of Philippine 
Government Agency 
- grant permits 
- monitor research activities and 
prepare reports 
- accompany principal collector 
during collection trips 
- grant permits 
- monitor research activities and prepare reports 
- monitor purchased specimens and accompany principal 
collector during collection trips 
Collection Sites Davao-Zamboanga/Mindanao 
1998 
Batanes Region 1999 
Central Visayas 2000 
Coron Island 2000 
Mabini & Batangas March 1999 
Panglao & Balicasag/Bohol 2001  
Application being processed in: 
Punta Engano/Cebu 
Buenavista/Marinduque  
Preliminary talks: Morong/Bataan 
Other places to be identified later as needed 
Sources: University of Utah / UP-MSI / DA (1998); University of Utah / UP-MSI / DA (2002); Batungbacal (2000), pp.14-19 
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7.3 List of Interview Partners in Chronological Order 
 
09 January 2002 Andreas Drews, GTZ, Bonn 
10 January 2002 Reinhard Liersch, Medicinal Plant Consulting, Bonn 
23 January 2002 Thomas Henkel, Bayer AG, Wuppertal 
25 January 2002 Frank Klingenstein, University of Bonn Botanic Garden, Bonn 
04 February 2002 Wilbert Himmighofen, Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture, Bonn 
08 February 2002 Burkhard Port, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bonn 
20 February 2002  Eliseo T. Balaynal, Deputy Director General of PITAHC, Manila 
21 February 2002  Atty. Analiza Albano Vitug, Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Manila 
21 February 2002  Meriden E. Maranan, Chief of Wildlife Regulation Section, Protected Area Wildlife Bureau, Manila 
21 February 2002  Lourdes Cruz, Professor, Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Manila 
21 February 2002  Ephraim Patrick T. Batungbacal, Research Officer, Tambuyog (NGO), Manila 
22 February 2002  Porfirio Aliño, Professor, Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Manila 
22 February 2002  Amelia Guevarra, Vice Chancellor, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Manila 
22 February 2002  Eufe Tantia, Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines, Manila 
26 February 2002  Fabian Dayrit, Professor, Ateneo University, Manila 
26 February 2002  Domingo A. Madulid, Botany Division, Philippine National Museum, Manila 
26 February 2002  Dave de Vera, PAFID (NGO), Manila 
26 February 2002  Carlito P. Fernandez, Acting Chief, Agricultural Support and Coordination Division, Florelitz Avellana, 
Special Project Divison, National Agricultural & Fishery Council, Manila 
27 February 2002  Josie de Leon, Division Chief, Protected Area Wildlife Bureau, Manila 
27 February 2002  Noel Saguil, research staff, Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Manila 
28 February 2002  Rene Ledesma, former Sr. Fishing Regulations Officer, Edwyn B. Alesna, Sr. Fishing Regulations Officer, 
Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Manila 
28 February 2002  Toni Santos, Brod Nagar, PAKISAMA (NGO), Manila 
01 March 2002  Paul, Project Supervisor, CBDC Project, Bohol 
05 March 2002  Pamela Fernandez, Professor, Oscar Zamora, Professor, Department of Agronomy, University of the Philip-
pines, Los Baños 
05 March 2002  Gary N. Atlin, Upland Rice Breeder, Plant Breeding, Genetics, and Biochemistry Division, International Rice 
Research Institute, Los Baños 
05 March 2002  Michael T. Jackson, Director for Program Planning and Coordination, Duncan Macintosh, Senior Manager 
and Head, Riceworld Museum & Learning Center, Visitors and Information Services, International Rice Re-
search Institute, Los Baños 
06 March 2002  Romero Quijano, Professor, College of Medicine, University of the Philippines, Manila 
06 March 2002  Gemiliano A. Aliqui, Executive Director, Philippine Council for Health Research and Development, Manila 
07 March 2002  Clarito M. Barron, Assistant Director, Anastacia M. Gochangco, Chief of Crop Research Division, Bureau of 
Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture, Manila 
07 March 2002  Saturnina C. Halos, Geneticist, Senior Project Development Adviser, Bureau of Agricultural Research, 
Manila 
07 March 2002  Perry Ong, Professor for Wildlife Biology, University of the Philippines, Science Director, Conservation 
International, Manila 
07 March 2002  Virgilio S. Palpal-Latoc, Marivene Manuel, Rodolfo Caberoy, Department of Zoology, Philippine National 
Museum, Manila 
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11 March 2002  Assistant of Mary Jean C. Du, Bohol Agricultural Promotion Center, Tagbilaran City, Bohol 
11 March 2002  Sabine Schoppe, Chairperson, State Polytechnic College of Palawan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan 
11 March 2002  Joselito C. Alisuag, Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, Puerto Princesa, 
Palawan 
11 March 2002  Raymundo D. Crisostomo, Officer in Charge, Dalia Sualog, Senior Science Research Specialist, Provincial 
Environment and Natural Resources Office,  Puerto Princesa, Palawan 
11 March 2002  Priscilla Adriano, Chief, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Puerto Princesa, Palawan  
12 March 2002  Teresita L. Salua, President, Lilian Bayron, Research Planning and Development, Edgardo H. Castillo, Soil 
Scientist Research Extension, Palawan State University, Puerto Princesa, Palawan 
12 March 2002  Telesforo Paredes, City Councilor, Puerto Princesa, Palawan 
12 March 2002  Rogelio C. Daquer, City ENR Officer; David T. de la Torre, Project Manager of INGAT KAGUBATAN 
(Forest Watch). Noel R. Ramos, Environmental Management Specialist II, City ENRO, Puerto Princesa, 
Palawan 
12 March 2002  Nelson S. Salvator, Provincial Agriculturist, Office of Provincial Agriculture, Puerto Princesa, Palawan 
12 March 2002  Central Visayas State College of Agriculture, Forestry and Technology, Bohol 
12 March 2002  Group interview with farmers (both members and non-members of CBDC) at Compagao, Bohol 
13 March 2002  Cleofe P. Bernardino, Executive Director, Palawan NGO Network, Inc., Palawan 
13 March 2002  Group interview with farmers (CBDC project participants) at Riverside Community, Bilar, Bohol 
13 March 2002  Group interview with farmers (non-participants in CBDC project) at Riverside Community, Bilar, Bohol 
13 March 2002  Group interview with farmers of Zamora Organic Farmer-Researcher’s Association, Zamora, Bohol 
13 March 2002  Group interview with farmers (non-members of CBDC project) at Zamora Community, Bohol 
14 March 2002  Grizelda Mayo-Anda, Assistant Executive Director, Environmental Legal Assistance Center, Inc., Puerto 
Princesa, Palawan 
14 March 2002  Group interview with members of the Tagbanua ethnic group, Palawan 
14 March 2002  Quirino Hora, Shell Salesman, Panglao Poblacion, Bohol 
16 March 2002  “Babes” Cruz, Secretary of Mayor of Coron, Coron City, Busuanga, Palawan 
16 March 2002  Rose-Liza V. Eisma, Legal Environmental Advisor to Marine Lab, Silliman University, Dumaguete 
19 March 2002  Rueben Dasay Lingating, Commissioner for North Western Mindanao, Norma Mapansa Gonos, Commis-
sioner of South Eastern Mindanao National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Manila 
19 March 2002  Isidro Sia, National Integrated Research Program on Philippine Medical Plants, College of Medicine, Manila 
19 March 2002  Gisela P. Conception, Professor, Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Manila 
20 March 2002  William Padolina, Vice Director, International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños 
20 March 2002  Eliseo Ponce, Director, Bureau of Agricultural Research, Manila 
20 March 2002  Lourdes Amos, Kasapi (NGO), Manila 
21 March 2002  Segfredo R. Serrano, Assistant Secretary Policy and Planning, Chamo Amjil, Chief Policy Advocacy and 
Legislation Support, Policy Research, Department of Agriculture 
21 March 2002  Francis Gomez, Altermed / Pascual Laboratories, Manila 
23 March 2002  Benny Campos, formerly Marine Science Institute, Working Group Conception (telephone interview) 
01 April 2002  Nancy Aspuria, Agriculturalist II, Bureau of Plant Industry Regional Research Center, Baguio 
01 April 2002  Celia M. Austria, Associate Professor of Zoology, University of the Philippines College, Baguio 
01 April 2002  Raymundo Rovillos, Research Coordinator, Tebtebba (NGO), Bagio 
02 April, 2002   Leo A. Viray, Regional Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau, Baguio 
02 April 2002  Rose Bellow, Batgui Producers Association, Inc., Baguio 
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03 April 2002  Windel, Cordillera Peoples Alliance, Bagio 
04 April 2002  Quirino de la Cruz, Plant Breeder (tissue culture), Central Luzon State University, Muñoz 
04 April 2002  Shubert L. Ciencia, Branch Manager, PRRM, Muñoz 
04 April 2002  Leocadio S. Sebastian, Director, Philrice, Muñoz 
05 April 2002  Gordon Cragg, Natural Products Branch, National Cancer Institute, USA (e-mail) 
Feb.-April 2002 Elpidio Peria, Elenita Daño, SEARICE, Manila 
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